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ABSTRACT 
Medieval Hermeneutic Pedagogy: Teaching with and about Signs  
in Several Didactic Genres  
 
Christopher A. Lee 
This dissertation explores the central place of semiotic interpretation in the 
instruction of several medieval genres—Latin and vernacular religious drama, French 
fabliaux, and Spanish exempla—encompassing both the lesson that is taught and the 
method for teaching it. It is my contention that teaching the proper way to interpret signs 
is the didactic focus in these genres and that their authors were also deeply concerned 
with scrutinizing their own use of signs in conveying this instruction.    
As medieval sign theory finds its origin in Augustinian semiotics, Chapter 1 of 
my dissertation raises key considerations in Augustine’s discussions of signa that would 
continue to inform later treatments of interpretation. I establish the intrinsic connection 
between teaching and the interpretation of signs in his writings as well as his frequent 
ambivalence on the subject. For the Bishop of Hippo, the proper understanding of sacred 
signs is the paramount lesson of Christian instruction, with misreading Jews as the 
primary emblem of faulty interpretation. Signs are also a concern for the pedagogical 
process (doctrina in its second sense) because the success of any lesson is dependent on 
the effectiveness of its signs to communicate. Yet, Augustine also places the burden of 
understanding squarely on the learner who must labor with interpretation and attain 
personal enlightenment. Augustine clearly admires the pagan classics and acknowledges 
the dominant role of words in instruction, but, for him, the falsified verbal signs of fiction 
have no value for teaching.  Moreover, non-verbal communication—through inner 
inspiration and visually apprehended signs or res significandi—is vastly superior to fallen 
language in transmitting meaning as well as creating memory of what is learned. Yet, 
Augustine also evinces a suspicion of sensory data. These ideas, including doubts about 
vision and the value of learning through fictive works, would continue to inform the 
instruction present in later medieval texts. 
Chapter 2 examines the persistence of Augustinian concepts in medieval religious 
plays from early church drama through the Middle English cycles. These texts are mainly 
concerned with teaching the proper interpretation of sacred signa, following Augustine, 
particularly through the characterization of Jews who fail to read signs correctly. 
Medieval religious drama also endorses the value of non-verbal communication—
through a reliance on individual faith as a precursor to comprehension and through 
dramatic res such as setting, gesture, and costume—both in conveying semiotic 
instruction and rendering it memorable. Jewish characters are further portrayed as 
working against these ideas, representatives of a failure to learn by seeing and believing, 
who seek instead to force interpretation through violence. 
Chapter 3 examines a genre in which the presence of doctrinal instruction is 
debatable, the French fabliaux, and identifies a consistent emphasis on the risks of 
interpretation across the vast corpus. All signs, verbal and visual, are potentially 
insufficient in constructing meaning and open to manipulation, emblematized primarily 
by the actions of deceptive women. Fabliaux evince a self-consciousness about their 
ability to present these hazards both because they do so through the medium of poetry 
and because they must rely on signs to make their point. However, the genre ultimately 
flaunts the insufficiency of its own signs as part of its message, using laughter and 
mnemonic imagery to promote understanding. 
 Chapter 4 extends the findings on fabliaux to the Spanish Libro de los engaños, a 
text of questionable didacticism that also emphasizes the role of women in manipulating 
signs. The practical wisdom derived from the collection—its interest in good counsel and 
prudence—can likewise be simplified to the need for careful interpretation of signs in a 
post-lapsarian world. However, through the didactic insufficiency of its tale-telling 
enterprise, it ultimately affirms the limits of teaching using signs. 
My dissertation concludes by examining the persistence of many of these ideas in 
twenty-first-century pedagogy.  Recent emphasis on equipping contemporary students 
with the tools for interpreting signs in an increasingly image-based culture and on 
promoting the expanded use of visuals in the classroom reiterate longstanding concerns 
of doctrina. Assessing the instructional role of signs first raised by Augustine and its 
reconsideration in medieval texts thus sheds new light on didactic content and purpose 
that continue to inform our endeavors as teachers today.   
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  1 
INTRODUCTION: REASSESSING MEDIEVAL DIDACTICISM 
 
Without question, the hegemonic view of literature during the Middle Ages was 
one that privileged the presence of didactic content.
1
  Drawing on the Ars poetica of 
Horace (called the Poetria in the university curriculum), medieval literary theory judged 
works that possessed recreational content alone inferior to those that combined 
entertainment with edification. The foundation upon which this idea rested was Horace’s 
statement, “omne tulit punctum qui miscuit utile dulci” (“he who mixes the useful and 
delightful wins every point”), taken as a standard to assess the success of poetic 
compositions (l. 342). The equally influential commentary On the Thebaid, a sixth-
century work falsely attributed to Fulgentius, likewise describes how poets should 
balance profit and pleasure, presenting an entertaining façade that conceals an edifying 
foundation. Worthy poets should not just aim to amuse, pseudo-Fulgentius notes, they 
have to present content “instructive and serviceable, for the building of habits of life, 
through the hidden revealing of their allegories” (239). The reigning notion that 
didacticism must be present in medieval texts has persisted for more than a millennium 
and a half. During the late nineteenth century, the great Spanish critic Menéndez y 
Pelayo, in his “self-styled vocation as keeper of the national values,” would zealously 
affirm the hidden didactic value of the humorous Libro de los engaños lest admission of 
its recreational nature jeopardize Spain’s “crusade for national dignity” through 
                                                 
1
 Medieval and ancient commentators tend to refer exclusively to “fabulae” or the efforts of “poetae” when 
discussing written works of artistic invention. However, use of the term “poetry” may conjure 
inappropriately limiting connotations for us, though in ancient and medieval literature, verse was indeed the 
primary medium for literary creation. Observations and proscriptions on poetry can be (and were) applied 
to prose works like secular exempla as well. Therefore, I use the more general term “literature” to denote 
creative endeavours whether or not they employ meter. “Fabula,” a term discussed further in Chapter 1, is 
generally used to refer disparagingly to the falsehood of literature, a sense best conveyed by my use of the 
term “fiction” whenever the untruth of such works is emphasized.  
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establishing a respectable literary canon (Resina 679). And, most famously, in the 1960s, 
D.W. Robertson would not only identify the exact nature of veiled didactic content in 
medieval texts as Christian doctrine derived from Augustinian biblical exegesis but also 
affirm that all medieval literature, no matter how secular, contained religious 
indoctrination on an allegorical level.
2
 
As might be expected, such a sweeping “monolithic approach” to medieval works 
generated considerable opposition, as for every genre like religious drama that seems to 
evince an emphasis on spiritual indoctrination, a number of others appear little concerned 
with Christian instruction on any level (Olson 31). Both Glending Olson and John Esten 
Keller later sought to make a case in response to Robertson that providing recreation was 
itself the end of some genres like the Old French fabliaux and the Spanish exemplum 
collections.
3
  Though neither perspective is generally accepted today, what these works 
have to say about their own instructional value still needs ironing out. As Catherine 
Brown has observed, “in medieval texts...teaching is an intensely active and intensely 
self-aware (one might even say self-theorizing) activity,” (10). After all, the Latin 
doctrina “means first of all the act of teaching or instruction; secondarily, and by figural 
transfer of meaning, ‘the knowledge imparted by teaching’,” a connotation made clear in 
Augustine’s De doctrina christiana, which is as much a teaching manual as it is about 
specific exegetical readings (Catherine Brown 9). Medieval didacticism thus extends well 
beyond the transmission of information, encompassing strategies for the pedagogical 
process itself. Looking for this self-theorizing aspect of doctrina is critical to fully 
comprehend the didactic complexity of religious drama, a genre with clear Christian 
                                                 
2
 Sturges quotes Robertson’s remark that “medieval Christian poetry…is always allegorical” (36). 
3
  See Olson’s Literature as Recreation in the Later Middle Ages and Keller’s “The Literature of 
Recreation: El libro de los engaños.” 
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doctrinal content as much as it for those like the fabliau and vernacular exemplum where 
it may be difficult to locate Christian allegorical content. There is didacticism in these 
works, just not the sort proposed by Robertson nor the sort that excludes the possibility of 
entertainment.  
To examine the nature of this instruction, it is necessary to return to Augustine’s 
doctrina. As “maximus post Apostolos ecclesiarum instructor” in the words of Peter the 
Venerable (qtd. in Sticca 2), Augustine’s ideas, either direct or filtered through 
intermediaries,  were “persisting and influential throughout the Middle Ages,”  
permeating virtually all aspects of culture, including artistic, musical, and literary theory 
(Hahn, “Visio” 190, n. 5).4  It is therefore not be surprising that his consideration of 
teaching should exert a profound impact on medieval didactism as well. Having served as 
professor of rhetoric at Carthage and at Rome, Augustine was well aware of the 
requirements of instruction, writing several major works—the De magistro, De 
catechizandis rudibus, and De doctrina Christiana—on the subject of Christian teaching 
that were known during the Middle Ages.
5
  These ideas on pedagogy, as E. Michael Gerli 
notes, “formed one of the three main currents of thought leading to the development of a 
[medieval] rhetoric of preaching” (“Recta voluntas” 504). It is my contention that, in 
particular, the role of signs in the teaching process, originally raised in Augustine’s 
                                                 
4
 Mediaevalia 4 (1978) is a special issue dedicated to the wide-ranging influence of Augustine during the 
Middle Ages. 
5
 The reception of the De doctrina during the Middle Ages is the subject of Reading and Wisdom while the 
influence of Augustine’s De magistro is apparent in Aquinas’ work of the same name as well as 
Bonaventura’s Christus unus omnium magister. The De catechizandis exists in a number of medieval MSS 
as well (see Wilmart, passim).   
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discussions of instruction, remains a central preoccupation in the didacticism present in 
genres as diverse as Christian drama, fabliaux, and Spanish exempla.
6
   
It is not coincidental that Augustine’s educational philosophy finds its fullest 
expression in works that also contain his most extensive consideration of semiotic theory, 
though the interconnectedness of the two has not drawn much critical attention. As I will 
discuss in Chapter 1, for the Bishop of Hippo, doctrina in its second sense as “the 
knowledge imparted by teaching” can be assimilated to the correct interpretation of 
scriptural signs, with misreading Jews as the primary symbol of faulty interpretation.  
Moreover, any consideration of how to teach—the first sense of doctrina—involves 
semiosis, for “teaching cannot be demonstrated without signs” (De magistro 10.30) and 
“one cannot even teach what teaching is” without them (Stock, Augustine 153). Thus, 
Augustine melds his teachings on how to interpret signs with an examination of how 
signs can be used to communicate meaning, a combined focus that informs medieval 
didacticism as well. The instructional focus of religious drama and secular works such as 
the fabliaux and Spanish exempla alike is not drawn primarily from Augustine’s biblical 
exegesis but are concerned with ideas voiced in his views of pedagogy and semiosis: 
these works are not so much interested in teaching Christian morals as they are with 
teaching the interpretation of signs as well as exploring how best to teach using signs. 
Chapter 1 further examines the intrinsic connection between signa and doctrina 
throughout Augustine’s works. I will first address his ambivalence concerning the 
didactic value of verbal signs present in fiction, an ambivalence that continues in 
medieval literary works claiming instructional content. By contrast, for Augustine, the 
                                                 
6
 I have chosen these genres because they are often perceived as being situated along a didactic continuum 
of sorts with religious drama containing obvious Christian instruction, the exempla ostensibly presenting 
secular wisdom that is sometimes questionable, and the fabliaux having no serious didactic value. 
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signs of Scripture teach truthfully and can be understood by the pious student who 
receives illumination from the Inner Teacher who is Christ.  This process, which I will 
elaborate in Chapter 1, calls attention to Augustine’s often overlooked privileging of non- 
or extra-verbal communication, especially for the purpose of teaching.  While Augustine 
acknowledges the dominant role of words in instruction and evinces a certain suspicion 
of sense data, his view of signs places considerable value on the communicative power of 
visual signs outside the metaphor of inner vision, encompassing items as disparate as 
textual imagery, gestures, and objects apprehended by the eye, all forms of verba visiblia 
that are more easily understood and remembered than words.  
This emphasis on the visual would seem to elevate the dramatic medium, but the 
theater, as a fictive endeavor, was worthless for Christian instruction in Augustine’s eyes. 
However, the didactic potential of the stage would not be lost during the Middle Ages. 
Nowhere is this more apparent than in the development of medieval religious drama “to 
instruct the populace in those truths essential for their salvation,” particularly correct 
typological interpretation (Tydeman 18). Within sacred drama, instruction in proper 
biblical hermeneutics continues to include the Augustinian conception of blindly 
misreading Jews.  
As I will demonstrate in Chapter 2, the generalized “Judeus” of church drama and 
the various Jewish torturers who appear in late-medieval Passion plays reiterate 
Augustine’s semiotic theory in teaching audiences how not to interpret “like Jews.” 
Medieval religious drama also endorses the didactic value of non-verbal signs—and thus 
the dramatic enterprise itself—through the use of res significandi like setting, gesture, 
and costume, both to convey semiotic instruction and render it memorable. Another 
  6 
essential element of the drama is its Augustinian emphasis on inner inspiration as the key 
to learning.  One does not merely look at the spectacle on stage but must look on in faith 
to fully comprehend.  Jewish characters are further portrayed as resisting these ideas, 
representatives of a failure to learn by seeing and believing. By the fifteenth century, 
however, we find a countercurrent in the Treatise Against Miraclis Pleying where the 
fictionalized treatment of religious truth on stage is seen as impeding proper 
interpretation and resulting in a literalism that is not coincidentally figured as Jewish.  
Yet, right reading is not a skill limited to doctrinal application. In a secular 
context, the practical interpretation of signs is also the main didactic focus of Spanish 
exempla and Old French fabliaux. Analyzing these genres in this fashion, as I do in 
Chapters 3 and 4, goes a long way toward explaining the prevalence of thematic elements 
centered on deceit, misunderstanding, and misperception, as well as the pedagogical 
motivation of the tales in general. Doubts about the value of the lessons derived from 
these works are allayed when the tales are examined through this lens. 
Viewed from the vantage point of semiotics, fabliau plots become negative 
exempla, not against the surface issues of adultery, clerical corruption, and other sinful 
behavior, but about the practical need for careful interpretation of signs in a world where 
meaning is never absolutely determinable. The manipulators in fabliaux, particularly 
deceptive women, thus serve as emblems for fallen signification, showing that all signs 
are potentially false.  In considering even visual signs to be tainted, a notion most 
apparent in narratives that emphasize mis-seeing, the fabliaux differ considerably from 
medieval drama. As I will also demonstrate in Chapter 3, this shifting perception of signs 
is attributable to the growing influence of Aristotelian nominalism in the thirteenth 
  7 
century in which referents do not have separate ideal existence, countering Augustine’s 
Neoplatonic view on the possibility of discovering truth through rationes aeternae. 
Informed by this nominalist zeitgeist, fabliaux evince a self-conscious concern about how 
they teach the hazards of interpretation not only because they bear the stigma of being 
fictive but because they must rely on signs to make their point. 
Within a nominalist worldview, the humor present in the genre registers as the 
Schadenfreude of those made aware of the dangers of interpretation, ridiculing characters 
who have not been so enlightened, who have failed to negotiate a world of deceptive 
signs. Laughter at the fabliaux is thus of an absurd or existential quality, a sign of 
understanding, the only possible response to the stark world where true meaning is nearly 
impossible to locate. Nonetheless, the presence of minimalist settings juxtaposed with 
violence, graphic sexual description and obscenity in the genre point to a continued faith 
in the mnemonic efficacy of visual imagery. This continues to reflect a concern with how 
best to create understanding in the audience.    
The resemblance of Spanish exempla to fabliaux, a comparison made explicit in 
Alan Deyermond’s characterization of the Libro de los engaños (also on the basis of a 
shared misogyny) as “the first substantial collection of fabliaux in Spanish,” raises the 
possibility that the Spanish tales are similarly invested in teaching about signification 
(Literary History 98). John Esten Keller dismisses the didacticism of the Libro de los 
eñganos on account of its useless misogynist lesson, a finding he extends to other 
Spanish collections of exemplary tales. But, if the misogyny of the Engaños is 
symptomatic of a larger cautionary lesson on the importance of negotiating deceptive 
signs, here also created by women, then it does furnish “sabiduria práctica” useful for 
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effective rule (Lacarra 192).
7
  As I discuss in Chapter 4, the findings for fabliaux pertain 
equally to the more cicumscribed collection of tales in the Engaños. Many of the qualities 
for good governance prescribed in the work—perspicacity, prudence, deliberation and 
consideration of advice before taking action—can also be assimilated to instruction on 
proper semiotic interpretation. However, the tales in the collection go farther than their 
French predecessors in raising the possibility that any teaching that involves signs is 
likely to fail. 
My study concludes by examining the persistence of Augustine’s ideas and their 
medieval reworkings in twenty-first-century pedagogy.  The recent emphasis on 
equipping students with the tools for interpreting signs in an image-laden culture and on 
promoting the expanded use of visuals in schools recapitulates longstanding concerns. 
Considering the role of signs in teaching therefore sheds new light not only on medieval 
didacticism but on issues that still inform our endeavors as contemporary educators.  
Equipped with this perspective, it we can explore the roots of this doctrina in Augustine’s 
semiotics.  
                                                 
7
 The apparent misogyny of the Engaños thus reiterates the patristic perception of Eve as manipulator of 
verbal signs, an accusation extended to all women. 
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CHAPTER 1: AUGUSTINE’S DOCTRINA OF SIGNS 
 
Augustine and the Despoiling of Literature  
 
The central preoccupation with semiotics in Augustinian thought has been widely 
documented;
 8 
the specific importance of understanding or interpreting signs for learning 
is apparent in Augustine’s treatment of biblical exegesis, as the most basic tool the 
Christian reader needs to teach or learn the truth of Scripture is knowing how to read its 
signs correctly. In essence, every Christian also needs to be a hermeneutician (De Looze, 
Manuscript Diversity 115). When finding ambiguous or otherwise difficult words, 
phrases, and larger narrative passages (textual signs) from the Old Testament, one must 
be able to recognize the depth of their signification beyond the literal, historical meaning, 
to read on an allegorical or typological level. The latter, also referred to as spiritual 
reading, represents the highest form of understanding available,” as it involves a greater 
awareness of the plenitude of divine meaning present in the text (Pendergast 273).
9
  
While Augustine does not discount the literal meaning of biblical texts, without 
the ability to read Scripture beyond this level, an exegete is blind to the richness of 
spiritual truth, prone to misreadings that can lead to sin or heresy. One can 
misunderstand, as the Arians did, the concept of the Son as begotten by and lesser than 
God the Father or interpret Old Testament events as simply a matter of historical record, 
overlooking their typological relevance to the life of Christ, an accusation Augustine 
                                                 
8
 The seminal studies are the articles by R.A. Markus as well as Darrell B. Jackson’s “The Theory of Signs 
in St. Augustine’s De Doctrina Christiana.” 
9The opposing phrase “literal reading” has dual connotations, aptly symptomatic of what I will later discuss 
as the nature of human language after the Fall. It can indicate the project of defining or translating unknown 
terms in Scripture and understanding historical events depicted therein, in which case it is free of negative 
associations. But when these activities are performed at the exclusion of pursuing a deeper understanding, 
the term “literal” does take on the connotation of being antithetical to spirituality. See Pendergast 270.  
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(among others) levels against Jewish exegesis. This purported Jewish inability to 
recognize instances of figurative signification in the Old Testament is judged “a 
miserable kind of spiritual slavery to interpret signs as things,” leading to nothing less 
than a blind rejection of Christ’s divinity (De doctrina 3.5.9). By contrast, the exegete 
skilled in the interpretation of verbal signs who is faced with the unfamiliar term “bos” in 
Luke (2.10.15) would realize that beyond its literal meaning of “ox,” it figuratively 
signifies a “worker in the gospel” and would likewise recognize Noah’s ark as 
prefiguring the Church (Contra Faustum 12.14-16) or the rock anointed by Jacob as 
prophetic of Christ on the cross (Contra Faustum 12.26).
10
 These are signa translata, 
signs that are meant to be interpreted as more than themselves as opposed to signa 
propria (De doctrina 2.10.15). 
To master interpretation of biblical signs, it is necessary to appropriate pagan 
learning, likened to the Hebrews “despoiling” the Egyptians (spoliatio Aegyptiorum) of 
gold and silver in Exodus (De doctrina 2.40.60), a metaphor first popularized by Origen 
in the third century.
11
 Much of the De doctrina is spent detailing the importance of a 
broad-based educational program as a tool for comprehending the depth of signification 
                                                 
10
 Augustine’s example of bos appears to be an intentional one, made because both of its significations 
perfectly describe the exegete himself who is also “a worker in the gospel” and engaged in labour like an 
ox. The struggle to discover meaning is figured in terms of labor, specifically of an agricultural kind, 
represented by Adam’s plowing and sowing, both of which are products of the Fall (See DGCM 2.5.6 and 
Jager 59, 73).  
     Paula Fredriksen has also asserted in Augustine and the Jews that Augustine’s expanded conception of 
signa data in the Old Testament presents a revolutionary positive perception of Jews not found in other 
patristic writings. Specifically, Augustine held that “[n]o less than Jewish scripture,” even Jewish practices 
like circumcision and animal sacrifice constituted typological signs (245).  Thus, though the practitioners 
remained unaware of the Christological connection, “traditional Jewish practice truly conformed to divine 
intention” (244). 
11
 There is, to my knowledge, no proof of Augustine’s familiarity with Origen’s “Letter to Gregory,” in 
which the spoliatio metaphor first appears. It is generally held that “Augustine was influenced by Origen 
both indirectly, through other writers who were dependent on him, and also directly by using Latin 
translations of his work” (Hammond Bammel 342) but exactly when and which works is open to question. 
The concept of spoliatio may have been known widely enough to be general knowledge, at least in patristic 
circles. 
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in Scripture, a conceptual framework that does not exclude studying “branches of pagan 
learning . . . appropriate to the service of the truth” (2.40.60) like music, astronomy, 
natural science and above all grammatica since the exegete “must understand the 
structure of signification” (Irvine 181).12  Learning these disciplines is suitable within 
Augustine’s distinction between fructus or enjoyment and usus or use.13  Things can be 
enjoyed for their own sake (fructus) or used as a means of obtaining higher truth (usus), 
but the only things rightfully to be enjoyed are “the Father and the Son and the Holy 
Spirit, and the Trinity that consists of them” (De doctrina 1.5.5). Therefore, pagan 
writings and disciplines of study are only acceptable if they are read in terms of some 
transcendent usefulness for understanding Scripture and ultimately, God.
14
  
Consistent with this distinction, the De doctrina itself despoils classical 
philosophy and rhetoric, creating a meld with Christian theology that contributed to its 
later appeal for medieval exegetes like Thomas Aquinas, whose Summa theologica most 
famously quotes Augustine on seizing the truth latent in pagan philosophy “as from 
unjust possessors,” while drawing on numerous non-Christian sources, most 
conspicuously Plato and Aristotle (Aquinas 1.84.5).
15
  The tradition also appears 
frequently in the Middle Ages, such as in the twelfth-century Victorine school, 
encompassing Hugh of St. Victor’s defense of profane knowledge and Andrew of St. 
                                                 
12
 Irvine deems the De doctrina “clearly…a Christian ars grammatica” (182). 
13
 See the De doctrina 1.3.3 and Conf. 4.11-12. 
14
 Of course, treating the Old Testament as an intrinsically Christian document for which pagan works are 
despoiled ignores the fact that typological interpretation is itself very much an act of “spoliation,” 
reshaping Jewish content for Christian use. Typical of the supercessionist view of Judaism promoted by the 
medieval Church, the Jewish people are reimagined in the guise of the Egyptians with Christians as the new 
Israel, just as they are Esau to the Christian Jacob or Hagar to Sarah. 
15
 St. Jerome also discusses how Christians should draw usefulness out of pagan texts, using a different  
metaphor of the “captive woman” from Deuteronomy 20.10. However, Jerome was less frequently cited in 
the Middle Ages as a proponent for reading secular literature than he is co-opted into the camp of medieval 
anti-humanists opposed to the study of literature (See Meersseman passim).  
  12 
Victor’s interest in Hebrew and Talmudic interpretation for purposes of Christian 
exegesis.
16
   
In the context of the medieval desire to reconcile veneration of classical auctores 
(and from roughly the twelfth-century on, a growing humanism) with Christian belief, 
spoliatio Aegyptiorum also served to justify the didactic worth of pagan literature 
exclusive of its instrumentality for biblical exegesis. The Italian monk and legal scholar 
Gratian, writing circa 1140, borrows Augustine’s metaphor to describe “the gold of 
wisdom or the silver of eloquence” found in pagan poetry, which has intrinsic value if 
turned “to the profit of salutary learning” (qtd. in Hardison Medieval Literary Criticism 
24). Discovering the “silver of eloquence” is the main rationalization for the inclusion of 
poetry in the medieval university curriculum, in imitative exercises designed to build 
rhetorical skill. The strategy of mining classical literature for the “gold of wisdom” not 
only assigns it an inherent educational value independent of its usefulness for biblical 
interpretation, but it does so by co-opting the allegorical method of reading Scripture 
from the De doctrina.
17 
   
The acceptability of reading pagan literature is justified by Augustine’s notion 
that the allegorical meaning of signa translata can be drawn or “despoiled” from a given 
work. Augustine’s Confessions themselves appear to draw heavily on Virgil’s Aeneid; 
indeed, as McCarthy notes, “The whole structure of the Confessions may be understood 
as resembling the great Roman epic. In pursuit of his destiny, the hero wanders from 
place to place while endangered by snares, tempted by pleasures, graced with divine aid, 
                                                 
16
 Reading and Wisdom contains four articles on the impact of Augustine at St. Victor, two on Hugh 
(Sweeney; Zinn) and one on Andrew. There is also an article on Aquinas. 
17
 A particularly interesting appropriation of the spoliatio concept occurs in the Cité des dames of Christine 
de Pizan, who parallels her enterprise of revising the male clerical tradition (Boccaccio and Augustine) to 
Dido’s sneaking gold out of Phoenicia disguised as worthless items to found Carthage (Pike 157). 
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and led by occasional visions” (458-59). Thus, Augustine “despoils” a pagan poem to 
devise the text of his conversion, “transforming what is for him the unreality of the 
Aeneid into spiritual nourishment for fledgling Christians” (Ramage 55).18 
On a basic level, the similarity between the interpretive technique Augustine 
provides for understanding biblical signs and the major strategy for reading the signs of 
literature during the Middle Ages appears a likely one, as the objects of both critical 
enterprises share a common nature as verbal artifacts comprised of linguistic signs in 
need of decoding. Augustine himself suggests the substitutability of this interpretative 
principle in the De catechizandis rudibus where he urges grammarians to employ the 
same careful method for Scripture that they use in assessing “the fables of the poets . . . 
fictitious creations and things devised for the pleasure of the mind” (6.10).  
This process would frequently be undertaken in the literary criticism of the 
Middle Ages. By the twelfth century, “a new sense of importance of poetry and poetics” 
(Wetherbee 44) prompted a defense of fictive narrative, or narratio fabulosa, by thinkers 
like William of Conches for its philosophical value, its veiled “speculations about man 
and his place in the universe” (Dronke 2). From Fulgentius’ Christianized reading of the 
Aeneid itself to the Ovide moralisé and Boccaccio’s Genealogy of the Gentile Gods, 
hidden edification consistent with Christian morality was found within pagan literature, 
available to those who read carefully beneath a surface level. Taken to its furthest extent, 
the view that literature could contain deep spiritual truth granted prophetic power to poets 
as vessels of a divine will that enabled them to fill their work with secret meaning. Such 
                                                 
18
 The passage in The Confessions reads “Nam versum et carmen etiam ad vera pulmenta transfero”: “I will 
convert verses and poems into real sustenence” (my translation) (Conf. 3.6.11). Pulmentum refers to the 
staple food of Roman soldiers, today polenta. For another discussion of the relationship between The 
Confessions and The Aeneid, see Ó'Meara, passim. 
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inspiration was attributed to virtuous pagans of the past who were granted visionary 
glimpses of Christian truth, most notably Virgil for his messianic Fourth Eclogue.  
 
Augustine and the Didactic Uselessness of Literature 
The medieval invention of Augustine as champion of literature in the service of 
Christian didacticism is an adroit maneuver considering the negative opinion the Bishop 
of Hippo actually held on pagan letters, an opinion also known during the Middle Ages 
and largely responsible for the need to justify literature in the first place. Despite 
similarities between the interpretative approaches and levels of meaning relevant to both 
literature and Scripture and despite his personal use of the Aeneid, Augustine is 
ambivalent on the value of fictive works. He did not perceive them as having any 
intrinsic didactic value; rather, he describes “the thousands of fictional stories and 
romances, which through their falsehoods give people great pleasure” (‘mendaciis 
homines delectantur’) as “superflua instituta” (De doctrina 2.25.39). In this regard, he is 
writing firmly in the Platonic tradition that discounts the value of poetry. 
Augustine’s focus on the pleasure-giving surface content of literature returns to 
the fructus/usus distinction and is often cited as his main objection to poetry. The 
pleasing literal content featured in fiction invites an inferior love of worldly things that 
should only be used, thereby impeding spiritual growth (“impeditur cursus noster”) (De 
doctrina 1.3.3). In other words, the same mix of pleasure and profit that makes fiction 
suitable for didacticism on the authority of Horace (and falsely, of Augustine) is what 
actually disqualifies it for instruction.
19
 The locus classicus for this view is the famous 
                                                 
19
 By this standard, Augustine certainly disagrees with the thirteenth-century commentator on Ovid’s 
Amores who observes that the “work’s usefulness is delight” (utilitas est delecatio)” (qtd. in Olson 30). Yet, 
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description in the Confessions of Augustine’s misplaced emotional investment in the 
death of Dido at a time when he should have been weeping for his own degraded spiritual 
condition. Looking back on his former reading habits after his conversion, Augustine 
asks, “what is more miserable than a miserable man who pities not himself; one 
lamenting Dido’s death, caused by loving of Aeneas, and yet not lamenting his own 
death, caused by not loving of thee, O God. . .?” (Conf. 1.13.21). Immersion in the literal 
plot of the Aeneid distracted Augustine at the expense of his spiritual development.  
The problem of fructus in profane works seems easily remediable by applying the 
rule of spoliatio Aegyptiorum in either its original or medieval context to yield content 
useful for biblical studies or, at least some hidden lesson consonant with Christian 
morality. And, in the second extended passage from the Confessions where pagan poetry 
is the subject, Augustine provides what would be for Gratian an example of proper usus: 
reading Homer so that “words are learned” and “eloquence is attained” (1.16.26). 
Nevertheless, finding “the silver of eloquence” in classical poetry, a central facet of the 
liberal arts education taught to Augustine himself, is rejected outright as a suitable use, 
negated by the greater likelihood of learning a detrimental lesson from the text.
20
   
Homer presents the image of an adulterous Jupiter, euhemeristically “attributing 
divine qualities to wicked mortals,” in such a way that the poet seems to be providing an 
“authority to imitate true adultery” (Conf. 1.16.25). Augustine supports his contention 
                                                                                                                                                 
while Augustine disallows blending fictional enjoyment with instruction, he does not deny the role of 
pleasure in instruction, observing that enjoyment of learning can facilitate remembrance (De doctrina 
2.6.7).  
20
 Augustine, as “a reformed rhetorician,” is ambivalent concerning the study of rhetoric: it is clearly useful 
when disciplined for Christian teaching, though not to be an end in itself (Vance 45). The De doctrina 
maintains that while one can garner stylistic lessons from pagan works (though not from literature), it is 
better to imitate the words of a Christian speaker like Paul, which originate with God (4.6.10). Augustine 
holds a negative view of dedicating oneself to long study of rhetoric in general, remarking that “I do not 
rate it so highly that I would wish people’s mature or advanced years to be devoted to learning it” (4.3.4).  
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that the moral learned from art can be deleterious with an instance from Terence’s 
Eunuchus, where the protagonist uses a mural of Jupiter’s seduction of Danae to justify 
his own rape of a virgin.
21
 Augustine is here not so much pointing out the dangers of 
visual representation but warning more generally against literary art (“verba 
quae…scripta sunt”), like the Terentian play itself, which can teach real individuals to 
enact immoral behavior (Conf. 1.16.26). What is more, a reader does not have to believe 
that a fictional crime is acceptable to be guilty of real sin; he or she is guilty merely in 
gaining enjoyment while reading about it. As Augustine puts it in the De civitate dei: 
“delectari tamen falso crimine, crimen est verum” (“to be pleased by a fictitious crime is 
a true crime”) (18.12).  
While drawing the most apparent negative lesson from pagan literature is 
necessarily a product of surface reading, literature simply cannot be read otherwise in 
Augustine’s estimation. Given their plenitude of meaning, “[t]exts about the true divinity 
alone have justification for their obscurity, and they alone warrant, and indeed require, 
the application of a scriptural hermeneutics” (Ando 47).  Fiction is categorized alongside 
stylized dance and visual art as an institution completely without the potential to be 
mined for useful meaning (De doctrina 2.25.38). Literature is superfluous for Christian 
instruction and should not be read because it is without this usus.  
How then could Augustine base The Confessions on the Aeneid? The answer, as 
Michael McCarthy has discussed, may lie in how the work juxtaposes the presence of 
Virgil with that of the Psalms, which are the second major influence in the work. The 
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 The lines are as follows: “Encouraging: Here was a god/Long ago, who’d played almost the same 
game—disguised himself/(As a man) sneaked under another’s roof (right down the chimney)/And seduced 
a woman. And not just any god, but the one/Who makes the heights of heaven bound/And flounder at his 
thunder’s sound. /I might be only human, but couldn’t I do the same? /And so I decided to do it” (Eunuchus 
188-9). 
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contrast of these two influences “epitomizes the clash Augustine felt between a culture 
dominated by the ancient classics and a new one formed by scripture” (McCarthy 454). 
The Aeneid is presented as a stylistic and rhetorical model in the text, one Augustine 
initially imitates, but one that cannot be embraced without also accepting the pagan 
cultural context of which it is a part” (McCarthy 463). Ultimately, then, Augustine’s 
conversion in the text also marks his movement away from Virgil and toward the ideal of 
the Psalms. Paradoxically, the Aeneid is only “despoiled” to raise the point that it must be 
rejected for usus.  
This reading notwithstanding, contemporary critics continue to identify literature 
as part of the pagan past that can be subject to spoliatio probably because Augustine 
himself seems to be ambivalent on the issue, and this uncertainty continued to haunt 
medieval debates on the instructive value of fictive works.
22
 Medieval humanists adapted 
Augustine’s principle of spoliatio in their favor while his refusal to acknowledge such a 
possibility for poetry provided just as much ammunition for opponents of literary study, 
particularly in the thirteenth century (Meersseman 2).
23
  These antithetical appeals to 
Augustine’s authority reflect continued anxieties about literature at the time, which also 
manifest in the fabliaux and the Libro de los engaños (both thirteenth-century works). 
These invoke claims of edification while simultaneously evincing deep-seated concerns 
over their own didactic insufficiency as fictional works. This resulting literary “split 
personality” has contributed to modern critical doubt concerning their didacticism.  
                                                 
22
 Ramage (55) discusses Augustine’s spoliatio of literature, while Hahn (“Visio” 174) places it alongside 
art in the” middle ground” among works that may be adapted.  
23
 “En général c’est S. Augustin que les humanisants font plaider en faveur de leur thèse . . . mais le 
contraire arrive également. »  
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The Incommunicability of Fictional Signs 
 
An essential part of Augustine’s rejection of Virgil as a model involves distancing 
himself from a kind of classical rhetoric that produces a “fictional order, on which the 
speaker is emotionally dependent,” one that makes a man weep for an invented character 
when he should be engaged in spiritual pursuits (McCarthy 266). In essence, the reader is 
trapped by lies. Augustine excludes fiction as a source of knowledge helpful for biblical 
exegesis because the possibility of penetrating the opacity of its signs to arrive at a useful 
Christian message is superseded by the much greater likelihood of becoming ensnared in 
its fabrications.  
One of the innovative aspects of Augustine’s view of interpretation in the De 
doctrina is his conception of exegesis as a bipartite process, comprised of “the process of 
discovering what we need to learn, and the process of presenting what we have learnt” 
(1.1.1). In this regard, Augustine also differs from classical rhetoricians, as he shifts the 
burden of creating understanding from the maker of textual signs, in this case, God, to the 
reader or interpreter, who must “produce an account of their meaning” for himself and 
then for others using “effective use of language, of signa” (Copeland 158). This 
understanding of interpretation as fundamentally incomplete without the ability to 
communicate truthfully for the purpose of education is a direct product of Augustine’s 
Christianity. Christ’s original commission in Mark 16.11 to “go into all the world and 
proclaim the good news to the whole creation”—to spread the nascent religion by 
teaching its truths to vast numbers of people, either by preaching or through written 
works like the De doctrina—precludes remaining silent about one’s knowledge of 
biblical meaning. Educating others about the meanings of Scripture and teaching 
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exegetical method to empower others to perform their own interpretation is as important 
as the act of exegesis itself. The desire to give and receive instruction about Scripture 
through communicatio is the essential means of creating worldwide Christian 
communitas, forming human bonds based on a newly shared realization of sacred truth. 
Successful transmission of understanding is the sine qua non of scriptural exegesis if 
conversion of non-believers, and therefore complete human salvation, is to take place.  
The importance of communication for Christian community is also mirrored in 
the inclusion of a human presence in Augustine’s semiotic theory of interpretation. 
Earlier Stoic writings on signs spoke only of the sign and its referent, with “no stress . . . 
laid on the subject or interpreter to whom the sign means or stands for its object,” but the 
Christian educative goal requires makers and receivers of signs (Markus, “St. Augustine” 
74). One can talk abstractly about a sign and what it signifies without explicit mention of 
the sign maker or reader, but it is impossible to discuss the communication of meaning by 
signs without incorporating the presence of a teacher and student(s).
24
  Toward the same 
end, the De doctrina focuses only on given signs (signa data), like words, as opposed to 
natural signs or symptoms (signa naturalia), such as smoke or a footprint, precisely 
because the former are inseparable from the communicative intent of a sign maker, of 
human beings who wish “to show, as much as they are able (quantum possunt) . . . 
anything that they have felt or learnt” (1.2.3).  Agreeing on the meaning of “signa data” 
then creates a form of community based on the shared understanding (Markus, “Signs, 
Communication, and Communities” passim). In a simple sense, every act of showing 
what one has learnt is implicitly pedagogical or, as Augustine puts it in the De magistro, 
                                                 
24
 The innovation of a three-term sign system can also be seen as a reflection of the Trinity, anticipating the 
project of the De trinitate to identify the omnipresence of the triune God in the world. 
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“We seek nothing by speaking except to teach” (1.1). The Christianized view of signs 
presented by Augustine holds that educative communication is paramount. 
Although he upholds an optimistic view of global conversion, Augustine 
recognizes that the transmission of Christian truth is limited by teachers’ abilities 
(“quantum possunt”) and may very well fail. The De doctrina is only necessary as a 
manual for successful teaching because a real potential for the opposite exists, stemming 
from a teacher’s inability to “avoid all words that do not communicate” (10.24.66). This 
caveat is more easily recommended than accomplished, and the De catechizandis rudibus 
acknowledges the non-communicative nature of verbal signs as a common frustration 
experienced even by Augustine himself: teachers “with an ardent desire to effect what is 
of profit to our hearer” (2.3) and an aim to “express ourselves to him exactly as our 
intellectual apprehension is at that time” find that there is a dichotomy between the 
meaning one seeks to teach and the “noise of words coming far short of representing it” 
(10.14).  
These anxieties about language reflect Augustine’s larger perception of words as 
never able to fully convey thoughts or intentions in a fallen world. Only in the pre-
lapsarian paradise described in De Genesi contra Manichaeos did human beings have the 
capability of understanding God and each other with absolute certainty, on an intuitive 
level without the need for verbal signs. Prior to the first sin, the soul received meaning 
directly, as if from “an interior spring, speaking to its intellect, so that it did not receive 
words from the outside” (DGCM 2.4.5).25  We can imagine this as a kind of telepathy 
where thoughts or “states of soul” were completely and perfectly communicable (DGCM 
                                                 
25It is unclear from Augustine’s writings whether God spoke to Adam without using words at all or using 
words but speaking directly to Adam’s mind to permit perfect understanding. The former view is suggested 
in the De Genesi ad litteram (Jager 54). 
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2.21.32). With the loss of Paradise, man “dried up by his sins, has need of  . . . human 
words,” which can be unfamiliar, polysemous, or ambiguous and always inadequate to 
the task of conveying meaning (DGCM 2.5.6). The loss of meaning that comes with the 
imperfect metamorphosis of concept into speech is both a type of fall and reflective of the 
Fall. 
Essentially, then, the task of despoiling a non-Christian text for purposes of 
exegesis involves an initial act of interpretation, though it would seem less difficult to 
draw useful meaning out of a finite pagan treatise than to unravel the plenitude of God’s 
word in Scripture. If we conceive of a secular work not as a passive object whose signs 
must be analyzed but as actively communicating meaning on behalf of an absent author, 
it must transmit its hidden value effectively in order for it to teach something useful. For 
Augustine, literature is superfluous because it is uniquely unable to communicate the 
educational message of its creator.  
Reconsidered in terms of (in)communicability, literature, comprised of verbal 
signs and produced in a sinful, fallen world, is encumbered with all the obstacles to 
communication inherent in human language. These deficiencies by themselves are not 
enough to render literature any more useless than other secular institutions that employ 
verbal language. But, consistent with Augustine’s well-known emphasis on intention, 
what makes literature ineligible as a medium for Christian truth is its purposeful play 
with language—its engaging in puns, speaking in metaphor, and aiming to convince 
readers that its invented universe is real. Deceptive and antithetical to truth, literary 
invention recalls the original act of linguistic manipulation perpetrated by the serpent in 
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Eden and perpetuated by Eve’s corrupted transmission of God’s command as a 
prohibition not even to touch the forbidden tree (Jager 31ff).   
Because literature is fictive, it is allied with the demonic, with sin, with the verbal 
trickery of women leading to the Fall, and thus with heresy, an association made clear 
through a shared stigmatic designation as fabulae.
26
  Very early in his career, in the year 
of his baptism (387), Augustine had defined fabula as a “lie composed for use or 
pleasure” (“ad utilitatem delectationemve”) retaining a mixed view as to the possibility of 
profit in literature (Soliloquia 2.11.19). However, even in the Soliloquia, Augustine does 
not discuss the usefulness of fiction for Christians, but its confusing blending of truth and 
lies, a problem expanded on in his mature writing. Quoting Paul in the De Genesi contra 
Manichaeos, Augustine describes the Manichees as having turned themselves “a veritate  
. . . ad fabulas” (2.26.39). Likewise, the fables (“falsis fabellis”) that delighted Augustine 
in childhood and the “fabulosissima” Manichean doctrine that seduced him later in life 
are two faces of the same coin.
27
   
When the lies of literature are patently obvious and appear in works designated 
exclusively for entertainment, they are most benign, though to be avoided as a source of 
inappropriate fructus. But, according to the De mendacio, Augustine’s understudied 
treatise on lies, invented stories that purport to offer edification, like those celebrated in 
medieval literary criticism, are far worse because they create a mixed bag of truth and 
fabrication, making it difficult to distinguish what is and is not deserving of belief. Using 
“a false story” for the beneficial purpose of teaching a positive lesson, for example so that 
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 The term would, however, lose its stigma among some twelfth-century thinkers among whom it came to 
mean a “myth” or beast fable with moral value (Dronke 5).Boccaccio, as part of his medieval defence of 
secular literature, would later attempt to rescue the “fabula” from its negative connotation by inventing a 
neutral etymology in for/faris, “to speak” (14.12). 
27
 Compare Conf. 1.10 and 6.5.  
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an individual “may be restrained from the act of lust,” is no less detrimental, for the 
invented fiction may be accepted by the interlocutor as true (De mendacio 8.11).  
Unveiling this misconception in turn raises the question of what else in the text 
may be false, discrediting what may really be true: “When regard for the truth has been 
broken down or even slightly weakened, all things will remain doubtful, and unless these 
are believed to be true, they cannot be considered as certain” (De mendacio 10.17). The 
perpetual uncertainty of truth-value results in the impenetrable opacity of fiction. 
Augustine expresses special frustration over the coexistent truth and falsehood of drama 
in the Soliloquia, as an actor like Roscius can be a true man (verus homo) and a true 
tragedian (verus tragoedus) but simultaneously a “falsa Hecuba” or a “falsus Priamus” 
(2.18). In order to do away with confusion “all falsehood should be completely removed 
from  . . . all discourses uttered for the purpose of teaching religion, both when it is taught 
and when it is learned,” effectively eliminating literature as a reliable medium for 
instructive content (De mendacio 10.17). To satisfy the Christian educative goal of 
knowing “God and the soul” (Soliloquia 1.7), one “must seek that which is true, and not 
something that presents two faces which contradict one another so that it might be true on 
one hand and false on the other” (Soliloquia 2.18).  
Perhaps more than any other medieval genre, the fabliaux reflect Augustine’s 
fears concerning the confusing truth claims of literature. Fabliau poets make notorious 
claims of literal truth for their clearly fictive narratives, like “Ja de mot ne vous 
mentirai,” (“Les trois Boçus [V, 47:3]), “Ce dist Guerins, qui pas ne ment” (“Du 
Chevalier qui fist les Cons parler” [III, 15 :12]), or “En lieu de fable dire veuil/Une 
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aventure qui est vraie” (“Les Perdris” [IV, 21:2-3]). 28  At the same time, their 
verisimilitude is highly questionable; this creates a conflict that affects how the genre 
presents instruction.  
For example, fabliaux manifest an ambivalence surrounding their didactic status 
through a thematic interest in what Howard Bloch calls the “scandal of their own 
production,” that is, in the way poetry manipulates the meaning of verbal signs (Scandal 
35). Bloch does not make it clear why fabliau poets would purposely foreground the 
semiotic deficiencies of their own literary enterprise. Following the long-standing 
assumption that the fabliaux lack instructive aims, one can attribute their self-
consciousness to an ambivalence surrounding their shortcomings in terms of usus. 
Knowing that their output is intended solely for delight, fabliau poets manifest two 
antipodal reactions: they either invent superficial didactic claims, or, accounting for 
Bloch’s findings, they flaunt their defiance of a hierarchical system of literary criticism 
that values didacticism. But if the fabliaux really do contain educational value, then 
laying bare the communicative shortcomings of words becomes a didactic call for 
wariness in interpreting signs. The fact that this point on the incommunicability of verbal 
signs has itself been overlooked extends the paradox of the argument even further; 
however, medieval listeners “normalement très entraînés au décodage,” in a culture 
where allegorical understanding had salvific stakes, would have been less likely than 
modern critics to miss it (Edeline 208).  
The consistent reiteration of educational purpose in the Libro de los engaños 
offers a more convincing argument for didacticism than the several lines of prefatory or 
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 Such claims are not unique to fabliaux. Marie de France, for example, states that “Eliduc” is a true tale 
(“vus dirai, si cum jeo entent/la verité. . . ” [lines 3-4]), though her statement can be read either as a claim 
for historicity or simply for truthful sens or allegorical meaning. 
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concluding verse alleging didactic motivation in many fabliaux.
29
  As is true of the major 
Spanish exemplum collections as a whole, the Engaños does not shy away from using a 
variety of secular material for the purported aim of instruction, including beast fables and 
humorous fabliau-like tales, many derived from Arabic sources. This overt mixture of 
fiction and edification led the Council of Salzburg to oppose the use of exempla for 
preaching on the grounds that audiences might be lured by the fructus of surface 
entertainment rather than by their hidden instruction (Keller, “The Literature of 
Recreation” 199 n.3). In this regard, the Eñganos is also inappropriate for instruction 
from an Augustinian perspective. And, like its Old French counterpart, the Engaños 
evinces a pessimistic view concerning the unreliability of its verbal signs, most obviously 
through the two competing versions of truth offered by the narratives of the king’s wife 
and his counselors, neither of which successfully convinces.  
The existence of medieval religious drama in a kind of middle ground between 
fiction and Scripture makes its didactic status particularly interesting within an 
Augustinian framework. The common dramatic practice of using humorous passages 
designed for audience entertainment and the interpolation of scenes and characters not 
present in Scripture, from the dialogue of Adam and Eve in the Ordo representationis 
Ade to the entirely extra-biblical Croxton Play of the Sacrament, are only a few examples 
of creative license that make religious drama quasi-fictional. Arguably, the very act of 
dramatizing the Bible fictionalizes it.  Yet, such plays may remain a medium for truthful 
instruction because they are also closely based on Scripture, which, for Augustine, is 
exempt from the danger of miscommunication.  
                                                 
29
 Still, Johnston and Owens note that “of those fabliaux which contain a moral about seventy-five per cent 
express it . . . as a compact lesson appended to the tale by the author” (xiv). A number of others make a 
short opening declaration of purpose, making surface claims of instruction quite extensive in the genre. 
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The Communicability of Scriptural Signs 
Unlike the flawed authors of fiction, the “Spirit of the Lord that teaches 
humankind cannot lie and is not false,” making Scripture a reliable venue for edification 
where literature is not (Augustine, Tractatus in epistolam Ioannis 4.2). As Brian Stock 
notes in his seminal Augustine the Reader, for the Bishop of Hippo, reading the verbal 
signs of sacred texts “lies at the root of our ability to acquire salvific knowledge” (197).  
Nevertheless, despite its absolute truthfulness, the Bible remains a verbal artifact, and as 
such continues to embody an inherent risk of miscommunication by virtue of its linguistic 
composition. Indeed, the limits of “conventional signs in speech are applicable to 
scripture, which consists of verbal signs given by God and revealed to us in the 
transcriptions of men” (Stock, Augustine 197). Scripture is, by Augustine’s own 
admission, not immune to the fragmentation of language and the ensuing loss of unified 
human communication following the Tower of Babel (De doctrina 2.5.6). The exegetical 
goal to “simply…find out the thoughts and wishes of those by whom [the Bible] was 
written down and, through them, the will of God” seems far from simple, especially 
because it involves discovering infinite meaning through the fallible medium of words, 
which is more than what is required of literature (De doctrina 2.5.6). Therein lies a 
conundrum: it appears impossible ever to comprehend or completely express the fullness 
of God’s truth given the insufficiency of verbal language, yet there exists “a need for 
teaching and disseminating the true word of God to a wide audience for the sake of 
furthering the cause of the Church (i.e., conversion and protection from competing 
heretical readings of the Bible)” (Pendergast 275). Augustine’s views of fallen language 
reveal that scriptural ambiguity is a self-perpetuated norm whenever finite words seek to 
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contain infinite truth and are then subjected to imperfect understanding. How then does 
one teach the faith with clarity in the face of this obscurity?    
Augustine solves the problem by resorting to the “Rule of Faith” (Regula fidei) as 
old as Christianity itself: if a would-be learner is a believing Christian with faith in the 
redemptive power of Christ and approaches the text with “pious diligence,” he or she will 
receive divine revelation concerning its true sense (DGCM 2.2.3). All interpretations can 
be true if pursued with “latitude of charity,” that is, with love of God, even if they are not 
intended by the writer (Irvine 269). The struggle with meaning, the need to study and 
broaden one’s background knowledge, is pro forma evidence of conscientious 
progression, moving “at each step to new levels of knowledge, with God as ultimate 
knowledge” (Pendergast 275).30  This labor of interpretation is “divinely predetermined, 
so that pride may be subdued by hard work and intellects which tend to despise things 
that are easily discovered may be rescued from boredom and reinvigorated” (De doctrina 
2.6.7). God recognizes that comprehension earned after hard work is more exciting and 
better retained in memory than knowledge effortlessly gained.   
The necessity of toiling at exegesis is also explained in Augustine’s second 
treatise on lies, the Contra Mendacium:  
Those things are veiled in figures, in garments as it were, in order that they may 
exercise the mind of the pious inquirer, and not become cheap for being bare and 
obvious. Although we have learned their meaning stated openly and plainly in 
other places, still, when they are dug out of obscurity, they are somehow recreated 
in our knowledge and thus become sweet. A student is not hindered because they 
are shrouded in this way. On the contrary, they are rendered more acceptable: for 
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 See De doctrina 2.7.9 ff. on Augustine’s notion of a three-stage progression to knowledge . 
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being desired they are more ardently desired, and for being desired they are more 
joyfully discovered. (11) 
This is a convenient means of justifying the difficulty of interpreting verbal signs 
in biblical texts. Under the operation of grace, any interpretation discovered by the pious 
exegete after such labor is guaranteed to be true. As Augustine asserts in the Confessions, 
if one “tries to understand in Holy Scripture what he who wrote it understood,” whatever 
he discovers will be as true an understanding as the biblical author had “even if [the 
evangelist] whom he reads did not understand this, as he understood a true thing though 
not the same one” (Conf. 12.18.27). The validity of diverse readings is not acknowledged 
without qualification, however; one must discern that the interpreter was a Christian 
worthy of receiving revelation before accepting a particular reading, an interpretative 
judgment that presumably can be made only by one who has also deserved to be 
enlightened. Even so, for those who “search out the secrets of [biblical] words, without 
finding fault and making accusations, but investigating with reverence . . . [the truth] 
would be given to those who ask, and those who seek would find, and it would be opened 
to those who knock” (DGCM 2.2.3). The obscurity of Scripture ensures that only 
believing individuals will penetrate its secrets since only believing individuals can. A 
pedagogical solution is already built into Augustine’s interpretative theory, one that has 
especially profound implications for the didactic method of medieval sacred drama, 
where belief is also promoted as a key to proper understanding.
31
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 This mechanism does not, however, do away with (or address) the potential “semiotic anxiety” created 
by multiple acceptable readings and a “limitless chain of interpretations”that never arrives at a single 
authoritative truth (Irvine 205).  
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Learning without Words 
Because biblical exegesis is, in the proper hands, freed from errors of 
interpretation, critics have not hesitated to attribute to Augustine a belief in the 
redemption of words through Scripture, or more generally through the Incarnation.  
Colish’s Mirror of Language is predicated on the claim that Augustine’s semiotic theory 
and that of his medieval inheritors “rests on the view that signs are fundamentally verbal 
in nature” (viii). She asserts furthermore that “St. Augustine, and most medieval 
epistemologists, tended to see signification as a whole in primarily verbal terms” (Mirror 
of Language viii). The enfleshing of the Word does initiate the parallel incarnation of 
God’s word in the writing of the Gospels and the revelation of previously hidden 
meaning in scriptural signs, that is, in new typological readings of the Hebrew Bible; yet, 
to label these developments proof that “through the Incarnation, God has privileged . . . 
human language (through the uttered word of Christ, and the written word of Scripture)” 
is misleading, for this claim overlooks the subtle distinction between redeemed language 
and redeemed understanding of language (Bergvall260).  Both the primacy of the 
scriptural text in Augustine’s thought and his ultimate appeal to Christ the Word as an 
unchallengeable, authoritative source of true knowledge are archetypically logocentric 
from a Derridean standpoint. It is important to remember that logos, both in Of 
Grammatology and for Augustine, does not refer to the privileging of conventional 
human language, but to a transcendent, unimpeachable form of language immune to all 
criticism.  
From the perspective of faith, there is no question that divine words present only 
true information. In regard to the transmission of sacred truth by human beings, there is 
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no such guarantee, and both Augustine and medieval thinkers knew this. Augustine 
concentrates on verba as the chosen medium for Christian education only by default, out 
of convenience because they maintain “an altogether dominant role among humans in 
signifying the ideas conceived by the mind that a person wants to reveal” (De doctrina 
2.3.4). Quite simply, words are the most popular way of transmitting information, though 
certainly not the most reliable.    
The nature of words has not changed since the Incarnation within the framework 
of scriptural study or the work of interpretation would no longer be necessary and all who 
read Genesis would immediately and completely comprehend the range of its meanings. 
Total certainty of truth is achievable in exegesis only if perfect understanding is granted 
at the behest of God and exclusive of human language, communicated on an interior level 
that transcends words to recuperate the pre-verbal comprehension possible before the 
Fall. Augustine describes this complex process of learning through the metaphor of 
irrigation.  Reading Scripture becomes a spiritually hygienic activity that prompts a 
“return to the inner spring so that [the exegete] does not seek rain externally” (DGCM 
2.5.6); truth is discovered through internal inspiration, not external words. Augustine’s 
interpretative theory presents not a redemption of words but a redemption from words.  
Even the instance often cited as proof of the redemptive potential of language, a 
conversation between Augustine and his mother in the Confessions that rises to heavenly 
vision, is a singular and fleeting occurrence. “We just barely touched [Eternal Wisdom] 
with the whole effort of our hearts,” Augustine writes, “Then with a sigh, leaving the first 
fruits of the Spirit bound to that ecstasy, we returned to the sounds of our own tongue, 
where the spoken word had both beginning and end” (Conf. 9.10.24). Sturges sees this 
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exchange as evidence that “the human speech of Augustine and Monica is fully adequate 
to its object, bringing them into the presence of that of which they speak, eternal 
Wisdom,” but this is not the case (6). The glimpse of divine knowledge initiated through 
Augustine and Monica’s linguistic exchange rises above speech and quickly falls back 
into the finite limits of verbum.  The divine knowledge they briefly experience takes 
place in the absence of words, in absolute silence and through an inner process of the 
heart, not the mouth. As Augustine prays at the end of De trinitate, “Deliver me, O God, 
from the multitude of words which I suffer from inwardly in my soul” (“Libera me, Deus, 
a multiloquio quod patior intus in anima mea”) (15.28.51).  
Augustine surmises that only if all worldly noise ceased would the divine logos be 
heard, again explicitly outside of human language, “non per linguam carnis, neque per 
vocem angeli,” but on an interior level that restores the transparent communication of 
Paradise (Conf. 9.10.25). Augustine looks even further back to the Beginning, before 
Eden when he reads the description of Creation in Genesis as the allegorical 
representation of a “caelum intellectuale.” Then all was understood at once, “non ex 
parte, non in aenigmate, non per speculum; sed et toto, in manifestatione , facie ad 
faciem” (Conf. 12.13.16). The same paraphrase of 1 Corinthians 13.12 appears in DGCM 
to describe the restoration of complete comprehension that will come at the end of time 
when language will be “superseded by a signless, transcendental grammar” (Irvine 271).  
This will only happen on a universal scope “when we all shall rise again,” after the Last 
Judgment, symmetrically connecting the beginning and end of Christian history through 
the perfect intellectual comprehension characteristic of both occasions (Conf. 9.10.25).   
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Before Judgment Day, the closest one can come to wordless understanding is the 
inner inspiration experienced by Monica and Augustine, which takes place during 
successful learning. In the De magistro, Augustine specifies that this perfect insight is not 
just limited to biblical interpretation. Reaching the final conclusion that no teaching 
through words is possible, he rescues pedagogy from complete skepticism by asserting 
that successful comprehension of anything, from biblical meaning to a geometrical proof, 
depends entirely on the worthiness of a student to consult an interior source, to receive 
personal revelation from an “Inner Teacher” (intus magister) who is Christ (De magistro 
12.39).
32
 This concept, drawn in part from Matthew 23:10 (“Neither be called masters, 
for you have one master, the Christ”) marks “a turning point in [Augustine’s] 
consideration of language” (Stock, Augustine 161), remaining a firm tenet of both his 
early and late pedagogical philosophy; it is echoed some eighteen years later in the 
refrain “interior ergo magister est qui docet, Christus docet, inspiratio ipsius docet” (In 
epistolam Iohannis 3.13).  
Inspiration from the Inner Teacher functions every time one is able to grasp a 
notion being taught and whenever one intuitively discerns its truth value, the latter crucial 
in determining the validity of polyvalent scriptural readings taught by others (De 
magistro 13.42). In the Confessions, Augustine imagines a hypothetical conversation 
with Moses where communication with the prophet is potentially hindered regardless of 
whether or not the two men share a common language. If Moses taught Augustine what 
he knew of God using familiar Latin, his words still would not indicate that what he said 
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 Though not limited to religious matters, the selectiveness of inspiration is discussed primarily within the 
context of sapientia, the ability to understand divine truth, not to scientia, or knowledge of temporal things. 
See Nash (8) on the distinction. Pagans and evil individuals thus have the ability to gain incomplete 
scientia without inner inspiration though they are barred from deeper knowledge of divine truth.  
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was true. Not “Hebrew, nor Greek, nor Latin, nor barbarian language” can provide this 
information; only something intangible within Augustine himself, revealed “without the 
mouth or the tongue, without the noise of syllables, would say ‘he speaks the truth’” 
(Conf. 11.3.5). Verbal signs are helpful in presenting ideas however imperfectly, but 
whether students absorb them or not is part of an internal, nonverbal mechanism; as 
Augustine explains, “Regarding each of the things we understand . . . we don’t consult a 
speaker who makes signs outside us, but the Truth that presides within over the mind 
itself, though perhaps words prompt us to consult Him” (De magistro 11.38).  A central 
tenet of Augustine’s view of learning then is that “the objects of knowledge are always 
present and that the responsibility for ignorance lies solely with the mind” (Bubacz 124).  
As part of Augustine’s “famed interiority,” knowledge is formed entirely within 
the person if he or she is able to consult the inner teacher, and the exterior teacher does 
not factor into one’s final comprehension (Bubacz 31). The way teachers use words, to 
provide “aids and admonitions,” is likened to the role of a farmer who waters the trees in 
his orchard while their Creator maintains their form and growth from within (In 
epistolam Ioannis 3.13). Those students who do not deserve to be irrigated by the “inner 
spring,” “they whom the Holy Spirit within does not teach, go back untaught” (In 
epistolam Ioannis 3.13). All teachers can do is pray for success in their endeavors, asking 
as Augustine does at the end of the De doctrina, “that they themselves should present 
[their lessons] effectively and that those to whom they present it may absorb it 
effectively” (4.30.63).33 Such a concept would become particularly relevant to the 
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 The absence of any epistemological discussion of teaching methods in the De catechizandis rudibus and 
Book Four of the De doctrina, both of which focus directly on pedagogical methods, is perhaps an 
indication that there is no anxiety about failed communication in Christian instruction. Augustine chooses 
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didactic agenda of medieval religious drama where looking on with faith is a prerequisite 
to internalize fully what one sees on stage. And, within its exploration of the limits of 
education in the Libro de los Engaños, a similar principle operates, presenting the onus to 
learn squarely on the individual. 
 
Learning and Remembering through Inner Sight 
As Ando observes, Augustine “very early in his career […] selects sight as the 
sense most closely related to the processes of the mind” (75). Even if cogitation 
commonly involves a mental conversation, which Augustine acknowledges, this is 
carefully distinguished from spoken verba. The former is described as formata, a term 
used in his discussion of vision in Book Eleven of De trinitate, as opposed to articulata, 
which is the word Augustine uses to describe verbal language (Sirridge 321). Thus, inner 
speech is also elided with inner seeing: “And yet, when we call thoughts speeches of the 
heart, it does not follow that they are not also acts of sight, arising from the sight of 
knowledge, when they are true. For when these things are done outwardly by means of 
the body, then speech and sight are different things; but when we think inwardly, the two 
are one” (De trinitate 15.10.18).34 Before words themselves are spoken, they are first 
“sonorum…imagines” in the mind (De trinitate 15.10.19). 
When inspired understanding occurs as a result of thought it is also best 
represented by the visual metaphors of “insight,” “seeing the truth,” or “illumination.” 
                                                                                                                                                 
instead to concentrate on matters of style and on practical considerations like whether one should provide 
learners with chairs for their comfort during a lengthy sermon (De Cat 13.19).  
34
 “Nec tamen quia dicimus locutiones cordis esse cogitationes, ideo non sunt etiam visiones exortae de 
notitiae visionibus, quando verae sunt. Foris enim cum per corpus haec fiunt, aliud est locutio, aliud visio: 
intus autem cum cogitamus, utrumque  
unum est.” 
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This places Augustine’s views firmly within the Platonic philosophy of light.35 “When 
we deal with things that we perceive by the mind,” Augustine explains, “namely by the 
intellect and reason, we’re speaking of things that we look upon immediately in the inner 
light of Truth, in virtue of which the so-called inner man is illuminated and rejoices. 
Under these conditions our listener, if he likewise sees these things with his inward and 
undivided eye, knows what I’m saying from his own contemplation, not from my words” 
(De magistro 12.40, my emphasis). Though the listener initially receives information by 
hearing verbal signs, it is only subsequent inner vision that prompts learning. Put quite 
directly, “What is grasped with the intellect is within the mind:  having it is nothing other 
than seeing” (De utilitate credendi 13.28). 36 What God allows the “oculum mentis” (De 
doctrina 3.5.9) to see are images held in memory, an assertion complicated by 
Augustine’s simultaneously conventional and unconventional use of the term memoria to 
designate a storehouse containing “not only images of past experiences but also . . . 
innate ideas that correspond to the eternal forms” (Nash 66).  
Memory in its conventional sense stores things that are learned or witnessed in the 
form of imagines, which are recalled as a frame of reference in the context of learning 
something new.  New information is transmuted into mental pictures and stored in 
addition to being checked against other mental images already existent in memory, so 
that “nothing can come into memory without that mental picture” (Epistola 7.1).37 
Augustine’s conception of memory as a visual faculty is not a new development but 
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 For an account of how “ocular metaphors dominate [Western] accounts of knowledge,” see Biernoff 39-
40. Indeed, they persist in Columbia’s motto from Psalms 36:9, “In lumine Tuo videbimus lumen.” 
36
 “Quod autem intellectu capitur, intus apud animum est: nec id habere quidquam est aliud, quam uidere.” 
37
 In the same letter, Augustine actually argues that “in regard to some things at least,” namely a concept 
like “eternity,” there can be an exercise of memory without any image of the thing remembered being 
presented by the imagination” (“potest esse quarumdam rerum sine ulla imaginatione memoria”) (Epistola 
7.2). The mechanism by which a mental image does not occur is not entirely convincing. 
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reflects his rhetorical training in the classical ars memoriae. His description of memoria 
as a space, a vast treasure-house where “things that have been perceived by the senses are 
hoarded” as images, in which state they are also sought out and retrieved “ex eodem 
thesauro memoriae,” is consistent with earlier accounts such as that of Cicero’s De 
oratore (Conf. 10.8.14).
38
  So too, Augustine cites mnemonic pictures in their traditional 
role as rhetorical training aids, enabling him to retain and recall a vast repository of 
information “by heart” as needed for Christian instruction.39  Because the things retained 
as imagines include not just what has been seen, but things heard, smelled, tasted, or felt, 
Augustine holds that all sensory data is initially transmuted into a visual representation 
within memoria. In particular, Augustine describes the metamorphosis of fleeting verbal 
signs that pass “with a noise through the air and are no longer” into more permanent 
“images of the sounds by which these words were composed” in the process of storing 
mental information (Conf. 10.10.17). 
The things themselves apprehended by the senses “are not introduced into 
memory, but only the images of them (“earum solae imagines”)…placed as it were into 
wondrous cells and drawn out miraculously when recollecting” (Conf. 10.9.16).  Here, 
Augustine suggests the superior communicative value of visual signs in cognitive 
understanding: a visual image is chosen because its personal signification can be easily 
apprehended during the act of recollection. Augustine’s description of memory as divided 
into cells (“cellis”) in this passage and earlier as “wide palaces where there are treasure-
stores of innumerable images” (“thesauri innumerabilium imaginum”) recalls the 
classical trope of the visual memory space (Conf. 10.8.12). Other discussions of 
                                                 
38
 Carruthers discusses Cicero’s architectural metaphor for memory in The Book of Memory 22. 
39
 Augustine speaks of calling upon these inner pictures “whenever I need to recite something from 
memory” (“cum aliquid narro memoraliter”) (Conf. 10.8). 
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memory—like the later Rhetorica ad Herennium, which shaped thirteenth-century artes 
memoriae—maintain that words, abstract concepts, and things without corporeal 
existence can likewise be remembered most readily when consciously transformed into 
images of a vivid, bizarre, or otherwise striking nature.
40
   
Words too are transmuted into mental images to be remembered, and textual 
passages containing rich (or strange) visual imagery, like one from the Canticum 
canticorum where the Church is described as a beautiful woman with teeth “like a flock 
of shorn ewes,” are more readily learned than one in “planissimis verbis” (De doctrina 
2.6.7). Here, Augustine may be drawing on the Roman rhetorical concept of enargeia or 
vividness whereby visual language was employed to stimulate the imagination and sway 
an audience (Cox Miller 32). Augustine again expands on this idea to consider the image 
within the particular context of how it helps one to learn, suggesting that striking visual 
images, whether in didactic texts or more generally presented before the eyes, may be a 
useful tool for instruction.  
 Playing a higher role in the mechanism of learning than conventional recollection 
is Augustine’s second visual process of understanding, which involves consulting the 
rationes aeternae. Described most completely in the De diversis quaestionibus, the 
rationes correspond to Platonic Forms, representing the archetypes or patterns for reality 
“eternal and existing always in the same state…contained in the Divine Intelligence” 
(46.2), which is accessible to the pure human soul; as such they are absolutely true and 
cannot be misconstrued. According to Augustine, who explains the mechanism rather 
vaguely, when a student grasps a concept being taught, it is because he or she gets a 
glimpse of its absolute form, pre-existent if deeply hidden in the soul. To complete the 
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 Rhetorica ad Herennium 3.16.28 to 3.24.40 is dedicated to the formation of memory images.  
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process, the learner must also be able to gauge the truth or falsity of an idea, again by 
unconsciously and instantaneously comparing it to its eternal equivalent. This is 
accomplished by non-verbal means, through the vision of the inner eye 
[“oculo…interiore”] and again by the grace of the Inner Teacher, who gives insight only 
to an eye that is “sound, genuine, and serene, like those things it attempts to see” 
[“oculum quo videntur ista, sanum, et sincerum, et serenum, et similem his rebus quas 
videre intendit, habuerit.”] (De diversis 46.2].  To teach the nature of the Ideas in the 
same passage, Augustine draws on this very method of visual consultation: he dismisses 
the importance of naming [“vocaverint,” “appellet”] the Forms in order to learn them, but 
instead directs the reader to “see [“videamus”] the thing that above all we must 
contemplate and come to know” (De diversis 46.1). In this way, “illumination is 
‘showing’ since realities are displayed directly” (Stock, Augustine 161). 
Augustine’s rhetorical questioning of the cognitive process in the Confessions 
makes reference to the role of the Forms, asserting that memory images of things pre-
exist the learning of them, Augustine asks “How, when [concepts] were spoken of,” he 
asks, “did I understand (agnovi) and say ‘it is true,’ if they were not already in memory, 
but so remote and concealed as if in secret caves, so that unless they had been drawn out 
by someone else, I would not have been able to think of them?” (10.10.17). Augustine’s 
reference to finding the Forms  in the caves of memory alters the classical concept of the 
visual “memory space,” an imagined physical location created in the mind where one 
places objects to be recalled by “walking through” the space and “seeing” them. Here, the 
forms are visualized without conscious intent to recollect them; the “someone else” who 
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triggers unconscious consultation of the forms can be a human teacher using words as his 
impetus, but it is the Inner Teacher who allows access to the latent truths resident there. 
Also unlike conventional recollection, in the case of the rationes, “not…the 
image, but the thing” resides in the mind (Conf. 10.9.16). Augustine’s statement that an 
imaginary student is “taught not by my words but by the things themselves (ipsis rebus) 
made manifest within when God discloses them” presents another way of looking at the 
rationes aeternae  in terms of the res/signum relationship of the De doctrina Christiana 
(De magistro 12.40). Whereas generally “things are learnt through signs” (“res per signa 
discuntur”), Augustine’s use of “ipsis rebus” implies that the unmistakeable truth of the 
forms originates in their quality as archetypal self-signifying res, able to directly 
communicate their own meaning without the intermediary of any other signum (De 
doctrina 1.2.2). In this regard they resemble the “‘natural language’ of Paradise that 
transcended bodily and temporal signs altogether” removing the possibility of 
misapprehension (Jager 54).  
 
Learning through Visual Signs  
If metaphors of vision are most appropriate to describe the process of inspired 
learning, the sense of sight conversely “has the greatest affinity to mental vision” 
(“visioni mentis…vicinior”) (De trinitate 11.1.1). Whereas Augustine is careful to 
distinguish inner speech during the thought process from its external counterpart, inner 
vision is more akin to external sight. From a certain perspective, Augustine’s threefold 
formulation of vision, enumerated in De Genesi ad litteram, can be seen as placing 
“corporeal vision in an inferior position, thereby promoting a general suspicion of all 
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experience or knowledge attained through physical seeing” (Stevenson 30). However, a 
look at the theory shows that, on the contrary, it raises the possibility of certainty in 
apprehending visual signs. Seeing first takes place on the sensory or corporeal level, and 
an image is then imprinted on the mind at the level of spiritual vision; this is the farthest 
that animals can go in terms of processing what is seen. However, human beings can 
access a third level, intellectual vision, wherein “if [what is seen] is symbolic of 
something, its meaning is either immediately understood by the intellect or sought out” 
(DGAL 12.11.22).
41
 This last stage involves consulting the eternal forms and the 
inspiration of the Inner Teacher and so can provide a true assessment of what is seen. As 
Margaret Miles has observed, there is necessarily a spiritual component in “the accurate 
‘seeing’ of visual objects….because it cannot take place without the soul,” without the 
involvement of inner illumination(“Vision” 139-40). And as long as visible objects are 
perceived in terms of their usus—as evidence of God—they will be understood.  
Although removed from the ideal condition of the rationes aeternae, visual signs 
in the external world can also be self-signifying objects, partaking in their own kind of 
natural language with its concomitant benefits. Heavenly bodies, “the lands and the seas, 
and countless things begotten in them” are all examples of res that reveal their own 
qualities upon empirical observation, though they obviously bear no intent to educate (De 
magistro 10.32).
42
  Among human beings, however, “thousands of things . . . can be 
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 Translation by Taylor. The Latin in CSEL reads “alicuius rei signum est, aut intellegatur continuo, quid 
significet, aut quaeratur” (12.11.19-20). 
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 Augustine’s argument for a self-signifying natural language can be faulted for its assumptions concerning 
the apparent ease of distinguishing the attributes of a thing upon observation. The nature of the sun, for 
instance, is still not completely understood, though perhaps Augustine is not making a case for complete 
but for sufficient understanding. This criticism does not remove the fact that what we perceive of the sun 
(however incomplete or limited) is obtainable without recourse to outside signs. A case can be made either 
that the separate components of the sun—its brightness, heat, presence in the sky—are in fact independent 
signs that signify a sun, or inseparable from the whole, depending on one’s philosophical perspective. 
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exhibited through themselves rather than through signs: for example, eating, drinking, 
sitting, standing, shouting and countless others”  (De magistro 3.6). One can intentionally 
teach something of what “walking” is by showing the act of walking itself or learn the 
nature of a bird catcher’s skills just by watching him at work.43   
Each of these examples continues to rely on some innate ability on the part of the 
viewer either to infer the whole of bird-catching from a limited set of observed actions or 
to discern the difference between “walking” and “hurrying,” for instance; their 
effectiveness in transmitting information indicates the proximity of visual education to 
the sign-less communication available before the Fall. The possibility of uncovering 
meaning by observing an object exceeds what can be learned through verbal signs to the 
point that one “doesn’t learn at all unless he himself sees what is described, where he 
then learns not from words but from the things themselves” (De magistro 12.39). 
When visual signs are used to signify things other than themselves, they continue 
to evince the qualities of pre-lapsarian communication. In the De catechizandis, before 
Augustine addresses the anxiety of teachers whose thoughts run faster than the ability of 
words to express them, he discusses the superior communicative power of an angry face. 
If the phrase “iratus sum” makes sense only to Latin speakers, the meaning of an enraged 
look is universally comprehensible, conveying the same information with greater 
economy and efficiency (De catechizandis 2.3). As a rule, human beings can never “bring 
out those impressions which the intellectual apprehension stamps upon the memory and 
to hold them forth . . . by means of the sound of the voice, in any manner parallel to the 
clear and evident (“apertus et manifestus”) form in which the look appears” (De 
catechizandis 2.3)   
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 See De magistro 3.6 and 10.32. 
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Facial expressions do raise the question of whether they are signs issued with the 
desire to communicate or merely involuntary exterior manifestations of an inner “state of 
soul.”  Augustine considers them a spontaneous by-product of emotion (“sine significandi 
voluntate sequantur motum animi”) and eliminates them from discussion in the De 
doctrina as being of minimal value for educative communication (De doctrina 2.2.3). 
Under some circumstances visual signs are clearly delivered with communicative 
intent—a nod of the head or a military banner for instance—in which case they are 
termed verba visibilia or “visible words” (De doctrina 2.3.4)  Though fewer in number 
than words and used less often for purposes of signification, verba visibilia play an 
essential and foundational part in comprehension. In fact, facial expressions, bodily 
movements, and gestures are cited in the Confessions as the underpinnings upon which 
rest nothing less than the meaning of words themselves.  
To associate the sound of a word—a vacant flatus vocis for one as yet without 
verbal language—with the particular thing it signified, the infant Augustine depended 
mainly on visual cues, the physical movement of his elders toward the referent: “From 
bodily movement [meaning] was apparent, by the natural language common to all 
peoples, expressed by the face and glance of the eye, by the action of other members, and 
tone of voice” (Conf. 1.8.13). In this construction, the verbal sign is empty until it is 
attached to an object by a procedure that hinges on visual identification, first in noticing 
that there is a signum/res relationship at hand, then in observing the characteristics of the 
referent.  
An efficient means of creating awareness of a signum/res relation in the external 
world—the first step in teaching the meaning of any heretofore unknown verbal sign—is 
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to use gesture, particularly the act of pointing out with the finger. By pointing one can 
convey “with certainty” (“prorsus”) that a particular word should be attached to a specific 
referent, thereby imbuing the verbal sign with meaning (De magistro 3.5).
44
  Gesturing 
for the purposes of indication does have its limitations since it can reveal nothing on its 
own about the nature of the referent. For this, a visual assessment of the object is 
necessary, allowing it to signify itself, to present to the viewing eye the particular 
attributes that characterize it. “Intentus digitus” can only serve as “a sign of the pointing-
out rather than of any things that are pointed out” but this is true of all human teaching 
that merely directs; only the Inner Teacher reveals truth (De magistro 10.34). Jewish 
spiritual blindness illustrates that one cannot find meaning until one knows there is a 
situation that needs interpretation, an awareness that can be “pointed out.”  Indeed, the 
parallel between teaching and indicative gesturing is made explicit in Augustine’s 
defense of his task as an educator, likened to pointing out the new moon or a faint star 
with a finger: if a student does not have the proper (in)sight not to look at the finger but 
what is aimed at there is nothing more the teacher can do to educate him (De doctrina 
“Prologus” 3).  
And yet, “[d]espite his equation of verbal and visual” in the process of learning, 
Augustine “was very suspicious of visual signs and their value” (Hahn, “Purification” 
72). Frequently cited as evidence of this suspicion is a passage in De consensu 
evangelistarum where Augustine describes how iconography showing Christ with St. 
Paul and St. Peter misleads pagan viewers to assume all three were contemporaries, 
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 In the dialogue, Adeodatus suggests that “omnia visibilia” can be exhibited by pointing, to which 
Augustine proposes the hand motions of the deaf as a counterexample of gesture used to indicate “not only 
visible things, but also sounds and flavors and other things of this sort” (3.5). But “sign language” works 
differently from what happens when teaching the relationship between words and things; hand signs used 
by the deaf do not generally point out a visible object allowing it to illuminate its own meaning as a sign.  
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martyred together (Peter Brown 28). Regarding this misreading of an image, Augustine 
remarks, “they thoroughly deserve to err who have sought Christ and his Apostles not in 
sacred books but in pictures” (De consensu 1.10.16).45 Here, where Augustine is 
addressing a practical consideration of Christian learning, he seems to be urging a 
thorough knowledge of the context for such an image, a return to the original Scriptures 
as the primary source of instruction. Elsewhere, he similarly promotes the labor of 
interpretation that occurs when reading as more meaningful than merely looking at an 
image: “when you have seen a picture, to have praised it is the whole thing; when you see 
writing, this is not the whole, since you are reminded also to read it” (Tractatus in 
evangelium Ioannis 24.2). Here, where Augustine is again showing his Platonic roots, the 
self-evident nature of visual signs can also be their downfall, embodying “a lack of all 
spiritual potential” (Kessler Spiritual Seeing 151); not requiring an interpretation, they 
encourage “a resting in sense,” fructus rather than usus (Lerud, Memory, Images 58). One 
must therefore approach visual signs with caution. 
However, this quality does not remove the value of images if the viewer already 
has a knowledge of that which is depicted. A Christian who comes to the image with the 
proper context will be led to recall its deeper meaning. Along the same lines, “in the case 
of pictures and statues and other such representations, especially those made by 
experienced artists, nobody who sees the representation fails to recognize the things 
which they resemble” (DDC 2.25.39). This hints at the mnemonic power of visuals in 
instruction as well as the need to consider the efficacy of visual signs in relation to words, 
topics with implications for visual art and, in my discussion, dramatic performance, 
during the Middle Ages.   
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 “non in sanctis codicibus, sed in pictis….” Also see Chazelle 146. 
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Despite the demonstrated efficacy of verba visibilia for instructive purposes, 
Augustine’s vexed relationship with literature precludes his acknowledging the 
usefulness of theater—a primarily visual medium of actors and props physically present 
before the eyes of an audience—in communicating any truth. Augustine does admit at 
one point that, like things in the natural world, “the performances of men in all the 
theaters . . . display things themselves without a sign,” but never makes it clear just how 
an actor can indicate anything “sine signo” except perhaps the nature of acting itself (De 
magistro 10.32). And, even as Augustine posits that acting can convey information 
without serving as a sign for something else, he simultaneously expresses a wish to 
exclude it (“omittam”) from his discussion (De magistro 10.32).46   
The type of gestured acting Augustine refers to makes it more likely that he 
means something like “sine verbis” for “sine signo.”  Richard Beacham describes the 
nature of Roman mime—bawdy, often satirical improvisations where “grimacing, 
gesticulation, and general expressiveness were an essential part of the performance,” 
which were, however, not delivered without words (130). What Augustine evidently 
refers to, both in its main reliance on verba visibilia and its inclusion of tragic plots, is 
Roman pantomime or fabula saltica, a “dumb show dance of mythological material [that] 
sought to present characterization, emotion and narrative entirely through the movements 
and gestures of the body, or parts of the body, of an individual performer who neither 
sang nor spoke” (Beacham 143).47  This is precisely the special ability of actors described 
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exhibentium.” 
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 The skill of the actors was such that they were somehow able to convey Pythagorean philosophy and the 
substance of Platonic dialogues entirely through pantomime. 
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earlier in the De magistro: relating “fabulas sine verbis saltando,” in a kind of interpretive 
dance (3.5).  
How Augustine can so readily pass over the nonverbal signs of this theatrical 
form is explicable once we realize that histrionic gestures do not really partake of natural 
language. Far from viewing stylized theatrical gestures as similar to natural language, 
Augustine uses the term “fabulas” to intimate that they not only fail to self-signify, but 
that they communicate only fictions and lies. Regardless of their silent nature—evoked 
by the modern understanding of pantomime—the verba visibilia of the stage have more 
in common with the verbal signs of literature, used simply to “tell tales [‘fabulantur’]” 
(De doctrina 2.3.4). For this reason, Augustine more explicitly denies the association of 
acting with natural language later in his career even as he cites it as superfluous for 
Christian doctrina. “If the signs made by actors while dancing were naturally 
meaningful,” he observes, “rather than meaningful as a result of human institution and 
agreement, an announcer would not have indicated to the Carthaginians, as each actor 
danced, what the dance meant (De doctrina 2.25.38).  
Also like words, actors’ symbolic movements contain no intrinsic or readily 
apparent meaning and require interpretation, a task only possible for the “scientibus,” a 
limited audience of those few “in the know” (De doctrina 2.3.4). Roman aficionados of 
pantomime were “familiar with the different myths, and moreover (rather like 
contemporary devotees of the ballet) the precise way in which they were to be danced” 
which apparently was no longer the case in Augustine’s day (Beacham 143). 
Furthermore, once the meaning of arcane stage gestures is discovered, they present lies 
without value for Christian education; consequently, attendance at plays is an example of 
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improper fructus. Any superficial likeness theatrical signs share with other verba visibilia 
is negated by their intersection with fiction.
48
  
It is important to keep in mind that the gestured acting critiqued by Augustine is 
very specific to Roman stagecraft and does not automatically disqualify the visual signs 
of all drama as tools for Christian education. Yet, because theater was so strongly 
affiliated with pagan religious practice and culture, even more so than secular literature, 
Augustine himself “could not (or saw no reason to) synthesize…[it] with Christian 
learning” (Dox 16). Unlike how he adapted classical rhetoric and philosophy, he simply 
“could not tease theater out of its cultural function as popular entertainment and let it 
serve Christian ends” (Dox 16). The closest that Augustine comes to anticipating a 
Christian theater is in his Sermones, where he describes martyr narratives in highly visual 
terms as spectacle, albeit a kind thar differs from conventional theater “in that the eye is 
directed inward, where the drama is played out in the mind’s eye” (Cox Miller 31). The 
empassioned phrasing he uses to describe his feelings for such narratives is strongly 
visual—“Denique amo martyres, specto martyres: quando leguntur passiones martyrum, 
specto” (“Sermon 301A” qtd in Cox Miller 31, n. 25)—at once testifying to the dramatic 
quality of such narratives and proposing a “spiritual theater of the mind” as the 
alternative among Christians to pursuing secular spectacula.  
Created with “instruction in faith and morals as a primary end,” medieval 
religious plays put drama to a didactic use unforeseen by the Bishop of Hippo (Tydeman 
18). However, as I will show in Chapter 2, they recapitulate many of Augustine’s key 
ideas on instruction. For its doctrina, medieval religious drama similarly emphasizes the 
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 Examples from the visual arts, like the mural of Jupiter and Danae in Terence’s play, are not discussed as 
extensively as theatrical signs in Augustine’s corpus but presumably represent another exception to the 
educational value of visual signs due to their potential portrayal of false or immoral subjects.    
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interpretation of signs and promotes the pedagogical efficacy of verba visibilia through 
the use of props, scenery, and movement of actors before an audience. And, they do so 
while situating Jews as symbols of misinterpretation against inner faith that leads to 
understanding. 
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CHAPTER 2: JEWS AND CHRISTIAN EDUCATION IN MEDIEVAL RELIGIOUS 
DRAMA 
 
The Didactic Potential of the Stage 
 
Augustine’s rejection of Roman pantomime on account of the didactic uselessness 
of its visual signs may be unique among the Church Fathers, but his general antipathy to 
spectacula—stage plays and other forms of public performance like “wild beast shows, 
lubricious pantomimes, chariot races, and gladiatorial fights”—is not (Barish 43). Pre-
dating Augustine by some two centuries, Tertullian’s De Spectaculis represents the first 
and most famous Early Christian treatise in opposition to the theater.
49
  His warning that 
“the laws of Christian Discipline. . . forbid among other sins of the world, the pleasures 
of the public shows” anticipates Augustine on worldly fructus as a distraction from 
spirituality (Chapter 1). But, at its crux, Tertullian’s argument is a reaction to the threat of 
a rival interest: if attention is given to gladiators or actors, there is no space left to think 
on God, for a Christian cannot “serve two masters.” 50  Of course, the amount of energy 
spent by the Early Church reacting to the prevailing problem of Christians enjoying 
spectacula reveals just how powerful the draw of Roman theater was. Most tellingly, 
when barbarians besieged Rome, crowds sought solace in theatrical entertainment rather 
than in church assemblies (Beacham 194).    
Within the framework of competition that underlies their protests against the 
stage, patristic authors find one particular form of rivalry most threatening: the 
association of theater with pagan worship, even if this link had long become peripheral to 
                                                 
49
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 See Tertullian, De spectaculis XXV. The original citation is from Matthew 6.24. 
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the purpose of entertainment. By emphasizing “many different ways the sin of idolatry 
clings to the shows,” Tertullian raises an identification of theater with anti-Christian 
belief, and consequently with moral turpitude, a connection Augustine would repeat as a 
cause of Roman degeneration in the City of God (Ch. XIII).
51
  Among the Greek Fathers, 
John Chrysostom avows that “there is no difference between the theater and the 
synagogue,” conjoining the Jewish place of worship with the stage as equivalent loci of 
disbelief (I :2.7).
52
 This patristic attachment of disbelief and theater would persist for 
centuries even after a formal ban on public performance: the Carolingian Benedictus 
lenta continued to forbid from bringing legal suit “all that are spattered with the stain of 
evil repute: that is, histriones . . . heretics and Jews as well” (Ogilvy 608).  
Just as Augustine was dismayed by the lessons present in fiction, leading him to 
ally fabulae with heresy, concerns about the pagan attributes of theater acknowledge that 
the stage can be an influential source of instruction for ideas antithetical to Christian 
morality. For Tertullian, “tragedies and comedies, bloody and lustful, impious and 
prodigal, teach outrage and lust,” making audiences complicit in crimes of murder or 
fornication witnessed on stage—whether real or simulated—and desirous of committing 
these grave sins themselves (De spectaculis XVII).
53
  Augustine denies the possibility of 
extracting Christian lessons from drama, but recognizes a pagan didactic threat. He labels 
the shows a “den of wickedness” (De doctrina 1.29.30) and “disgusting spectacles of 
frivolous immorality” (De civitate dei 1.32) and in so doing connects the influence of 
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 Chapters Five through Thirteen of the De Spectaculis are dedicated to mustering evidence in this regard. 
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 Chrysostom’s related charge that “Jews are gathering choruses of effeminates” (I:2,7) raises a similar 
association of theater with deviant sexuality, which also recalls Tertullian’s opposition to the stage for its 
unnatural cross-dressing (See XVII, XXIII). 
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performance directly to their visual nature. Much is made in the Confessions of Alypius’ 
ability to temporarily resist his lust for gladiatorial spectacles (gladiatorii spectaculi) by 
closing his eyes while present at the arena (6.8). But when, prompted by the sound of 
cheers, he opens them and sees bloodshed, looking on the scene is described as a deep 
wound to his very soul (graviore vulnere in anima) (Conf. 6.8).  
 That Augustine should perceive the ability of spectacula as a visual medium to 
deeply impact the soul is not unusual given his treatment of verba visibilia as a powerful 
pedagogical and mnemonic tool. More curious is that, despite patristic fears relating to 
the great potential for negative instruction inherent in the theater, it took nearly a 
millennium before the Church would look to “compete with less decorous amusements 
by harnessing the methods of profane presentation” (Tydeman 4).  Augustine could not 
begin to consider the possibility of exploiting the theatrical form for Christian usus 
because it was so closely bound to its pagan origins; it was “indistinguishable from the 
culture that produce[d] it” and thus could not be “despoiled” like rhetoric or grammatica 
(Dox 16). For medieval Christian thinkers, the “physical quality of ancient theatrical 
practice as it was understood through late classical sources—the requirements of 
buildings and performers, spectators and prostitutes, scenery and costume; its social 
function—set theater apart from texts and language that constituted knowledge” (Dox 
70). And so, with the Trullan Council’s outlawing of formal public performance in 692, 
the conventions of dramatic staging passed into obscurity so that we have no evidence of 
theater through the early Middle Ages except for vague references to solo street 
performers, buskers of sorts called mimi and scurrae.
54
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 Ogilvy’s article in Speculum 38 still provides the best overview of the terms used to describe these 
performers. Ogilvy and others (Chambers, Tydeman) have contended that the mimi and their ilk 
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For Bevington, the medieval loss of Roman dramatic principles is exemplified in 
the tenth-century plays of Hrotsvit, which were based directly on Terence but intended 
solely for reading, with no understanding of staging technique (3).  Yet, regardless of 
whether or not Hrotsvit’s Dramas were enacted at Gandersheim (a real possibility 
according to some scholars), the Saxon canoness deserves notice more for her 
contribution as the first to “despoil” pagan drama for Christian didactic aims than for 
what she did not know of stage conventions.
55
 Hrotsvit consciously intends to imitate the 
dangerously appealing form and style (dulcedo sermonis) of Terence in order to “glorify  
. . . the laudable chastity of Christian virgins in that self-same form of composition which 
has been used to describe the shameless acts of licentious women” (Hrotsvit “Preface” 
The Plays of Roswitha l. 9). Not only does she explore the “Augustinian theme of the use 
and abuse of worldly objects and beauty” as she reiterates Augustine’s views on the 
corruptive influence of fiction (again exemplified by Terence), but she also appropriates a 
pagan fictive form for Christian edification within the model of Augustinian spoliatio 
(Eril Hughes 63).
56
   Her response to the anti-Christian content of the theater is simply to 
make it Christian. Men enter brothels not for sex but to convert prostitutes. Where a 
young man’s passion leads him to rape in Terence’s Eunuchus, it brings conversion and 
the maintenance of chastity in Hrotsvit’s Drusiana. Hrotsvit’s apparent defiance of 
                                                                                                                                                 
represented a continuity of professional actors who somehow kept the “rudiments of acting” alive and thus 
available for the eventual rebirth of drama, even if they were prevented from staging organized 
performances (Chambers qtd. in Mann 141). Given the lack of hard evidence for such professional troupes, 
this remains a minority view among theater scholars. 
55
 Becker (passim) believes that Hrotsvit’s Dramas were staged based on their visuality as well as the 
cultural climate of Gandersheim and the Ottonian court. It is just a small step from written dialogue to 
assigning spoken parts to different individuals, especially given the standard monastic practice of reading 
aloud. From this point, it is easy to imagine the addition of some physical movement and gesture, and 
perhaps props and costuming.  
56
 Sticca sees Hrotsvit’s approach as a legacy of Jerome’s advice in Epistola XXI on how to use the classics 
(1-2). 
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convention in writing a genre outlawed by the Church actually represents her long 
overlooked conformity to the established tradition of spoliatio Aegyptiorum.
57
  
Despite being the first to exploit the dramatic form to present Christian values, 
Hrotsvit did not contribute directly to the development of later religious drama. The 
integration of histrionic elements into the Church service, such as in the tenth-century 
Quen quaeretis, is generally figured as a natural development, “an impulse” (Bevington 
5, 6) built into the nature of the Eucharistic service with its reliance on ritual garb, props, 
and gestures presented before an audience; it was a change that “arose spontaneously as 
part of a much wider process of elaborating the services” and not part of any intentional 
didactic strategy (Wickham 11). In fact, dramatic descriptions of the liturgy, as in 
Amalarius of Metz’s consideration of the Mass, never raise a connection with classical 
theater precisely because the latter existed “solidly in the realm of society, idolatry, and 
representational perfidy” (Dox 58). Writing in the twelfth century, Hugh of St. Victor 
would discuss theatrics as one of the mechanical arts but only in regard to its prior 
existence in antiquity not in terms of any contemporary dramatic activity (Lerud, 
Memory, Images 33). Given this careful distinction, rather than looking at the classical 
precedent, it is more fruitful to situate the development of drama against changes in 
attitude toward images in general. 
The applicability of developments in medieval sculpture and painting to the study 
of drama has been widely observed. Lerud notes that the images that comprise drama can 
be “considered in the same general category as painted and sculpted images” and it is 
thus “fair to appropriate the discourse regarding images and image veneration to our 
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understanding of the drama” (“Quick Images,” 213) while Jean-Claude Schmitt urges the 
study of “l’image” in all its semantic connotations (“tout le champ sémantique que ce mot 
circonscrit”) during the Middle Ages (Le corps 167).58 Both visual art and drama can be 
seen “as two participants in a larger visual discourse, repeatedly building on and reacting 
to each other” (Stevenson 6). The Western Christian attitude toward images has long 
been a vexed one, marked by considerable negative perceptions that are expressed quite 
thoroughly by Theodulf of Orleans in the eighth-century Libri Carolini. Yet, a 
countercurrent existed, beginning with Pope Gregory the Great’s letters to Bishop 
Serenus of Marseilles. Gregory’s statements, which are ultimately influenced by 
Augustine’s discussion of visual signs (Chazelle 138), mark a turning point in the 
perception of images and were “cited by virtually every author and encyclopaedist who 
considered the role of images throughout the Middle Ages, up to and including the 
Council of Trent” (Athene Reiss 5). 
 In response to Serenus’ destruction of the images in his church to prevent them 
from being adored, Gregory defends their value for the instruction of the illiterate (“ad 
aedificationem imperiti populi”) (XI, 10.48); painted images are permitted as long as they 
are not adored but serve as a means of instruction concerning what should be adored 
(“Aliud est enim picturam adorare, aliud per picturae historiam quid sit adorandum 
addiscere”) (XI, 10:22-23). In this role, pictures are like books for the unlearned (“in ipsa 
legunt qui litteras nesciunt”) (XI, 10.25-26). Here, Gregory is promoting the didactic 
value of images based on their ability to evoke the content they depict. For Peter Brown, 
this key moment marks a new notion that “images can act as a substitute for writing” 
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(17). Moreover, Gregory’s statements clearly present the idea that images can serve as a 
means of accessing the divine, “the invisible world ‘out there’,” a crucial development 
for the eventual use of visual signs in drama (Kessler, Spiritual 105).  
Despite continued suspicion of images during the Carolinian period, Gregory’s 
influential letters opened the door to the didactic use of images in the service of Christian 
instruction, a door that would then be flung wide open with the growth of an 
Incarnational theology from the tenth century onward, leading to “une véritable 
conversion aux images” (Baschet 10). When God took on physical form, he essentially 
acceded to making himself visible—in the words of Irenaeus of Lyon, “The Son is the 
visibility of the Father”—and so, through the image one could attain salvation (qtd. in 
Baschet 17). This prominent idea in turn led to an “emphasis on the material world and 
the body’s place within it,” sparked the representation of sacred subjects in sculpture and 
painting (Stevenson 3) and “lent itself extraordinarily well to various kinds of mimetic 
activities” including the depiction of the same subjects in visual performance (Dox 4). 
The production and use of sacred images would reach such a level during the eleventh 
and twelfth centuries that the practice was often criticized by Jewish theologians as a 
form of idolatry, prompting Christian apologists like Rupert of Deutz and Guibert de 
Nogent to formulate thorough defenses, often in the form of a debate (Schmitt, Le corps 
99). Jews also feature in medieval religious drama, not only as continued emblems of 
disbelief but as misinterpreters of signs, against whom the plays model a correct approach 
to understanding that likewise defends the value of visual signs. 
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The Didactic Judeus of the Anglo-Norman Adam 
 The central focus of the twelfth-century Anglo-Norman Ordo repraesentationis 
Ade, also known as the Jeu d’Adam or Mystère d’Adam, is a creative account of the Fall, 
but some of the most intriguing aspects of the play are centred on interruptions to this 
biblical narrative. After staging the murder of Abel at the hands of his brother, the Adam 
diverges from its source material in Genesis to include a procession of Old Testament 
figures declaiming messianic prophecies about Christ (ll. 745-882). This ordo 
prophetarum is interrupted in turn after some 150 lines when a Jew, “quidam de 
synagoga,” attempts to argue with the prophet Isaiah concerning the credibility of his 
predictions:     
Ore me respon, sire Ysaias: 
 Est ço fable, ou prophecie? 
Que est iço, que tu as dit? 
Truvas le tu, ou est escrit? 
Tu as dormi, tu le sonjas. 
Est ço certes ou a gas? (ll. 883-888) 
 
Much of what has been written about the procession of prophets in the Adam has 
addressed it as a variant on the popular sixth-century Sermo contra Judeos, paganos, et 
Arianos de symbolo falsely attributed to Augustine.
59
  From this perspective, the ordo 
prophetarum is mainly valuable for the evidence it provides for a staging of the play 
during the Christmas season when the Sermo was traditionally part of the liturgy. Setting 
aside other evidence that the Adam was not a winter play—its use of pre-Lenten 
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responsories, its performance outside the church—I believe that the moments of narrative 
disruption surrounding the ordo are more important for what they reveal of the 
playwright’s interest in signification, in which Jewish disbelief is essential.      
The disputatious Jew who does not appear in the Pseudo-Augustinian sermon and 
who interrupts the procession of prophets with his scepticism has gone almost without 
comment in critical discussions of the Adam. Erich Auerbach’s noted chapter on the 
mimetic aspect of the play analyzes the Genesis story but ignores Judeus’s interruption 
and the ensuing procession.
60
  Neither Karl Young in his comparison of different twelfth-
century ordines prophetarum nor Willem Noomen in editing the Adam text discusses the 
polemical Jew at all.
61
  And while Lynette Muir has speculated on how the Adam author’s 
knowledge of Jewish exegesis is reflected in the unique attributes of his ordo, she only 
mentions the Judeus to observe that it would be “not impossible, though … very original” 
to have his audience “represent the Jews, so that the quidam de synagoga would come out 
of the audience and Isaiah and his fellow prophets would address the audience as Judei” 
(34). Her own doubts notwithstanding, Muir’s supposition furnishes the best way of 
looking at the Judeus: within the context of the twelfth-century Christian-Jewish debates 
as a sign substituting for the equally disbelieving Christian spectator.  
By the twelfth century, the application of logic and dialectic to faith led many 
Christians to question a number of thorny doctrinal issues like those of the Incarnation 
and the Virgin Birth, as “they could see with their own eyes that empirical reality 
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contradicted what their priests taught them to believe” (Abulafia, Christians and Jews in 
Dispute I, 183). At the core, these issues involve interpretation of signs: Is the doctrine of 
the Virgin Birth based on the correct reading of Scripture? Should one believe the verbal 
signs one has read or heard taught in this regard or judgments formed on the basis of 
empirical experience?  Because the doubts raised by Christians reflected the objections 
posed by disbelieving Jews, the former projected their internal discomfort outward in the 
form of a virulent and irrational anti-Jewish sentiment that also developed during the 
same period.
62
  Robert Chazan speaks of social and intellectual “developments that 
engendered a sense of dislocation and anxiety in the northern European populace of the 
late twelfth and early thirteenth century” and observes that a “fearful population would 
have been likely to project some of its discomfort” on a minority like the Jews (93). In its 
written expression, this vehement anti-Judaism appears in works like Guibert of Nogent’s 
Autobiography and the Adversus Iudeorum of Peter the Venerable.
63
  On a more rational 
level, thinkers like Odo of Cambrai, Anselm, and his pupil Gilbert Crispin, sought to 
validate difficult theological issues using the dictates of logic, and, given the similarity 
between Christian and Jewish misgivings, frequently framed their writings in the form of 
a debate between the author and an incredulous Jew.      
The number of such dialogues put in writing during the twelfth century suggests 
occasions of informal exchange that actually took place between Jews and Christians at 
the time, but it is readily apparent that the Jews of the dialogues are more important for 
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their functional didactic value than for their historicity.
64
  The adversus Judaeus tradition, 
as Fredriksen reminds us, is always “[p]edagogical and prescriptive” (93). The raison 
d’être of these works is to enforce the truth of Christian doctrine and the words of the 
Jewish opposition “had to be reformulated for them to be in any way operational in 
fulfilling that aim” (Abulafia, Christians and Jews in Dispute x); quite simply, the Jews 
cannot win the debate and are merely strawmen. Peter Damian’s eleventh-century 
Dialogus inter Judaeum et Christianum is one example of a work that is “more of a 
pedagogical exposition” than a conversation (Dahan 54). Its goal is expressly to provide 
one “Honestus” with an ars disputandi against the arguments of Jewish opponents.  But 
unlike Honestus’ purportedly confrontational real world counterparts, the Jew in 
Damian’s text is virtually silent, providing “brief, formulaic…questions to which Peter 
gives much fuller responses in his own voice” (Kruger 21).   
The more realistic polemical works of the following century, like Gilbert 
Crispin’s Disputatio Iudei et Christiani and Odo of Tournai’s (later Cambrai) Disputatio 
contra Judeum Leonem, which provide the Jewish opponent with lengthier responses and 
do not conclude with his obligatory conversion, nonetheless continue to use Jewish 
characters as an opportunity to present Christian instruction. Odo’s declared purpose in 
writing the Disputatio is “ad instruendum fidelem monachum,” Brother Acard, regarding 
concise arguments in support of the doctrine of the Incarnation (Col.1103A). Odo’s 
declaration that his discussion with Leo took place in Senlis may suggests the historicity 
of his debate, but his statement that “it seemed appropriate to me to pursue this question 
[of the Incarnation] in the form of a dialogue, where the Jew had asked and I had 
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responded” is an admission to its invented nature (85). Likewise, despite claims of a true 
encounter with a Jew from Mainz, Crispin notes that he is writing “sub persona Iudei” 
(5.22).  
Limiting opposing arguments to ensure that Christian doctrinal points are 
vindicated testifies to the use of Jewish characters not as free agents but as instruments to 
defend and teach orthodox interpretation. Crispin’s Jew voices ideas originally expressed 
by Anselm and Jerome (Abulafia, Christians and Jews in Dispute VI, 141) and “much of 
what Leo has to say in [Odo’s] disputation is Christian rather than Jewish” (Abulafia, 
Christians and Jews in Dispute X, 385).  In this way, the Jew of the dialogues becomes a 
polyvalent sign, simultaneously an instructive mouthpiece for the Christian author and a 
defeated surrogate for those judaizing “Catholics who had been lost by taking the part of 
the Jew” and who should now realize that their doctrinal doubts have been misguided 
(Odo of Tournai 97).  
This conception of Jews as useful didactic instruments is not original to the 
medieval dialogues but derives from Augustine’s philosophy of testimonium veritatis, 
which finds its most famous medieval proponent in Bernard of Clairvaux. According to 
this notion, Jews have been and should continue to be preserved if only for their valuable 
function as keepers of the scriptures that testify to the truth of Christ through the 
typological prophecies contained therein. As such, they would remain “a continuing 
quotidian revelation of God’s will shining in the darkness of secular time” (Fredriksen 
365). In other words, Jews are exclusively objects for use, “an implement for preserving, 
transmitting, and expounding the prophecies of Christianity inscribed in the Old 
Testament” (my emphasis), compared by Augustine in one image to writing desks 
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[“scriniaria”] upon which sacred books may be placed (Cohen 29). And, in carrying the 
Old Testament, they are transmuted into the signs of the Old Testament themselves. In 
the words of Bernard, Jews become “the living letters (vivi…apices) of Scripture,” verba 
visibilia of a sort with the capacity to teach the typological truths of Christianity (qtd. in 
Cohen 236).
65
  Like pagan texts, Jews can thus be “despoiled” for their usus as didactic 
signs. The effectiveness of Jews as general instruments for Christian education, indicated 
by their repeated use in instructive dialogues, carries over to the Ordo repraesentationis 
Ade.  
Far from being “an afterthought [or] a footnote to the vivid biblical drama of the 
play’s earlier scenes,” the quidam de synagoga disputans who clashes with Isaiah bears a 
close resemblance to the Jews of twelfth-century interreligious debate literature, 
suggesting a shared purpose or influence; situating the Jew in this context is thus vital in 
illuminating his underappreciated role in the instruction of the play (Goodman 166). 
Since the audience for the Adam was not likely to include any Jews, summoning them to 
an assembly (“Vos, inquam, convenio, o Judei”) for the purpose of teaching them how to 
interpret their own sacred texts would clearly be a fruitless effort.
66
  Jennifer Goodman’s 
claim that the play is primarily “an argument for the conversion of Jews addressed to a 
contemporary Jewish audience” (162) remains unconvincing, as it discounts the primary 
Christian audience shared with the Latin debate literature, which was surely not aimed at 
Jews.  Moreover, it is difficult to imagine Jewish passersby, who may have been barred 
from proximity with churches during Holy Week (Goodman 176), stopping to engage 
themselves in a play that vehemently emphasizes the wrongness of their belief. Such 
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lessons in the play on reading signs are really directed at a questioning Christian 
audience, as in Odo’s and Crispin’s influential and widely circulated dialogues from 
earlier in the same century. In fact, the stage directions support identifying the Christian 
audience of the Adam with the “Judei” of the ordo prophetarum.   
When Daniel directs his prophecy “a vus, Judei,” the Latin rubric has him 
“stretching his hand toward those to whom he speaks” [“manum extendens contra eos ad 
quos loquitur”].67  It is unlikely that there is a group of real (or fictitious) Jews on stage, 
or they would have been mentioned in the same extensive and careful stage directions 
that call for the prophets to be prepared in a secret place, one by one [“in loco secreto 
singuli”].68  The similarity of the vocal quidam de synagoga disputans who confronts 
Isaiah, however briefly, in the Adam to the Jews of the interreligious debate literature 
from the same period suggests influence or at the very least a shared purpose.
69
  We can 
therefore expect that the author of the Adam uses his Judeus in much the same way as a 
didactic instrument. Close reading of the Jew’s narrative interruption reveals that he is 
specifically a vehicle for instruction on the proper interpretation of signs, a focus that 
exposes the playwright’s own desire to promote the didactic efficacy of dramatic signs.70     
Questioning the Reliability of Signs  
 
Isaiah’s prophecy in the ordo relates the conception of the Messiah in the line of 
Jesse (“Egredietur virga de radice Jesse”). Before the Jew will grant the validity of 
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Isaiah’s teaching on the subject, a concession that would require nothing less than the 
acceptance of typological interpretation as an exegetical method, he aims at establishing 
the validity of its verbal signs. The first question he asks about Isaiah’s words—“Est ço 
fable, ou prophecie?”— recapitulates the notion of invented tales (fabulas) as devoid of 
all truth, the antithesis of true prophecy (l. 884). When Judeus asks “truvas le tu, ou est 
escrit?” his choice of the verb “trover” labels Isaiah as a “troveor,” one who invents 
poetry and makes a profession of fabrication, and whose lessons are thus untrustworthy 
“fables” (l. 886). As if to reinforce the prophet’s potential role as a maker of fictions, an 
earlier rubric calls for him to be clad in “an ample cloak” (“magno indutus pallio”). 
Medieval French poetry contains numerous instances where poets are paid for their 
performances with gifts of robes or other garments, so that a sumptuous cloak would be 
for a jongleur or trouvère, “the outward sign of [poetic] talent” or skill at invention 
(Bloch, Scandal 48).
71
  By voicing concerns about the truth value contained in the verba 
of fiction, the Adam playwright answers raises potential objections of those (again 
represented figuratively as Jews) who may desire a clearer separation between the 
inalienable truth of Scripture and the invented content of drama before accepting the 
credibility of the play.  
Yet, the Jew’s suspicion that Isaiah’s words are untrue stems not only from their 
fictive nature, but also from their status as oral signs in the vernacular. Judeus voices his 
initial objection not to Isaiah’s Latin prophecy but to his longer paraphrase in Old French, 
for which the Jew repeatedly demands a prooftext. His “ou est escrit?” followed six lines 
later with “En livre est escrit?” (1518), opposes material that is written with that which is 
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recited by a trouvère, judging the former to be reliable and the latter not. All of the 
origins Judeus proposes for Isaiah’s teachings—fable, dreams (“tu le sonjas”), and jokes 
(“gas”)—are frequently associated with orality, not set down in writing and consequently 
mutable, of questionable authority because they are open to invention by the teller while 
remaining closed to textual examination (1509-10). Dreams, for example, were long held 
to be of dubious value in patristic and other ancient sources including Augustine’s 
influential account of vision where, at best, they were “sometimes false, sometimes true”  
(De Genesi ad litteram 12.18.39).
72
 Though they could contain true prophecy, they are 
“often fallacious” with an equally strong possibility of being “l’oeuvre de l’Ennemi” 
(Schmitt, Le corps 98).  
Similar apprehensions about the diabolism of oral performance are embedded in 
the play’s earlier representation of the Fall, where the devil is depicted as trouvère of 
sorts with Eve as his credulous audience. Insisting on the validity of his instruction (“Ne 
me crerras?” [545]; “n’aiez dutance” [567]),” Satan repeatedly defines his relationship 
with Eve as one of his narrating in the vernacular (“t’en dirrai” [452]; “te dirrai”[508) and 
her listening (“Orras me tu?” [456]; “tu m’ascute” [508]). For Steven Justice, the French 
spoken in the garden connects the narrative of the Fall with an audience that speaks the 
same language, enforcing a sense of shared culpability that depends on identifying the 
vernacular as a fallen “language of potential error, of ignorance, and…of duplicity” 
(855).  
Unlike Eve, the Jew will not trust what he hears unless he can scrutinize a written 
source for Isaiah’s teachings. This does not seem unreasonable, especially at a time when 
the production of texts was labour intensive and the material implements of writing—
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parchment and ink—important commodities. Works deemed worthy of preservation in 
written form, the Bible being the most prominent example, had to contain some 
significance, which Judeus understands to be the possession of truth. Conversely, putting 
something in writing could reinforce its permanence and imply its condition as 
unalterable fact. Eric Jager has discussed how clerical or monastic culture privileged 
“written tradition as a means not only of preserving the truth but also for avoiding error,” 
an idea promoted by Adam author’s own use of the extensive Latin stage directions (152).  
When the playwright seeks to ground his work in a set written script by specifying that 
the actors should “neither add nor subtract a syllable but pronounce them all steadily, and 
speak those things that are to be spoken in their due order,” he expresses a distrust of oral 
presentation similar to that of Judeus.
73
  And later, the ordo prophetarum commences 
with a similar warning for the prophets to pronounce their prophecies “aperte et distincte” 
(1304). The need to set down these caveats in the rubrics suggests that dramatic 
performance was fraught with risks of improvisation or misdelivery of lines. The only 
way to curtail the potential manipulation of didactic meaning in the play is to base all 
performances on a single, permanent written script that encompasses the author’s 
intended message. By setting the rubrics of this script not in Anglo-Norman French but in 
Latin, the language of Scripture and patristic texts, official papal and court documents, 
the Adam playwright also appears to subscribe to Judeus’s notion of Latinity as imbued 
with “qualities of prestige, stasis … and regularity,” as opposed to the sense of 
“impermanence, and change” that marks the vernacular (Machan 232).  
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Forcing the actors to conform to a written text may enforce the idea that writing 
retains truth that can be lost in oral presentation, but once we consider the play from the 
viewpoint of an audience, the author’s proscriptions become irrelevant. Unlike actors or a 
producer versed in reading Latin, audience members do not scrutinize the script and are 
unaware of its contents, receiving their instruction only through performance. They have 
no way of knowing whether the actors on stage are being true to the written intent of the 
playwright or not. Moreover, the Adam is the earliest extant play that provides Christian 
instruction in the vernacular, and so what they hear is not performed in Latin but in the 
vernacular and is thus not imbued with “the qualities of prestige, stasis … and 
regularity,” but with a reputation of the vernacular for “impermanence, and change” 
(Machan 230, 32). Vernacular commentary, translation, or retelling, as Rita Copeland has 
discussed, always “creates a certain difference with the source,” and a creative stage 
version of the Genesis text in Anglo-Norman French would appear to risk the 
concomitant loss of auctoritas due to this difference (103). Indeed, the laity took belief in 
the authority of sacred Latin works to the point that the codices in which they were 
inscribed became physical talismans, “regularly fetishized as objects of awe and mystery” 
(Green 263). So, if the Jew continues to represent a Christian audience for the Adam, his 
refusal to accept instruction without written evidence, presumably in Latin, may 
anticipate suspicion of the play, by either lay viewers or other clerici, as a means of 
education. If the Jew is correct about the unreliability of oral verba in the vernacular, his 
objection threatens the didactic potential of the dramatic performance. 
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Res significandi in the Adam 
To assess the Adam author’s responses to Judeus’s objections, it is again useful to 
consider the context of other Jewish-Christian debates. The didactic purpose of these 
dialogues determines that the Jew’s argument can never be right; his ideas are raised 
simply to be refuted, as they are in the Adam, albeit in a much more compressed form. 
The response to the Jew in the play differs markedly from other debates, however, in 
defending the didactic value of dramatic performance at least as much as it upholds 
Christian doctrine. The Adam author clearly does not view his verbal signs as fictive, for 
one thing: significantly, the only character in the play other than Judeus to accuse another 
of fabrication is the murderous Cain, who does so wrongly and in nearly the same 
phasing—“Ja est ço fable” (l. 654). The playwright’s proscription against changing a 
single syllable of his script is reminiscent of warnings against the alteration of sacred 
texts and bespeaks an attempt to give his work a commensurate status above fiction.
74
  If 
a Christian audience member is unlikely to accept Judeus’s assertion that the prophecies 
of a prophet like Isaiah are “fable,” he or she likewise should not doubt the lessons taught 
by a play that is also ultimately grounded in Scripture and closely allied to sacred (Latin) 
liturgy through its responsories and ordo prophetarum.  
 Where Judeus’s insistence on written proof is concerned, Isaiah can easily provide 
a chapter and verse from the Old Testament, which is the entire purpose of the ordo 
prophetarum in which he appears—to convince disbelieving Jews with the evidence of 
their own sacred texts.   This is what takes place in the twelfth-century Ordo ad 
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repraesentandum Herodem when Herod’s scribes find and present evidence of Christ’s 
miraculous birth by paging through the Hebrew Bible (l. 56), but no such effort at 
presenting prooftexts is made in the Adam. That Isaiah resists drawing on the authority of 
the Bible for support is surprising in this context (and in its own right), even more so 
since the prophet appears on stage “ferens librum in manu,” with a book (presumably of 
Scripture) that he refuses to use, preferring the unwritten “book of life” for proof.75  Here 
the Adam author goes out of his way to eschew biblical authority in favour of the more 
important point that writing, though potentially more stable than oral verba, is neither an 
automatic guarantor of truth nor the best source of instruction. In so doing, while 
simultaneously seeking to lock his own text in a written script, the playwright perfectly 
illustrates what M.T. Clanchy has identified as new tensions between written and oral 
signs—the latter of which should also encompass exchanges of objects and witness to 
visible acts—as most reliable in presenting truth.  
Written works like those of the classical auctores and the Church fathers had been 
set down on parchment because they already possessed status on account of their age or 
connection with divine teachings and were not rendered authoritative solely by virtue of 
being written down. On the contrary, in the Norman England of the Adam play, newly 
written texts often begot distrust, particularly among those who could not write and did 
not possess a mastery of reading, as Clanchy has shown.
76
  For these individuals, who 
were not few, information in written works was more suspect than what was simply 
heard. Such suspicion was evidently well founded, for monks as “the traditional experts 
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in writing, were also the greatest forgers” (Clanchy 234), taking full advantage of the 
permanence of the written word, “so that a document which stated something untrue or 
unverifiable would continue to state it—and make it look authentic and proven—as long 
as that document existed” (Clanchy 193). As a consequence of this mistrust, it was 
expected that an “honest person . . . did not demand written proof,” while a disreputable 
one, like Judeus, would insist upon it (Clanchy 193).  
The nature of the Adam play as a performed piece also depends inescapably on 
signs that are other than written. Because of this, the playwright must refute Judeus’s 
insistence that truth only resides in a written textual source if he is to preserve the 
didactic value of his dramatic enterprise. Given the potentially negative aspects of written 
signs (and the need to promote the non-written signs of performance), when Isaiah finally 
admits that evidence for the truth of his prophecy does originate in a book, the text he 
refers to is not an actual codex but the metaphorical “book of life.”77 
Within the book “de vie,” things that are seen (“vëu”) are prioritized rather than 
written or even spoken signs, as they are in Augustinian semiotics, (l. 893). Images, 
following Gregory the Great’s dictum, can properly instruct not only the uneducated but 
also “those who knew only vernacular languages,” bolstering the authority of instruction 
provided to this sort of audience by the play (Kessler, “Gregory” 163).  Images can thus 
serve as authorized antidotes to the “fluid, often embellished oral accounts” of biblical 
narrative (Kessler, “Gregory” 163). The Adam author’s choice to rhyme “veer” (“to see”) 
and “voir” (“true”) suggests that he too holds that visual signs signify truthfully, a 
proposition proven in the strange episode with “no specific biblical source” that follows 
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Isaiah’s mention of the book of life (Muir 108). Judeus shows Isaiah his hand and asks 
the prophet to tell him if this external sign signifies a healthy or a sick heart, a metaphor 
for his spiritual condition (ll. 899-900).
78
  Isaiah responds that it signifies the Jew’s 
incurable state of error, a finding that appears obvious and easily arrived at given the 
doctrinal emphasis of the play without the need for chiromancy. Nevertheless, Isaiah’s 
correct interpretation instantly convinces Judeus that objects apprehended visually signify 
the truth more readily than written texts; he abandons his insistence on textual proof and 
asks the prophet to reprise what he has seen in his vision, upon which all the Jews will 
take Isaiah as their schoolmaster and “hearken to [his] teaching” (l. 910-13).79  What 
better testimony to the instructive efficacy of a heavily visual medium like Church 
drama?  
Indeed, in its use of visual signs, the Adam embodies all three ways in which 
images may be used pedagogically, later termed the triplex ratio by Aquinas: it instructs, 
moves to devotion, and prompts recollection (Kessler, “Gregory” 152). First, as soon as 
Judeus learns to recognize the power of objects (res) in signifying visually—a lesson he 
derives from Isaiah’s analysis of his hand—he can learn about typological reading as an 
exegetical method. In medieval exegesis, such as Hugh of St. Victor’s De Archa Noe,  
visuals are frequently promoted as the optimal means of teaching typological 
interpretation, “because the representation of typologies in pictures will imprint 
exegetical concepts on the mind more forcefully than by other means” (Christopher 
Hughes 174). This generally refers to art that provides “visual exegesis” of biblical 
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content in medieval churches or manuscript illustrations, but it would seem to apply 
equally to drama, which frequently emphasizes typology (Christopher Hughes 183).  
The initial prophecy that had prompted Judeus’s to interrupt the ordo involves a 
description from the Vulgate of a flowering branch arising from the root of Jesse, 
followed by Isaiah’s interpretation of it. What Judeus had questioned was not the visual 
image but the prophet’s typological reading of it as a sign. The Jew, whose inability to 
interpret is necessarily exaggerated for rhetorical reasons, seems to perceive the 
flowering branch as little more than that, a literal object communicating its own nature as 
a branch. Isaiah interprets it as anticipating the birth of Christ through Mary, based on an 
Augustinian understanding that certain res—like “the wood which . . . Moses cast into 
the bitter waters to make them sweet … the stone which Jacob used as a pillow … the 
ram which Abraham offered up instead of his son”—signify allegorically (Augustine, De 
doctrina 1.2.2). Having learned to view objects as possessing the ability to signify 
truthfully, Judeus recognizes the branch as an occasion of allegoria in rebus, and asks for 
details about its interpretation such as whether it is “verge ou baston” and who will be 
born from its flower (l. 908-9). Judeus’s questioning thus becomes a didactic tool 
promoting the central lesson of how one comes to interpret res typologically, without 
which knowledge Christians will interpret scriptural signs literally, like Jews. 
The importance of typological reading is emphasized on many levels within the 
Adam. It is inherent in the overarching structure of the play as a whole, which, though 
incomplete, would seem to have concluded with Christ’s redemption of Adam. In his 
prophecy, Abraham (who is unique to the Adam ordo prophetarum) strongly suggests 
this conclusion, speaking directly of “Jhesu, le nostre salvaor,/Qui Adam trarra de grant 
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dolor,/Et remetra en paräis” (l. 925-27). Typology is also stressed in the ordo 
prophetarum; as each prophet declares his role in anticipating the coming of Christ, he 
indicates his place in a chronological progression based on the New Testament 
fulfillment of Old Testament signs.
80
  Res that possess typological meaning communicate 
God’s plan through events and objects in the world and are therefore free of deception, 
unlike verba, which are created by humans in a fallen condition and are hence prone to 
manipulation.  
From the perspective of Augustinian semiotics, even res like Judeus’s hand that 
do not serve as signs from God share the reliability of divine language and come close to 
the sign-less communication possible before the Fall. Actions like walking or eating, for 
example, signify themselves by being performed and seen, without need of verbal 
explanation, so that one “doesn’t learn at all unless he himself sees what is described” 
(Augustine, De magistro 12.39). Similarly, in Augustine’s description of how he learned 
the meaning of spoken words as a child, verba are zero referents, mere sounds that bear 
no meaning until the res they refer to are pointed out and seen (Conf. 1.8). The 
effectiveness of a visible sign in converting Judeus continues to illustrate the Augustinian 
sense of visual learning as superior, a conclusion that extends to the Adam playwright’s 
prioritization of dramatic res—props, scenery, costumes, gestures, and action on stage—
over words in conveying instruction.  
The presence of ample stage directions in the Adam points to a concern with 
extra-verbal signification. Among other twelfth-century plays, only those of the Fleury 
collection, in Latin, provide a similar amount of detail. The Fleury Ordo ad 
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repraesentandum Herodem contains directions such as “let Herod and his son make 
threatening gestures with their swords” and “let the Magi go to sleep there in front of the 
manger,” but these do not concentrate on the performers’ actions as signs (Bevington 64-
65). Along with its caveat not to alter the spoken dialogue of the script, the Adam rubrics 
require that performers make gestures appropriate to the subject matter they are speaking 
about (“faciant convenientem rei de qua loquuntur”).81  This warning is reminiscent of 
one in Quintilian’s Instituta Oratoria warning to avoid histrionics during rhetorical 
performance (action) that could create a disconnect between what is being said and the 
accompanying gesture  (11.3.87). Similarly, gesture and bodily movement serve a 
rhetorical function in the play as signs that convey information independently of speech 
and so must be used with care to preserve the proper meaning of the play.   
 Jody Enders also connects the use of gesture in medieval French drama, including 
the Adam, to the rhetorical tradition, especially Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria, which 
maintains the notion of “gesture as ‘truer’ than language, truer than words, truer than 
writing in that it could agree holistically not with language but with such internal 
motivations as thought and character” (Enders, “Of Miming” 7). Where the didactic 
efficacy of non-verbal signs comes into play, I would amend Enders’ assertion that “in 
rhetoric as in drama, gesture and other visual phenomena speak first” (as apparent in the 
Adam) to include the equally important contribution of Augustine’s semiotics (“Of 
Miming” 10).82   
Following Augustine’s notion of signa naturalia (though here presented with 
intent to signify), the Adam stage directions operate under the assumption that human 
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facial expressions are a form of non-verbal communication that can be used in drama to 
signify inner emotional states without possibility of misunderstanding. When Adam 
refuses the devil’s temptation, for instance, the latter withdraws “tristis et vultu dimisso” 
but approaches Eve “laeto vultu.”83  Later, when the Figura confronts Eve, he does so 
“minaci vultu.”84  It is presumed in each of these instances that an actor would know how 
to represent sadness, happiness, or threat with an expression and that an audience that has 
not read the rubrics would understand the meaning of each look. Besides facial 
expression, movement also has the ability to signify transparently. The actor playing 
Adam can indicate piety by inclining his head in one way (“caput pie inclinans”) and rage 
in another (“cum magna indignatione movens caput”).85  Shame on account of sin can be 
conveyed through a more complex series of movements, by standing “not fully upright, 
but . . . somewhat bent forward.”86  And when Adam and Eve suffer violent grief, they 
indicate it by throwing themselves to the ground and striking their breasts and their 
thighs, “manifesting their sorrow with their gestures” (“dolorem gestu fatentes”) in a 
manner that the audience would understand.
87
 This may draw on the second value of 
images, eliciting emotional investment from an audience. Though it does not promote the 
level of affective piety in later Middle English Passion plays, the emphasis on conveying 
emotion through facial expression, gesture and body language contributes to engagement 
with the content of the play.  
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The use of physical signs of this sort is extensive enough for Lynette Muir to 
consider “the dumb-shows and the mime” one component of the tripartite structure that 
comprises the play (3). However, despite the extensive visual communication present, 
this is obviously not the only means of instruction: the play is not a “dumb-show.” If 
dramatic res are primary in the play, words are also necessary at least to “gloss the 
images of theater” (Lerud, Memory, Images 47). Herbert Kessler has written extensively 
on the importance of tituli or written captions to sacred works of visual art during the 
Middle Ages. These—most notably the “Nec Deus nec homo” accompanying depictions 
of Christ—were designed to tell the viewer how to perceive the image, circumscribing 
interpretation and understanding.  One of the objections to images raised by the Libri 
Carolini was the fact that they did not signify transparently in all cases; for example, it 
might be impossible to tell whether a painted depiction of a beautiful woman represented 
Venus or the Virgin Mary based on visual cues alone (Kessler “Spiritual Seeing” 187). 
Therefore, verbal captions were necessary to identify figures in sacred images at least to 
those who were literate enough to understand the label. Drama requires no such literacy 
as the identification of biblical figures is delivered to an audience as spoken text, as in the 
Salerno ordo prophetarum, which pre-dates the Adam and follows the original Sermo 
contra Judeos closely. Here, the lector invokes each prophet using the repeated verbal 
formula “Dic et tu [prophet’s name], testimonium Christi” before each delivers his 
speech.
88
  In Limoges, the cantor likewise calls upon each prophet by name: “Israel, vir 
lenis, inque de Christo,” “Dic tu, David,” and so on.89  Naming functions as a convenient 
didactic or mnemonic aid enabling the audience (which for a Latin work was likely a 
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clerical one), to identify the personage on an elementary level and to join speaker to 
scriptural passage for more sophisticated understanding.  
While the opening rubrics for the Adam procession include similar direction for 
the prophets to be called by name (“vocantur per nomen prophete”), no specific lines are 
provided to be repeated before each prophet’s appearance—only Abraham is given the 
line “Abraham sui” (l. 745).90 On the other hand, the costuming and props given for each 
speaker in the ordo receives detailed attention.  The Adam author deemphasizes the 
naming the prophets, just as he does not allow Isaiah to provide Judeus with a scriptural 
citation, to promote instruction by the visual interpretation of res. The props or 
accoutrements possessed by the prophets in the ordo are signs indicating who they are 
and often their relationship to one another. Abraham is “senex cum barba prolixa,” 
befitting the forefather of Israel. Moses bears “in dextra virgam et sinistra tabulas,” the 
latter which identifies him easily still today. Aaron appears “episcopali ornatu, ferens in 
manibus suis virgam cum floribus.”  His garb as a bishop is a useful reminder of his 
status as High Priest, and his virga, which has typological significance in its own right, 
connects him to his brother Moses who carries the same object. An ornate diadem and 
other royal (in)sign(ia)s label David as a biblical king. Solomon, also a king, is dressed 
the same way but naturally appears younger than his father David. The Fleury Herod 
contains directions that the ruler’s scribes should be “barbati” and his companions clad 
“in habitu juvenili” but these do not come close to the detailed signs particular to specific 
figures (Bevington 62). 
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“sire Ysaias” (l. 883). 
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Certainly, these res do not teach on their own who the prophets are or tell their 
stories; they are not self-evident in their signification. Instead, they serve the third 
purpose of images, which is to prompt recollection, depending on a prior knowledge of 
what the prophets are supposed to look like based on “a well-defined visual code of 
representation, by which a saint could . . . be defined by his attributes” as depicted in 
ordines prophetarum carved on the facades of churches and cathedrals like Notre Dame 
(Camille, “Seeing” 33). John Colletta has described how the props of the prophets in the 
Adam are “precisely the objects that had come to symbolize a prophet” in sculpted 
representations of the ordo from the late-eleventh and early-twelfth centuries (80). Most 
medieval Christians would have been familiar with these images and would have learned 
whom they signified either by reading the accompanying inscriptions or through “a 
combination of questions and insights supplied by others,” if they were unable to read 
Latin (Noakes qtd. in Camille, “Seeing” 33). Indeed, in his second letter to Serenus, 
Gregory describes the value of images using the term “addiscere,” “to learn more,” 
implying that there is some pre-existing verbal instruction (XI, 10.23). If an individual 
should come upon the likeness of a prophet again in the Adam, there would be an instant 
recognition based on remembrance. In this sense, the props and costumes of the Adam are 
visually mnemonic rather than didactic, spurring recollection of a pre-existing system of 
non-verbal, iconographic signification and dependent upon it for their interpretation. This 
process still comprises an important part of learning; once remembrance takes place, 
visual appearance teaches which Old Testament authority spoke which typological 
prophecy about the coming of Christ.  
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The costumes and props in the Adam function within this mnemonic system not 
only to revive the memory of prior images but to inscribe images in the mind for future 
recollection, as they are themselves visually memorable. For this last stage of the learning 
process, the playwright draws on the rhetorical tradition present in manuals like Cicero’s 
De oratore that advocate the value of “mental pictures” as a means of remembering 
words or concepts for oratorical situations, advice that reappears in what Mary Carruthers 
has spoken of as the “completely medieval art of ‘images in places’” (Memory 130). 
Though not widely influential until the thirteenth century, the pseudo-Ciceronian 
Rhetorica ad Herennium was copied as early as the eighth century in Corbie and was 
commented on in the 11
th
-century at the school of Chartres (Lerud, Memory, Images 11; 
Copeland 159). It offers a good example of how the memory space works, recommending 
that one imagine figures of “exceptional beauty or singular ugliness,” for example, 
individuals extravagantly dressed “with crowns or purple cloaks” (III, 22.37), so they can 
more easily be recollected, and situating them before an ordered backdrop: “a house, an 
intercolumnar space, a recess, an arch, or the like” (III, 17.29).  
As Enders notes, an ars memoriae like this that requires “detailed memory 
backgrounds against which vividly costumed characters moved holding their special 
props” could very well be describing actors, scenery, and props on stage (The Medieval 
Theater of Cruelty 68). In fact, Theodore Lerud has argued convincingly that medieval 
theater developed, like medieval art, specifically in the mnemonic tradition, “as external 
versions of those images necessary to the psychological processes of memory and 
understanding” (“Quick Images” 213). No where is this more apparent than in the Adam 
which draws on the mnemonic and rhetorical significance of images as an integral part of 
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its didactic method, dressing the prophets of the ordo in “largis vestibus” (1306, 1407), 
rich robes and crowns of the sort described in the Ad Herennium, so that their vivid visual 
attributes might enable an audience to better retain the typological messages they 
present.
91
  And, it is easy to imagine the recesses, arches and areas between columns as 
loci inside or outside the church building that comprised the performative spaces for the 
play. 
The same opening stage directions that specify details of costuming and props 
also insist that any actor who names (“nominaverit”) paradise is to “look in its direction 
and point it out with his hand” (“respiciat eum et manu demonstret”).”  This requirement 
implies that naming with words alone is insufficient to convey meaning. As Jean-Claude 
Schmitt puts it, “Pour être compris, on ne peut dire ‘ceci’ sans pointer l’index vers l’objet 
don’t il est question” (La Raison 47); one must see the res being named, to which one is 
directed by another non-verbal sign—the pointing hand. Consistent with Augustine’s 
description of learning the names for things in the Confessions, as well as his discussion 
with Adeodatus in the De Magistro (3.5), pointing tells the viewer that a semiotic 
relationship exists between what is described verbally and its physical referent on stage, 
directing him or her to discover the attributes of the object through visual scrutiny. 
Pointing is thus the gestural equivalent of the verbal “ecce,” a means of instructing 
without words (De Magistro 10.34).  
Several prophecies in the ordo prophetarum depend upon this type of visual 
assessment to illuminate their symbolic significance, which may not otherwise be 
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accessible to the audience. Habakkuk, in declaring his awe of the “works of God” shows 
the object of his fear and wonder by raising his hand “contra ecclesiam.”92  A more direct 
visual interpretation is provided for Jeremiah’s reference to the people of Judaea entering 
“ceste porte…Por nostre Seignor aourer” (l. 859-60). When Jeremiah indicates the doors 
of the church building, he attaches a typological referent from the history of the Church 
to his Old Testament prophecy, one physically present before the medieval audience: the 
prophet’s demand that the people of Judah return to the Temple to worship becomes a 
admonition for Jews to enter the Church. In each case, the gesture of pointing reinforces a 
different way of perceiving other visual signs, reminding the audience to look beyond the 
literal to the typological signification of certain res. 
A mindset that sees events and objects as signifying across the past, present, and 
future is critical to typological understanding. Interpreting Aaron’s rod as not just a 
physical staff but a res significandi referring to the advent of Christ through Mary 
requires one to recognize the object for what it is in the Exodus story as well as its 
meaning centuries later. Connecting the doors of a twelfth-century Romanesque church to 
the prophet Jeremiah’s words in the Holy Land more than a thousand years before 
demands an interpretation of signs that straddles time and space. This is borne out in the 
iconography of the period as well: an illumination of Christ’s supper at the house of 
Simon the Pharisee in the St. Alban’s Psalter, for example, depicts the literal bread of the 
meal marked as the sacramental host of later ritual.
93
  
An essential part of Christian education involved training people to “see through” 
the literal referent of a sign and simultaneously visualize the typological one it also 
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signified at another time. The most famous iconographic instance of pointing in 
Christianity—John the Baptist’s indication of Jesus as “Agnus Dei” in John 1:29—
presents just such a typological “ecce” relationship between sign and referent.  John is 
not indicating a literal lamb or a metaphorical one but is identifying Christ typologically 
as the messianic sacrifice in Isaiah and as the eschatological lamb of the Apocalypse.
94
  
The semiotic relationship thus pointed out remains a true one, as devout viewers of this 
iconographic representation would “see through” to its typological referent.  
On the other hand, pointing out the stage set hung with curtains and silken 
hangings whenever “paradise” is mentioned would seem to promote a relationship of 
false signification: the dramatic res indicated is a constructed set piece, not the historic or 
biblical garden suggested by the verbal signs applied to it. Yet, the directions for its 
construction–“Constituatur paradisus”–do not call for a simulacrum of paradise to be 
constructed, but paradise itself.
 95
  Eugene Vance locates the same lack of distinction in 
the rubric insisting that “‘Adam’ (and not the actor playing Adam–the differences 
between author, actor, and spectator are not yet distinct) must be well instructed (bene 
instructus)” in how to respond (195). By way of contrast, the Regularis concordia, 
frequently cited as the earliest evidence of histrionic elements in liturgy, describes the set 
piece of its Easter service as “a kind of likeness of the sepulcher” [quaedam assimilatio 
sepulchri], going out of its way to resist a direct identification (Bevington 16).  More 
contemporary with the Adam, the opening rubric from the Fleury playbook visitatio 
speaks of making “similitudinem Dominici sepulcri” and not the sepulcher itself 
(Bevington 39).  
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More than a symptom of an incipient drama that does not account for simulation, 
this equivalence can be seen from one perspective as continuing to promote the 
typological instruction of the play. The naming and pointing that takes place in reference 
to the paradisus adorned with hangings, fruit, and flowers may refer to the part of the 
church building so festooned and thus, by synecdoche, to the church/Church itself, which 
is typologically anticipated by paradise in patristic writings (Justice 864). In this case, the 
act of pointing is again meant to indicate a relation based on typological signification, 
and by the same principle the actor playing Adam is Adam just as all men are.  
In a broader sense, the lack of separation between actor and character, stage set 
and historical place is an indication of how medieval church drama participates in and 
promotes a particular way of looking at what Baschet calls “image-objets” from painting 
and sculpture to dramatic representation (16). Baschet’s term is useful in capturing the 
medieval notion that such visual res were always to be perceived as objects of usus, signs 
of other transcendent realities, not referents in their own right. We can already see the 
application of this Augustinian distinction to images in Gregory’s letters to Serenus 
where images are acceptable in the practice of worship only if they are not adored but 
viewed as signs of “the invisible world ‘out there’” (Kessler Spiritual 105). In Gregory’s 
formulation, “it is one thing to adore a picture, another to learn through the picture what 
should be adored” (Ep. 11). This idea would serve as the cornerstone in how to view 
images without partaking in idolatry and is recapitulated often in the tituli that 
accompany examples of visual art like the Hitda Codex image of Majestas Domini (c. 
1000), reminding viewers, “This visual image represents the invisible truth” (Kessler, 
“Gregory” 153).  
  83 
Such a caveat is not necessary in the Adam, for it is unlikely that any audience 
would mistake a constructed paradise for the real thing, or venerate it, so the insistence 
on its being “paradisus” is instead an invitation to “‘see through’ [the]…image in order to 
experience a higher reality behind it” (Ehrstine 265); it would be improper to see a stage 
set as being its transcendent counterpart, but it is necessary to use the former to imagine 
the latter.
96
 In a manner that is strongly Platonic, the successful response to an image, 
whether a painting or dramatic res, recognizes that it is not an end point, not a thing 
merely to be enjoyed, but something that functions on the order of transitus: as a means 
of accessing the divine (Baschet 42). Here, Augustine’s tripartite concept of vision again 
comes into play. Corporeal vision may see one thing on stage, but if one “sees through” 
and identifies what is seen with its biblical referent, it is raised to the level of spiritual 
sight or imagination “from which truth will be abstracted by the intellectual sight,” 
leading to an understanding of the sacred (Scherb, Staging 19).   
It is no wonder dramatic performance developed as a means of Christian 
instruction, for the process of elevated seeing is inherent to the medium. Augustine’s 
concern in the Soliloquia that the actor Roscius could be simultaneously a real man and a 
real actor and a “falsa Hecuba” or a “falsus Priamus” touches on the essential doubleness 
of dramatic res (2.18); they are always two things at once: what they are in the real world 
and what they represent in the play, though drama, including the Adam, encourages its 
audience to let the former disappear. As a rule, an audience “looks past, or through, the 
real events on stage” (Saltz 203) to that which is represented, and to the degree an 
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audience focuses on the representation, “the real world is ‘subdued’ and ‘transcended’” 
whereas attending to the props as props or actors as actors distracts from appreciating the 
representation (Saltz 206). Thus, dramatic res “are only important because they are 
objects of imagining” (Saltz 210). The correct way to encounter visual signs promoted by 
the Adam, however, as a medieval Christian way of seeing, has particular spiritual 
significance. The need to transcend corporeal vision—like going past literal interpretation 
or rejecting fructus for usus—so crucial for spiritual understanding, is conveniently 
embedded in the dramatic medium, whereby spectators not only see to learn but also 
learn to see. Just as the arrangement of pictures and tituli in manuscripts or on the walls 
of churches often directed viewers’ eyes in a way that reinforced an upward progression 
from the material to the sacred invisible, the conglomeration of gesture, staging, and 
dialogue in dramatic performance were also designed for the purpose of “setting in 
motion a dialogic process, an intellectual movement” from corporeal vision up the ladder 
to spiritual seeing and higher understanding (Kessler, Neither God Nor Man 132).  
The audience for the Adam would already be accustomed to interpreting signs in 
this fashion if not from looking at visual art then from liturgy. As Ehrstine observes, 
“scenic enactment” in dramatic performance “encouraged spectators to elide the 
boundaries between stage representations and their spiritual significance, producing a 
‘sacramental gaze’” (265) similar to what took place when they viewed the bread and 
wine of the Eucharist as the real body and blood of Christ, truly and miraculously present 
before them.
97
  Those who partook in the sacrament were encouraged to suspend what 
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they saw with their corporeal eye, so the transformation that occured became real. In 
Aquinas’s formulation, “no bodily eye can see the body of Christ contained in this 
sacrament” (qtd. in Beckwith, Signifying 61). As with the Mass, audience members for 
the Adam also participate “par les yeux de corps mais surtout à travers eux par les ‘yeux 
de l’âme’” (Schmitt, Le corps 360).  
Indeed, encouragement to view the res in the Adam with the same mentality that 
one would maintain in Eucharistic devotion comes from the Latin lectiones in the play, 
which, as Joseph Dane observes, “refer the audience to the Mass, where the listener is 
accustomed to understand things as signs” (22).98 Beckwith observes that the Eucharist is 
fraught with “an almost irreducible tension between visible and invisible…precisely 
because of its flagrant transgression of the evidence of the senses” (Signifying 61), sight 
in particular, but there is less tension in drama because it aims to a greater degree at being 
mimetic. Seeing through the Adam stage set to the true paradise of Genesis actually 
requires less imagination than the sacrament, since it is planted with “odiferi flores et 
frondes…diversae arbores et fructus.”99 One can imagine Abraham when looking at an 
actor dressed as the prophet.  While indicating the stage paradise as the original paradise 
is not laden with the complexity surrounding transubstantiation, part of the devotional 
experience of religious drama, as represented by the play, involves similarly visualizing 
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the dramatic res as if they were really and truly present before the gaze.
100
 As they are 
enacted, the directions of the play enforce this idea.  
Interestingly, the technique used in the Adam to promote proper seeing of a visual 
sign anticipates what would later be done in the liturgy. By the end of the twelfth century, 
it would not be enough to indicate the transformation of bread into flesh through the 
priest’s words—hoc est corpus meum—alone. A “gesture of elevation [that] marked the 
moment of consecration” was integrated into the Mass for this purpose (Rubin 55). With 
the development of sacramental elevation, “the essence of the rite lay in seeing the host” 
(Rubin 60). The officiant reinforced the transformation of bread into the true referent of 
his spoken words by visual display, leaning on gesture to indicate a true semiotic 
relationship, not unlike an actor who repeatedly indicates “paradisus” (Rubin 55).  
It is possible, however, that the ability to see beyond dramatic res significandi can 
go too well according to one of the rare objectors to church drama, Gerhoh of 
Reichersberg. In his De investigatione Antichristi (1161-62), Gerhoh writes, 
Sed divinitas insuper et matura facies ecclesiae abhorret spectacula 
theatralia, non respicit in vanitates et insanias falsas, immo non falsas sed 
iam veras insanias, in quibus viri totos se frangunt in feminas quasi pudeat 
eos, quod viri sunt, clerici in milites, homines se in daemonum larvas 
transfigurant.” (qtd. in Young II, 412) 
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Gerhoh’s emphasis on the “false, nay, not false but indeed true madness” that 
takes place on stage, such as how an actor playing a dead man who was resurrected died 
shortly thereafter, smacks of Augustinian concerns about the confusing mixing of truth 
and falsehood in fabulas and on the stage (Clopper 44). Gerhoh also rehearses 
longstanding objections to the frivolousness of theater, affiliating some liturgical drama 
with Roman “spectacula theatralia.” However, he seems especially concerned with the 
transformative aspect of drama: how men shame themselves by changing 
[“transfigurant”] “entirely into women” (“totos…in feminas”), clerics into soldiers, or 
humans into demons. Somehow the true nature or aspect of the actor is unnaturally 
subsumed and erased by the act of impersonation. Indeed, speaking about another form of 
dramatic res—masks—Twycross and Carpenter surmise that medieval audiences were 
not likely “to look behind the mask, or recognise a tension between it and the actor . . . . 
Once the mask is on, the actor as an individual man simply disappears behind or into it: 
only the character is left” (32-33). The ability to see past objects on stage to what they 
signify is, at least in Gerhoh’s estimation, too effective when clerical actors are seen as 
Herod, the Antichrist or the demons they play while their status as holy men is 
overlooked (Clopper 44). 
 
Augustine’s “Intus Magister” in the Benediktbeuern Ludus de nativitate 
For a medieval audience, the suspension of disbelief necessary for viewers to 
identify the true referent of the sacrament or to envision the space outside a church as the 
paradise of Genesis represents more than the willingness to imagine spoken of by 
Coleridge: it is a pious act adhering to Augustine’s concept of the Inner Teacher, wherein 
  88 
faith is the first prerequisite for learning the proper interpretation of visual signs. As 
archetypal non-believers, Jews are therefore emblematic of an inability to learn; Isaiah 
tells Judeus that his condition of error is permanent because the latter’s continued 
adherence to Judaism is enough to preclude the possibility that he will be graced with 
understanding. The prophet, whose faith is sure, is conversely able to arrive easily at the 
meaning of Judeus’s hand  “par Deu vertu” (l. 894) just as what he has seen in the book 
of life has been taught by God (“de Deu l’ai apris”) (l. 928). But Judeus has apparently 
also begun to internalize Christian belief during his discussion with Isaiah, for he asks the 
prophet to repeat his teachings with the expectation of learning from them. 
The connection of belief to learning only hinted at in the Adam is the central 
didactic focus of another twelfth-century drama, the Benediktbeuern Ludus de nativitate, 
which explores the issue again through its characterization of Jews. Like the Adam, the 
Benediktbeuern Christmas play contains an ordo prophetarum, termed “the most 
imaginative version of the Procession of Prophets to be found anywhere in medieval 
drama” (Bevington 179).  In this processus, each of the prophets emphasizes the inviolate 
nature of the Virgin Mary—another aspect of Christian doctrine subject to twelfth-
century doctrinal scrutiny—and not the typological signs predicting the advent of Christ. 
The energy and innovation of the ordo, however, is owed largely to another polemical 
interruption by a Jewish antagonist, this time called Archisynagogus, whose extravagant 
gesturing (“imitando gestus Judaei in omnibus”) is a form of dramatic res that signifies 
his Jewishness transparently.
101
   
Unlike his counterpart in the Adam, Archisynagogus does not demand textual 
support for a typological reading but requests a rational methodology of arriving at the 
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truth of the Virgin Birth. He declares that he has come with the sole expectation of 
learning the “chain of events” (“rerum series”) behind the logic-defying concept that he 
has heard so much about (ll. 85-86). In doing this, he seems to be opening the door for a 
Christian-Jewish debate that will ultimately reaffirm the purity of the Virgin for any 
Christians who evince doubts similar to those expressed by Archisynagogus. Indeed, as in 
contemporary written debates, the Jewish participant is made to voice Christian doctrine 
even in stating his objections. Marsicano notes, “Even [Archisynagogus’] oxymoron 
about the wolf fleeing the lamb puts Christian iconography on his lips” (61). 
Archisynagogus appears to be present to provide a didactic lesson based on rational 
explanation and “argumenta,” an expectation that is generally fulfilled in Christian-
Jewish debates like those by Odo and Crispin. And so, when the Boy Bishop who 
presides over the festivities calls on “The mind of Augustine,/By whom the dispute/May 
be brought to an end” (99-102), there is every anticipation of an intellectual battle, one 
that will reaffirm the purity of the Virgin on rational grounds for any Christians 
harbouring doubts similar to those voiced by the Jew. 
Augustine begins his appearance by commanding his Jewish opposition to “open 
their ears” (“nunc aures aperi”) to verbal instruction, which prompts only loud laughter 
from Archisynagogus (l. 119). In line with the theme of overturning and reversal that 
governs Christmas festivities like the Feast of Fools, what follows is marked by a curious 
incongruence between stage directions and dialogue, expectation and actualization. While 
the directions call for Archisynagogus to address Augustine’s testimony on the virgin 
birth “cum nimio cachinno,”102 his words actually contain a well-ordered refutation of the 
statement “virgo pariet” as a concept “quod negat ratio” (l. 131). The dialectical 
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construction of Archisynagogus’ words establishes his desire for Augustine to respond 
“ad objectum,” to continue in the debate format using the same method; and, if the 
didactic purpose of the Christmas Play were indeed to defend Christian doctrine using 
reason, we would expect Augustine to answer the latter’s objections with logic (l. 164-
65). Instead, Augustine halts the discussion, completely eschewing “argumenta moresque 
sophistici” as methods of arriving at the truth of miraculous events on the manifest 
grounds that reason falters in this unique case (“talis casus unici”) (ll. 169-71).  
 This is highly unusual, for in addition to the existing tradition of Jewish-Christian 
written polemic as a mode of defending Christian belief, “rational dialogue was 
becoming a preferred medium of arguing about theology” as early as the eleventh century 
where it also was identified strongly with Augustine based on his debates with the 
Manicheans (Novikoff 394, 417). Moreover, no excuse bars rational argument about the 
Virgin Birth elsewhere in the context of interreligious debate. Odo’s argument defending 
the notion of Mary’s bodily purity relies specifically on the concept of “ratio” as superior 
to “sensus,” for instance, while Inghetto Contardo’s Disputationes contra Judeos bases 
its justification on empirical observation of parthenogenesis in earthworms;
103
 therefore, 
despite what the character of Augustine claims, the dismissal of an established and 
effective method of instruction does not reflect its inherent uselessness for the given 
situation, but a divergent view on the proper means of Christian learning. 
Archisynagogus’s interruption of the ordo is thus less an opportunity to uphold 
any single doctrinal point (what one must believe) as it is a means of promoting an 
Augustinian notion of how one must believe to best learn sacred truth in general, a focus 
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that has remained largely unexplored in assessing the didacticism of the play. The utter 
rejection of debate reveals the conflict between Archisynagogus and Augustine as a clash 
of two opposing pedagogical approaches to Christian mystery: the Jew’s emphasis on 
learning by intellectual process versus the saint’s ultimate defence of seeing and 
believing. The resolution of this ideological opposition in favour of the latter constitutes 
the overlooked didactic message of the episode and of the Ludus de nativitate as a whole. 
The motives behind the rejection of debate as a means of instruction are first 
determined by the authorship of the play. To no small extent, the rejection of “sophistic 
arguments” takes aim at the carefully constructed scholastic approach to doctrinal issues 
used by contemporary Christian thinkers like Roscelin, Odo, and Anselm among others, a 
method with which the Benediktbeuern author was surely very familiar. The presence of 
the Ludus in the same manuscript as the carmina burana songs strongly suggests that it is 
part of a single collection composed by the vagantes clerici, the wandering student poets 
who were known to “thumb their collective nose at the very academic and ecclesiastical 
establishment that nurtured them” (Colish, Medieval Foundations 202).104 In this case, 
the disdain for “educative dialogue and intellectual dispute…, the methods and practices 
most emblematic of the medieval university,” can be read as a parodic jab by students 
against their masters and modes of teaching (Novikoff 418). Archisynagogus is twice 
called “magister” (401, 526) and his belaboured emphasis on the wording of the 
statements “virgo pariet” (132, 140, 144, 154), “est virgo puerpera” [“A virgin is 
childbearing”] (151), and “matre virgine” (183) recalls university instruction through 
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 The attribution of the Benediktbeuern plays to the vagantes is longstanding. Wolfgang Michael for one 
calls the manuscript “the most outstanding vagantic collection on German soil” (27). 
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sophismata, logically problematic sentences like these that were dissected at the level of 
grammar and debated pro and contra “to teach proficiency in argument” (Leff 207).105  
Likewise, when Archisynagogus remarks that Augustine’s foolish defence of the 
Virgin Birth is akin to the statement “homo mortuus est” (176), he conveys the 
ridiculousness of the proposition by invoking a classic sophism that preoccupied a 
number of later thirteenth- and fourteenth-century university masters at Paris and 
Oxford.
106
 In simplified terms, “the man is dead,” is held to be a grammatically 
impossible statement by schoolmen like Richard Kilvington and John Buridan since a 
man who is dead is no longer technically a man but a corpse that no longer partakes in the 
state of being.
 107
 By giving Archisynagogus an interest in the rigorous application of 
logic, the vagantic author mocks the “Jewishness” of schoolmen with the same narrow 
understanding of Christian mystery, drawing on an established notion of Jews as “hair-
splitting logicians” (Smalley 235). Criticizing precisely the Judaic interpretation of “a 
virgin shall conceive,” Peter the Chanter, for example, notes that Jewish readers are 
“versed in the sophism of composition” that lacks comprehension of deeper truth (qtd. in 
Smalley 234). 
In a broader sense, the Jew’s confrontational attitude to learning is highly 
reminiscent of the methods of dialectical instruction that also developed in the schools 
toward the end of the twelfth century, particularly the quaestiones disputatae. This 
approach required a master to debate an opponens in response to a question (quaestio) on 
                                                 
105
 On the sophismata, see Pironet. 
106
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1979), 43-70. 
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a topic such as the interpretation of Scripture or canon law posed to him by students or 
other masters before providing an authoritative resolution or sententia.
108
 For Vincent 
Marsicano, the entire structure of the Ludus de nativitate, not just the ordo, is governed 
by this didactic pattern of quaestio-disputatio-sententia (60). Yet, to perceive the 
presence of these scholastic elements as a means of promoting instruction through 
polemics is to neglect the parodic implications of attributing the format to 
Archisynagogus. In Vitalis of Blois’ Geta, another Latin play with connections to the 
medieval schools, the title character also engages in sophistries to the point of doubting 
his identity and very existence: 
Sic sum, sic nil sum. Pereat dialectica per quam  
Sic perii penitus. Nunc scio: scire nocet. 
Cum didicit Geta logicam, tunc desiit esse (401-403). 
[Therefore I am; therefore I am not. 
Oh, damnation to this dialectic 
Which has condemned me utterly to non-existence. 
Now I have knowledge, but knowledge is dangerous. 
When Geta learned logic he ceased to exist.]
109
 
   Recognizing a similar parodic aspect of the Archisynagogus episode, as well as 
the sudden truncation of all arguments in the play, remains an essential step in unveiling 
its more sober point: Augustine’s refusal to take up the quaestio of another master and 
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 Bernardo C. Bazàn discusses the origin and evolution of the disputatio in Les Questions disputées dans 
les facultés de théologie, de droit, et de medicine 31-40. 
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 Translation by Allison Goddard Elliot, Seven Medieval Latin Comedies. See Ferruolo, 118-19 for 
commentary on the criticism of logic in Geta. 
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participate in his proposed mode of instruction reflects the notion that Christian sententia 
must be obtained through means other than disputatio.  
An examination of the serious philosophical motives behind the denial of 
scholastic didacticism in the play reveals the nature of this alternative path toward sacred 
truth. Beyond its participation in the simple mockery and reversal of order that 
characterize Christmas festivities such as the election of the Boy Bishop, the deferral of 
reason in the ordo evokes the anti-Aristotelianism of thirteenth-century theologians like 
Eustace of Ely who defended inspired learning against those who “sought to reduce the 
ineffable mysteries of the Trinity, transubstantiation and other theological truths to ‘our 
understanding…and presume to formulate them according to certain natural and 
philosophical and logical reasons, seeking to include within the rules of nature what is 
above all nature” (Leff 199). Archisynagogus’s opposition to the Virgin Birth on account 
of what the “law teaches” (158) does not find the concept incongruous in relation to the 
“Old Law” of Judaism but according to the laws of nature expounded by Aristotle. 
Refutations of “homo mortuus est” appear in commentaries on the De Interpretatione and 
Sophistici Elenchi and the logical impossibility of this sophisma leans heavily on 
Aristotle’s discussion of syllogism in the recently discovered Prior Analytics, a technique 
alluded to as well in the Jew’s request to be shown the “rerum series” (86).110 
Archisynagogus is therefore a champion of learning through Aristotelian logic—a point 
made obvious in his direct invocation of the philosopher’s authority to support his case 
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(176-78)—and his wrongheadedness owes as much to this philosophical perspective as it 
does to his Judaism.  
Although the Ludus de nativitate can be dated no more precisely than the late-
twelfth or early-thirteenth centuries (the MS dates from 1230), it is tempting to identify 
its interest in university instruction alongside its anti-Aristotelian perspective as a 
response to the early controversy over the teaching of Aristotle at the University of Paris 
between 1210 and 1231; this was an expansive quarrel that “crystallized the latent 
conflict between rational experience and revelation” (Leff 190). Whether or not this clash 
of ideas had yet come to a head when the play was composed, it casts the introduction of 
Augustine as a foil to Archisynagogus in a more complex light, for the Bishop of Hippo 
is not only the putative author of the Sermo contra Judeos but also a representative of 
Platonic instruction, the bastion of a pedagogical system that opposes a reliance on 
external logic with one based on inner inspiration. 
The deferral of reason is a didactic reminder to the clerical audience for the Latin 
play that Christian learning, following Anselm’s Augustinian “credo ut intelligam,” must 
always be grounded first in faith; this is the sole means of confronting the absurd puzzle 
of how God could have been born in a lowly manger or Archisynagogus’ criticism about 
the irrationality of conception without sexual intercourse. Augustine thus appears in 
Christmas Play  not just as the putative author of the Sermo contra Judeos but as the 
bastion of a didactic methodology in which “all truth could only be gained from an inner 
illumination that ultimately…derived from God” (Leff 205).  
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Because logical explanation is didactically useless, one must learn instead by 
seeing and believing.
111
 The value of images is precisely their special ability to subvert 
the limitations of reason and instill belief, an idea promoted by critics of scholastic 
learning such as Serlo of Wilton (Kessler, Neither God Nor Man 139). According to 
legend, Serlo abandoned his position as master at the university of Paris after 
experiencing the vision of a dead former student, who was clad in a”gown of parchment 
covered with the sophisms of the schools,” and who was now burning in purgatory for the 
“vain arguments” he had made while alive (Raby 340).  The story surrounding Serlo’s 
conversion is particularly apt for the message of the Ludus de nativitate, for not only does 
Serlo reject the scholastic path to pursue a life of faith as a Cistercian, but he is also 
converted by virtue of what he sees.  
Similarly, Archisynagogus and his Jews must learn through seeing. How this is to 
be accomplished is encapsulated in Augustine’s response to Archisynagogus’s cry of 
“Res neganda!” (“A thing to be denied!”) regarding the Virgin Birth, a mindset 
antithetical to the pious receptivity required for learning (204). Instead of countering by 
emphasizing the miracle as “a thing to be affirmed,” Augustine replies with “Res 
miranda,” “a thing to be wondered at” (205). If metaphors of vision—seeing the truth, 
gaining insight, and being illuminated—are most suited to describing the process of inner 
learning, the external sight implied by the act of “wondering” conversely “has the 
greatest affinity to mental vision,” and is capable of providing a similar transformative 
experience (Augustine, De trinitate 11.1.1). Described as “blind” (“caeca”) (222) and 
“veiled in shadows” (“tenebris abscondita”) (111), Archisynagogus and his companions 
must first see the truth; only then can they accept the doctrine of the Virgin Birth. This 
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approach is apparent when the character of Augustine abandons his appeal to the ears of 
the Jews and offers instead the classic pictorial image of light passing through a glass, not 
as rational proof, but as a visual analogy for the conception of Christ (ll. 192-98).  
Still more effective than imagery in teaching Christian truth are the visual signs of 
drama because they include verbal exposition, and so Archisynagogus and his followers 
are invited to become spectators to biblical events portrayed in a series of playlets within 
the larger Ludus de nativitate.
112
  These episodes—the Annunciation, the Coming of the 
Magi, Adoration of the Shepherds, and Slaughter of the Innocents—come after the 
exhortation of “Discant nunc Judaei” (233) and are clearly intended as a means of 
creating belief among the fictional Jews and, by extension, of affirming it in a wider 
Christian audience.  
Reconsidered from this perspective, the Benediktbeuern Procession of Prophets 
already contains a unique emphasis on observing res as a means of arriving at sacred 
meaning. In no other medieval ordo edited by Young, including the original Sermo 
contra Judeos, does Daniel’s prophecy conclude with his singing of the responsory 
“aspiciebam in visu noctis” (27), which stresses the importance of sight in his sacred 
knowledge. Moreover, while other ordines present only the eschatological prophecy of 
the Erythraean Sibyl on the signs of Judgment (“Iudicii signum: tellus sudore 
madescet…”), the Benediktbeuern processus depicts her first “viewing the star” 
(“inspiciendo stellam”) over Bethlehem and commenting on its messianic “novum 
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 The stage directions call for the prophets to withdraw or “sit in their places to observe the play” 
(“sedeant in locis suis propter honorem ludi”) (Stage directions preceding l. 233). There is no mention of 
where Archisynagogus and his associates are to go, though since the play’s lesson is directed toward them, 
they likely remain on stage to witness the action and later enter it. 
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nuntium” or “new message” (29).113 On one hand, the “newness of the star” (“stellae 
novitas”) (30) and its message refer no doubt to the supercession of the vetus 
testamentum with the coming of Christ; however, because simply observing the star is 
represented as the direct catalyst for the Sibyl’s visionary awareness, “newness” is also 
identified with seeing and believing as a replacement for the old scholastic approaches to 
sacred knowledge, approaches embodied by the senex Archisynagogus and classed as 
“errore Judaeorum” like a continued adherence to the Old Law.114  
Such a distinction between new and former ways of learning is made plain when 
the star is foregrounded as a mystery to be interpreted, in the scenes portraying the 
Coming of the Magi. As the three kings seek to interpret the star of Bethlehem, rubrics 
indicate that they begin by properly marvelling at it (“admirentur”),115 but the first king 
confuses himself by trying to understand the “novum. . .nuntium” (253) further according 
to the “sayings of the old school” (“lingua sectae veteris,” my emphasis) (268), namely 
astrological knowledge based on the scholastic methods of the “quadrivium” (247). For 
all this, he remains “perplexed” (246), “bemused” (259), and “speechless” (271), 
knowing only that a child of global power will be born (275-77). The second king 
initially focuses on stargazing (“semper inspiciendo stellam”) like the Sibyl, but makes 
the mistake of also “pondering about it” (“disputet de illa”) in an internalized disputatio, 
and is frustrated by his attempts to comprehend the mystery fully through the “faculty of 
reason” (288).116 The third king is similarly able to recognize that the star is an object 
signifying the birth of “a great prince” (327), but since he too is occupied with reasoning 
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about its nature (“disputando de stella”) in the mode of the university, he is unable to 
grasp its full significance.
 117
 The kings begin to comprehend the divinity of the king they 
seek when they recognize that the star speaks (“stella loquitur”) its own self-evident 
meaning as a type of verba visibilia (l. 366). Only another visual act—seeing the infant to 
whom the star refers—can bring a complete understanding of its meaning. 
Simply gazing on the child is again offered as the final arbiter of sacred truth later 
in the Ludus de nativitate as well when angelus and diabolus compete to sway an 
audience of shepherds regarding the divinity of the newborn Christ. The devil—who, in 
the medieval conflation of the Judaic and the diabolic, sounds very much like 
Archisynagogus—attempts to derail the faith that is the basis for inspired understanding 
when he urges the shepherds not to visit the manger.
118
 His argument, couched like 
Archisynagogus’s in the language of Aristotelian dialectic, characterizes the concept of a 
divinity born in a manger as something “that truth does not prove” (“quae non probat 
veritas”) (452); the angel who announces this concept thus “makes contraries out of the 
truth” (“fabricat/vero contraria”) (467-68), an objection that accuses the angel of 
violating the very basis of dialectic: its capability “of discerning true things from false” 
(Alcuin qtd in Catherine Brown 37). This is highly ironic, for the quasi-magical power to 
turn “verum in contrarium” (477) through syllogism is exactly what medieval critics of 
dialectic like Walter of St. Victor present as its “diabolic art,” confirmed now in the 
devil’s own manipulative logic (Catherine Brown 64).119 
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But the devil’s rhetoric aims at more than creating doubt through reason; his 
choice of words seeks to undermine seeing as the basis for belief by representing the 
Incarnation as “a falsehood open before the eyes” (“ad oculum…reserata falsitas”) (455-
56) when it is only questionable according to the dictates of reason. The angel who 
speaks against him, however, reaffirms the didactic value of marvelling in the absence of 
any rationalization, assuring the shepherds that the manger will show the truth 
(“monstrabit praesepium,” my emphasis) (488) to those who look on. This episode thus 
does not simply portray “belief in divine miracle as an alternative to rational 
faithlessness,” as Bevington observes, but more specifically counters logic with an 
invitation to see for oneself, which will lead to understanding (179).  
Such an emphasis on looking on to gain understanding of the divine may also be 
owed to what Hahn has identified as a thirteenth-century shift from the idea of 
momentary glimpses or glances of the sacred to “prolonged gaze apprehended as an 
interactive experience” as might take place when attending a dramatic representation 
(“Visio” 169). This requires a certain willingness of the viewer to engage with the object 
of sight, following Augustine’s theory of extramissive vision, whereby “a diffusion of 
rays…are emitted from narrow pupils into the open” (“diffusio radiorum…e brevibus 
pupulis in aperta emicant”), encounter the object and return to imprint the soul of the 
viewer (De musica 6.8.21). The viewer “must actively turn the power of looking upon the 
appropriate objects and invest the soul’s energy wisely” (Hahn, “Visio” 184) to gain 
comprehension of sacred truths. 
Because of this, the didactic methodology illustrated in the Benediktbeuern 
Christmas Play is one where the ability to apprehend Christian truth through visual signs 
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is inextricably bound to and preceded by belief, a notion that goes back to Augustine’s 
idea how comprehension is reached via the Inner Teacher. Only observers who approach 
signs, whether visual or otherwise, with willing faith can raise corporeal sight to the 
highest sort of vision and be guaranteed understanding, an idea reiterated often in the 
Middle Ages; As Hahn notes, outside of the letters to Serenus, in his Dialogues, Gregory 
presents the idea that “the physical eye, used as it should be, could be opened to truth 
conveyed by vision if one purified sight through ‘acts of faith and abundant prayer’” 
(“Visio” 177). Caesarius of Heisterbach, glossing Augustine in the early thirteenth 
century, similarly extolls the ideal “vision of the saints” in the City of God—those who 
are perfected in faith—as “full and clear” not “doubtful and obscure” (Hahn, “Visio” 
170).  
Differing from the view presented in the Adam, faith triggers acceptance of visual 
learning in the Ludus, not vice versa. Judeus is converted simply by seeing Isaiah’s 
interpretation of his hand, but Archisynagogus is unconvinced when witnessing New 
Testament events because he lacks a willingness to suspend the doubt that is the basis for 
rational inquiry. For viewers of the Ludus de nativitate to learn, they too must distance 
themselves from the lack of faith that allies them with Jews by simply accepting the 
truthfulness of the dramatic res they see on stage. Once more, the suspension of disbelief 
that takes place when viewing dramatic res as the things they portray participates in the 
desired state of non-intellectualizing receptivity necessary to learn sacred truth. Christian 
viewers eager to disavow the lack of faith that would ally them with a Jewish audience 
would surely be inclined to accept the truthfulness of the what they see on stage.  
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Ultimately, a persistent emphasis on learning by looking promotes the didactic 
efficacy of the Benediktbeuern play itself and the dramatic medium in general, for 
Biblical scenes recreated on stage are accorded the same evidential weight as the events 
themselves. Archisynagogus and his companions are expected to learn by watching the 
original events surrounding Christ’s birth; this enables Archisynagogus to abandon his 
role as a spectator and enter the action at Herod’s court on two separate occasions (401-
424; 526-34). Yet, because these are the same scenes performed for the audience of the 
play, the distinction between true Gospel events and their re-enactment, between passive 
observation and active participation, breaks down and with it any obstacles to visually 
accessing spiritual truth. Even more than the Ordo repraesentacionis Ade, the 
Benediktbeuern play emphasizes a sense of seeing where “there is no gap between what 
happened at one moment in salvation history and what happens in real time” (Muessig 
137). As Clifford Davidson has observed, in any drama, “the impression of breaking 
down the barriers of time and space must be present if the play is to be brought alive,” 
but in the Ludus, the Jews are actually brought across these barriers as audience members 
(“Space and Time” 74). This sort of participation in the events of the play, the sense of 
“being-in-the-biblical-world,” strongly reinforces a way of looking at Christian history as 
transcendent (Stevenson 98).  
Learning from Jewish Violence in Middle English Drama 
 
In addition to illustrating an Augustinian view of images in learning, the reflexive 
acceptance of what one sees stressed in the Ludus signals a fundamental shift in attitude 
surrounding the right to question Christian doctrine, a change with implications for 
European Jews and their depiction in medieval drama. An increasing emphasis on 
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orthodox belief within the thirteenth-century Church resulted in the establishment of 
inquisitional tribunals and the passage of legislation designed to check spontaneous 
interreligious debate of the sort desired by Archisynagogus. Synods at Paris, Trier, 
Tarragon, and Bourges issued orders, echoed by papal bull, that expressly forbade “any 
lay person…[to] discuss in public or private the Catholic religion,” for the logic of 
disbelieving Jews “often tricks simple Christians” and promotes rather than forestalls 
doubt (Dahan, The Christian Polemic 28-29). Alongside these limitations against debate, 
a number of canons from thirteenth-century councils, most notably Fourth Lateran Canon 
68 and the Synod of Narbonne Canon 3, aimed at preventing Jewish-Christian interaction 
altogether, effectively eliminating the possibility of continued dialogue (“The Twelfth 
General Council” 290-91).  
For historian Gavin Langmuir, a vehement and violent antisemitism arose from 
“an irrational reaction to repressed rational doubts” precisely because such restrictions 
and texts like the Ludus promoted the denial of reasoned inquiry in favour of unwavering 
belief (276). When Christians who questioned theological matters like the Incarnation 
and Virgin Birth were encouraged to “suppress…their rational empirical knowledge 
about the nature of objects and human beings” rather than to address such doubts using 
the tools of logic, the resulting acceptance of irrationality primed them to invent and 
accept fantasies about Jews that were not grounded in observation, particularly involving 
their imagined violence against Christians through ritual murders, well poisonings, and 
cannibalism (Abulafia, Christians and Jews in the Twelfth-Century 5).
120
 Such beliefs in 
turn led to the increased hostility and reactionary attacks against Jewish communities. 
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Though the exact causes of medieval antisemitism are highly complex, it cannot 
be denied that coincident with the development of these irrational attitudes, depictions of 
rationally questioning Jews all but disappear from medieval religious drama as well. This 
does not mean that Jews no longer figure in the didacticism of late-medieval drama, 
however—in fact, the exile of actual Jews made them even more useful as symbolic 
instruments—only that the Jewish approach to interpretation usually figured in terms of 
inappropriate verbal interrogation is represented more abstractly and with greater hostility 
as brutality toward the corpus Christi. Archisynagogus’s attempt to learn through 
scholastic quaestiones is supplanted by dramatic representations of Jewish quaestio in its 
sense of inquisitional torment; the non-intellectualized response to visual scenes urged by 
the Benediktbeuern Christmas Play would find its most prominent expression in the 




This use of Jewish violence as a metaphor for misguided interpretation is perhaps 
most evident in the large surviving works of Middle English religious drama. Any 
generalizations made concerning the 150 or so plays of the surviving English cycle plays 
must be drawn with caution, but it is safe to say that interpretation remains a central 
concern across the extant works. V.A. Kolve’s assertion that the “organizing principle” of 
the Corpus Christi cycles is, like that of the Adam, based on figures and fulfillment, 
points to the importance of typological interpretation in particular (97). A number of 
plays emphasize typology overtly through an “expositor” or “doctor” who introduces or 
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interrupts the narrative in order to teach its significance directly to the audience. The 
most extensive instruction of this kind takes place in the Chester “Abraham” where an 
expositor provides some seventy lines of explanation on what the circumcision, the 
akedah, and the wine and bread Melchisedek offers to Abraham “signifieth” for 
Christians (l. 143).
122
  In the first Passion Play of the N-Town cycle, Jesus himself turns 
exegete, explaining the symbolic meaning of the Last Supper at length (l. 349-440).  
Within the teaching of typology, Jews in the cycles are used as quintessential 
examples of how disbelief removes the ability to understand both the Christological signs 
hidden in Old Testament events and the divine nature of Jesus in the Gospels. Even 
Moses in N-Town cannot comprehend how the burning bush, altered but not consumed, 
figuratively anticipates the Virgin Birth; he knows only that it “fyguryth sum thynge of 
right gret fame” though he “kannot seyn what it may be” (“Moses” l. 21-22). Whereas the 
bystanders at the crucifixion who misunderstand Christ’s cry of “Eli, eli” as a prayer to 
Elijah are described in Matthew 27.47 and Mark 15.35 only as “quidam autem illic 
stantes et audientes” and “quidam de circumstantibus audeintes” respectively,  these 
misinterpreters are specifically made out to be Jewish in the surviving Middle English 
cycles. In Chester, the misunderstanding of verbal signs is made by “Primus Judeus” and 
in N-Town by “Secundus Judeus,” while in York the high priest Caiaphas himself 
commits the interpretive error.
123
  Depicting an audience comprised of Jews who stand 
around and listen but do not comprehend relays the importance of belief in learning for 
another standing audience, that of the plays themselves. Jews are again surrogates for the 
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Christian audience, revealing the ignorance that results when seeking to learn Christian 
truth in the absence of faith. Nowhere is this lesson more starkly presented than in the 
interpretative violence of Herod’s court. 
The brief mention of Herod’s desire to see a “signum” from Christ and the latter’s 
silence during his interrogation in the Gospel of Luke (“interrogabat autem illum multis 
sermonibus at ipse nihil illi respondebat”) becomes in the York, Wakefield, and N-Town 
Passion sequences an opportunity to present Jewish disbelief as an obstacle to 
interpreting Christian truth (Luke 23.8-9). Christ appears before Herod in absolute silence 
as an inscrutable visual sign, glossed by verbal reports as both a traitor and a maker of 
miracles, one who has healed the sick and raised the dead, but whose utter speechlessness 
neither confirms nor denies these readings. Like Archisynagogus, Herod desires to learn 
Christian interpretation. In York, he wants to hear how Jesus “ledges our laws”; in the 
first N-Town Passion he is eager to learn the “trew sentence” (“Litsers’ Play” l. 168)  
behind the miraculous stories he has heard, seeking not rational explanations but visual 
proof of Jesus’ powers—“O meracle wroughth in my presens” (Play 30 ll. 202-04). 
Herod orders Christ to “prove some of thy posty” before he can believe, but within an 
Augustinian model of inspired learning, Herod needs to believe before he can see or 
understand (Chester “Trial and Flagellation” l. 186).  
Expressly Jewish in all of the cycles (a worshipper of “Mahound” and a disciple 
of Satan as well in the York “Litsers’ Play”),  Herod is shackled by unbelief and cannot 
comprehend Christ’s teachings or nature on his own, interpreting reports of the latter’s 
deeds as “leasings” or lies (“Litsers’ Play” l. 223).124  Stymied in his efforts to extract the 
truth by Jesus’ complete refusal to reply, Herod and his retinue threaten physical violence 
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as a means of drawing out an explanation. When threats also fail to make Jesus speak in 
York, the court continues to misread his silence as resulting from his awe of royal dress 
(l. 282), his insanity (l. 272), or his fear either of Herod’s loud voice (l. 251), his sword (l. 
255), or his station (l. 280). Even the punishment Herod’s advisors finally devise betrays 
a false understanding of signs. As Beadle and King note, Christ’s white fool’s tunic does 
not make him into an object of ridicule but into a visual sign of purity and humility for 
the Christian audience of the play (175).  
When Herod actually administers corporal punishment in the N-Town Passion, he 
does so in a last-ditch attempt at interpretation; since Jesus’ resolute silence fails to either 
show or tell, Herod orders several “Judei” to scourge him to “make hym for to speke,” to 
compel him to interpret himself truthfully (l. 232). Christ’s silent form becomes an 
impenetrable text from which Herod seeks to extract meaning by force.
125
 By diverging 
from Gospel accounts to ascribe the scourging of Christ to Herod and his lackeys rather 
than to Pilate, the N-Town play emblematizes an improper response to indecipherable 
Christian signs as typically “Jewish” violence. The sweat of interpretation figured in 
patristic terms as fruitful ploughing becomes the fruitless toil of Jewish torturers who 
exhaust themselves trying to beat meaning from the silent Christ. This forceful approach 
to interpretation governs Judaic exegesis of written signs as well, according to the 
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 This connection of Jewish violence to interpretation is not original to Middle English religious drama—
it is anticipated by Chrétien de Troye’s Cliges, when the inert, silent body of Fenice is stripped, flogged, 
and burned by three physicians from Salerno in an attempt to make her speak and reveal the truth: that she 
is alive. Given the parallels of Fenice’s tortures to the persecution of Christ as well as the role Jews played 
in medicine and in the founding of the medical school at Salerno in particular, it is safe to assume that 
Chrétien’s three physicians are also Jewish. Interestingly, in Image on the Edge, Michael Camille mentions 
a Middle English medical text that speaks of the “margynes of the skynne” (16). 
    Depictions of Christ’s flesh as a text inscribed in blood (and the spit of Jews) are also widespread in the 
late-medieval “Charters of Christ” which are generally contemporary with the cycle plays (See Rubin 55). 
These do not, however, discuss torture as interpretation but as an act of writing on Christ, transferred by 
him to the human heart.  
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Chester “Purification.”  Encountering Isaiah’s prophecy on the Virgin Birth, the Jewish 
priest Simeon twice tries to “scrape… away” the problematic word “virgin” in his Bible 
(a process of erasure that requires applying a razor to the parchment skin) to impose by 
violent means his own anti-Christological reading of “a good woman” (ll. 33-40).  
Perhaps the most direct demonstration of physical force as an interpretive 
technique appears in the extra-scriptural Croxton Play of the Sacrament, which can be 
associated more directly than the cycles with the feast of Corpus Christi (Gibson 35). The 
Croxton play dramatizes the efforts of the wealthy Jewish merchant Jonathas to procure 
the sacrament and subject it to various tortures. The accusation of host desecration 
levelled against Jews is not a new one, originating in the thirteenth century, but Croxton 
differs from most accounts in attributing to the participants a motivation other than 
simple malice. As Jews were officially absent from England following their expulsion in 
1290, those in the play are once more stand-ins for incredulous Christians who question 
orthodox belief rather than historically accurate portrayals. Written in 1461 as a response 
to the Wycliffite rejection of transubstantiation, Croxton uses Jewish violence to 
symbolize the Lollards’ erroneous attempts to understand the supernatural mystery of the 
sacrament according to the dictates of reason.
126
  Like Herod and Archisynagogus, the 
Jew Jonathas is driven by doubt to seek empirical evidence of Christian truth, to “put [it] 
in a prefe”; but where Archisynagogus’ rational inquiry had been reminiscent of the 
intellectual quaestiones of scholastic didacticism, the Jews of Middle English religious 
drama depict quaestio in its sense of inquisition by torture (l. 422).
127
  Jewish violence 
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 See Scherb, “Violence,” passim.  
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 Enders (The Medieval Theater of Cruelty 41-43) discusses the multiplicity of meanings inherent in the 
Latin term quaestio particularly as it applies to the “shift in the rhetorical tradition from intellectual to 
bodily hermeneutics” (38).  
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directed toward Christ’s body in the form of the host becomes a means of investigating 
the truth of Christian doctrine. As Jonathas explains, “the entent is, if I might knowe or 
undertake/If that [Christ] were God all-might” (l. 291-2), a proposition he wants to test by 
stabbing a sacramental wafer with daggers “to prove in this brede if ther be eny life” (l. 
460). What is already deemed an improper means of interpreting Christian signs—
seeking proofs and rational explanations—is replaced by a learning process that wrests 
truth using brute force, one more starkly at odds with the Augustinian concept of inspired 
understanding and equally ineffective.   
Paradoxically, torture in its own right is no more useful a method of discovering 
Jesus’ divinity than verbal questioning would be—neither stabbing nor boiling, nor 
baking the sacrament yields the information Jonathas seeks—but the abused body of 
Christ is extremely effective as a self-evident verbum visibilium that creates 
understanding through simple visual inspection. The conversion that ultimately takes 
place in Croxton is not the result of rational proof derived from violence—the Jews 
confess to Christ their error in seeking to “know thy crede” (l .754)—yet the 
“child…with wondys blody” whose appearance is essential in converting the Jews 
nonetheless materializes as the product of torture (l. 804). The mutilated aspect of the 
figure is necessary to its value in teaching Christian truth; looking on the “swemfull” 
form is repeatedly foregrounded as evidential, both by Jonathas (l. 800, l. 805) and by the 
Episcopus who invites audience members onstage “to goo see that swimfull sight” (l. 
809). Like Thomas of India, who believes in the resurrection only when he actually sees 
and feels Christ’s wounds, the Jews are best convinced by observing the gory image on 
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stage, as is the audience—and the didacticism of the play takes the effectiveness of this 
verbum visibilium into consideration.  
As Sarah Beckwith has observed, the body of Christ was frequently a 
metaphorical venue for issues of “social integration and social difference” in late-
medieval England (Christ’s Body 33); the mutilated corpus Christi of Jonathas’ “newe 
Passion” (l. 38) participates in this social dynamic as a locus of incredulity, then an 
instrument of conversion. For Mervyn James, the conversion of the Jews in Croxton 
represents the communitas that can result on the occasion of the Corpus Christi 
celebration, a social union extended to the audience by the bishop’s invitation to 
participate in the procession of the play (11). I would suggest rather that what results in 
the action and performance of the play is an Augustinian form of communitas arising 
from a common approach to Christian signs, one grounded in seeing and believing; it is, 
in other words, a social group made up of those who now share the same notion of how to 
learn. As R.A. Markus notes, for Augustine, “[w]hat distinguishes the Christian from the 
Jewish community is   . . . an openness to the New Testament context within which the 
things spoken of in the Old Testament receive a further meaning. Lack of it is the 
‘servitude’ of the Jewish people, the closure of their biblical discourse” (“Signs” 104). 
This need for openness extends beyond typological reading as part of an interpretive 
approach to the whole body of Christian signs, which demands a willingness to accept 
visual signs as true signifiers. By doing this, the Jews of Croxton do not learn just that the 
Christian doctrine of the sacrament is true, they learn to adopt an entirely new method of 
learning. It is not surprising that didacticism regarding the interpretation of res 
significandi is presented through Jewish confusion regarding the sacrament, as rejecting 
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transubstantiation (a central aspect of Lollardy transferred to Jews) is the prime example 
of an inability to understand signs and signifieds. 
If, from a patristic perspective, Christ’s Passion at the hands of Jews is ironically 
necessary for salvation to take place, looking on the “swimfull sight” of the suffering 
Christ also ensures that the lessons of belief and repentance it presents are retained in 
memory. The mnemonic value of the cycle plays in general has been commented on in a 
number of places. Scherb discusses how the N-Town Passion plays are divided by their 
rubricator “into a series of independent scenes that have the authority of an iconographic 
tradition behind them” (53) while Lerud’s extended thesis proposes that “the English 
Corpus Christi drama must be informed by a view of the plays as ‘quik boks,’ uniquely 
able to jog the mind toward spiritual understanding” (Memory, Images 62). However, less 
has been said about the particular role of visualizing Jewish violence in this process.  
It is no secret that images of violence are held to be exemplary mnemonic tools in 
both classical and medieval artes memoriae. To remember the phrase “Iam domum 
itionem reges,” for example, the Rhetorica ad Herennium recommends visualizing 
“Domitius, raising hands to heaven while he is lashed” (3.21.34). As Mary Carruthers 
notes, while certain aspects of the image (“Domitius”) evoke specific terms to be 
remembered (“domus”), the image of a suffering man being flogged is used simply to 
make the whole scene vividly unforgettable (Memory 140). In a more general sense, the 
Rhetorica proposes mutilating the memory image in some way (“deforabimus”), 
dismembering to create remembrance (3.22.37). Thomas Bradwardine’s fourteenth-
century “De Memoria Artificiali,” which developed independently of the Rhetorica ad 
Herennium tradition, similarly enjoins the reader to use a series of shockingly gory 
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images, like those of a bull being castrated and a woman with her womb ripped apart, to 
help recall the signs of the zodiac (Carruthers, Memory 136).  
The Franciscan devotional practice of affective piety that contributed to the 
development of the cycle plays likewise demanded that one visualize the suffering Christ 
of the Passion in order to remember the nature of his sacrifice. In the York “Crucifixion,” 
Jesus on the cross calls directly on the audience to “Byholdes myn heede, myn handis, 
and my feete,/And fully feele nowe” (l. 255-6). The graphically violent simulations of 
Jesus being flogged, beaten, and crucified in all of the surviving Middle English cycles 
furnish the ideal medium to trigger this visual recollection and imprint the image on the 
mind so it will not be forgotten in the future. The various Jewish authorities and torturers 
presented as responsible for acts of violence against Jesus in the drama are thus essential 
didactic instruments in a mnemonic sense.  
But beyond simple memorialization, visualizing the brutal suffering of Christ 
either through an image or dramatic recreation serves a devotional purpose addressed in 
Gregory’s second letter to Serenus, where he speaks of “the burning of compunction” 
(“ardorem compunctionis”) that will come from seeing depictions of past holy deeds (XI, 
10.60). In his earlier Pastoral Care, Gregory had already spoken of something more than 
“a simple reaction of the memory” in response to images, discussing how one engages in 
“revolving images in the mind until they are portrayed on the heart” (Hahn, “Visuality” 
50).  Witnessing the suffering of Christ facilitates a devotional understanding via 
emotional engagement.  The Jewish brutality against Christ’s body presented as an 
example of faulty interpretive technique remains necessary in begetting both visual 
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learning and remembrance through its own wrongful violence; its inclusion in drama is 
vital to ensure that the lesson of the plays is internalized and retained.
128
   
 
Against the Jewishness of Drama 
 A subtle but crucial shift in the medieval attitude toward the didacticism of visual 
signs is reflected in the depiction of Jews in the Croxton Play of the Sacrament: here, the 
visual can precede and prompt belief, which had not been the case in the Benediktbeuern 
Ludus de nativitate. This change marks the movement from an Augustinian view of 
learning that perceives inner illumination as the fundamental basis for understanding to 
an Aristotelian nominalism that places “increased emphasis upon intuition or sensory 
apprehension in knowledge” even in the absence of an intus magister (Carré qtd. in 
Davidson, A Middle English Treatise 15). For Clifford Davidson, the nominalist idea that 
signs in the world possessed their own reality independent of universal forms was largely 
responsible for the validation of perception in the acquisition of knowledge and 
consequently for the proliferation of drama as a valid source of truthful instruction in the 
late Middle Ages.  If signs apprehended visually can convey truth without the 
prerequisite of inner illumination, dramatic performance becomes an even more powerful 
tool to create, not just enhance, Christian belief, even in those may not be able to access 
intellectual vision. Any nominalist underpinnings in the Croxton play, and in Middle 
English religious drama as a whole, remain conservatively grounded in faith and 
Christian doctrine and not independent empirical or philosophical speculation associated 
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 The idea that “No torment was too extreme of too gory for representation” in medieval religious drama 
thus reflects more than a lust for the sensational and bloody decried in John Gatton’s thesis (79): graphic 
violence likely contributes to the mnemonic value of the plays, whether there are Jews involved or not. 
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with Aristotle.  Nevertheless, the reliance on visual signs or sense experience as an 
instrument for learning in religious drama was not without its detractors. 
The views expressed in the fifteenth-century Lollard Treatise of Miraclis 
Pleyinge, written some fifty years before Croxton, represent the most complete 
arguments prior to the Reformation rejecting the validity of religious plays as a didactic 
medium.
129
  Despite the heresy attributed to Lollard works, the Treatise rehearses 
familiar patristic fears concerning the unsavoury social atmosphere at dramatic 
performances that leads “to leccherie . . . to glotonye and to othere vicis” (ll. 142-46). 
Where it targets the signs of religious drama, the Treatise is actually quite Augustinian in 
denying the notion that such signs (as part of fiction) are at all instructive, though it goes 
further to deny that the true signification of verba visibilia is applicable to the visual 
presentation of drama.  
Because its aim is first and foremost entertainment or “verrey leesing” (l. 244), 
stage representation comprises “signis withoute dede” (l. 245);  the visually apprehended 
signs of religious drama merely pretend to signify deeper Christian content—“dedis” or 
res—since any hidden didactic meaning is effaced by an entertaining façade, making 
dramatic signs essentially empty ones. Echoing the Bishop of Hippo, the Treatise author 
maintains that where surface pleasure and underlying edification coexist they do so 
always at the expense of didacticism, as “two things most contrarious mowen not pleyn 
togidere withouten hurting of either . . . and most schal the fleysh hurtyn the spirit, as in 
suche pleyinge the fleysh is most meintenyd and the spirite lasse” (ll. 576-79). Like 
Augustine’s fabulae, religious drama entraps by creating fructus, enjoyment of literal 
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 The Wycliffite author’s definition of miracle plays encompasses all forms of religious drama including 
representations of the Crucifixion in the admonition that “Men shulden not pleyn the passion of Crist” (l. 
813-14). 
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content that becomes an end in itself. The verba visibilia that signify transparently in 
Augustine’s semiotics, “as nakyd lettris to a clerk to ridden the treuthe,” fail to make 
miracle plays didactic; the mechanism whereby one simply sees and understands is 
negated by the profane nature of the plays, which are “made more to deliten men bodily 
than to been bokis to lewid men” (ll. 445-48).  
Distracted by fructus and lacking in faith, spectators of religious drama are 
entrapped by external appearance and become, once more, akin to Jews. Those who act in 
the plays and maintain them, as well as those who gain pleasure from them, are no better 
than “the Jewis that bobbiden Crist” because they scorn the teachings of God, especially 
in their failure to break free of an enslavement to literal signs (l. 157-58). In fact, the 
Treatise explicitly describes the enjoyment of religious drama as a kind of regression into 
a Jewish attachment to the letter, a “verre goinge bacward fro dedis of the spirit to onely 
signs” (ll. 631-32) or “fro the gostly living of the Newe Testament to the fleyshly living 
of the Olde Testament” (l. 628-29). The Treatise author also compares the religious 
drama to Ishmael in its carnality, a familiar anti-Judaic metaphor typologically applied to 
Jews, who are thus distinguished from the Christian spirituality embodied by Isaac (l. 622 
ff.). Where the Croxton play would later accuse the Lollards of interpreting like Jews, the 
Wycliffite author applies the same metaphor to viewers of religious drama. Rather than 
teaching Christians how to avoid interpreting signs like a Jew, the plays “judaize” 
Christians by inviting literal reading.  
Ultimately, debate over the didactic efficacy of religious drama, and by extension 
of visible signs, was settled in favour of the views expressed in the Treatise of Miraclis 
Pleyinge. During the Reformation, Protestant legislation in England upheld the 
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dangerously seductive nature of images, outlawing visual representations in art or on 
stage that invited misinterpretation and could lead to doctrinal confusion. The impact of 
this policy can be witnessed in the expurgation of objectionable scenes from the religious 
drama and in the eventual abolishment of the cycle plays themselves by the late sixteenth 
century.
130
 Yet, the shifting notion of visible signs, this “anti-visual prejudice” that 
shaped English Protestantism, does not originate with the objections raised by Wycliffite 
thinkers. Warnings against obtaining knowledge through sense experience repeat 
thirteenth-century concerns that arose in response to a new Aristotelian outlook, one that 
is most fully voiced in the didacticism of the Old French fabliaux. 
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 See Clifford Davidson, “The Anti-Visual Prejudice” passim and Harold Gardiner Mysteries’ End 80-85. 
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CHAPTER 3: DANGEROUS SIGNS: SEMIOTIC INSTRUCTION IN FABLIAUX 
 
Fabliaux and the Question of Didacticism 
 One of the most remarkable characteristics of scholarship on the Old French 
fabliaux has been its imprecision concerning issues as basic as authorship, date, audience, 
and extent of the corpus. Most of the works in the genre are anonymous and nearly all, in 
the words of Jean Rychner, “sont indatables” (I, 8). In the hundred or so years since 
Joseph Bédier initiated the contemporary study of fabliaux, even the definition of what 
constitutes one remains not entirely settled and the number of tales considered part of the 
corpus varies by collection.
131
 As Crocker puts it, “Unstable in terms of authorship, 
audience, purpose, and even effect, the fabliaux are almost impossible to see as a 
coherent creative corpus” (1). Given these difficulties in pinning down exactly what a 
fabliau is—and consequently which works should be included in the canon—the 
reasonable subjectivity of Muscatine’s admission may be the best that one can hope to 
achieve: “my reading tells me that there is something basically different in tone and 
attitude between a ‘typical’ fabliau” and works with which it shares some resemblance 
like “Richeut” or the Roman de Renart” (“The [Re]invention of Vulgarity” 286).132  
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 Bédier’s terse “contes à rire en vers” (30) which encompasses a subjective choice of 148 tales pared 
down from the 152 in the earlier Montaiglon and Raynaud collection, has been criticized by Knud Togeby 
(7) and Omer Jodogne (22) among others as too broad and inclusive. Operating on the much narrower 
assumption that only those works that call themselves fabliaux are such, Jodogne in Le Fabliau reduces the 
object of study to a mere 56 tales which leaves approximately 100 fabliau-like works in a sort of generic 
limbo. Following Jodogne’s criterion, though starting with sixty-six “fabliaux certifiés” (Jodogne 16), Mary 
Jane Stearns Schenck arrives at the very specific definition of “an independent, brief narrative with a 
tripartite macrostructure whose narrative is a humorous, even ribald, story with a cautionary moral” 
(Fabliaux xi) and 130 texts, based on structural and morphological features of what seems to be the typical 
fabliau. Meanwhile, the latest complete edition of the tales, in Willem Noomen’s Nouveau recueil general 
des fabliaux (NRCF) arrives at an inventory of 127. 
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 I am reminded of US Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart’s definition of obscenity in 1964 
(particularly apt considering the scurrilous nature of fabliaux):  “I shall not today attempt further to define 
the kinds of material I understand to be embraced … [b]ut I know it when I see it” (Silver). 
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 In addition to the difficulty scholars have had in locating the defining attributes of 
the fabliau, the origins of the tales (from Gaston Paris’ Orientalist theories to Per 
Nykrog’s view that the genre originates in fable); their productive milieu (among the 
bourgeoisie according to Bédier, in the aristocratic courts for Nykrog, among upwardly 
mobile peasantry in the estimation of Schenck); and their didacticism have all defied firm 
resolution.
133
  Of these, the question of whether or not fabliaux are didactic has perhaps 
most polarized scholars into two opposing camps, for unlike medieval religious drama 
where moral or doctrinal instruction is always in evidence even where the chief aim may 
be social, the didacticism of fabliaux is never above suspicion even where there are 
explicit declarations of didactic intent.  
 The most popular method of assessing instruction in the genre has been an 
examination of these authorial statements in the prologues and concluding morals of the 
tales. In support of general didactic purpose, one version of “La Housse partie” opens 
with the Horatian assertion that a master poet must create understanding and teach (“Fere 
connoistre et enseignier”) as well as tell a good story (III, 16: 3).134  A second version of 
the same tale immediately proclaims itself an “essanple” (l. 1) as does “La Dame 
escoliée” (VIII, 83: 5) and “Le Prestre crucefié” (IV, 27: 1), evoking an association with 
didactic exempla. In a more extended defence of literary didacticism, Trubert, the author 
of “Le Vilain au Buffet,” upholds his desire to relate something from which one can learn 
(“a dire chose ou l’en apraingne”) in answer to those wicked people who think literature 
is only frivolous lies (V, 52: 7).  
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 See the first chapter of Schenk’s The Fabliaux: Tales of Wit and Deception for an excellent summary of 
these issues. 
134
 All citations from fabliaux provide volume, tale number, and line number from the Nouveau recueil 
complet des fabliaux (NRCF)) and.refer to the critical text. 
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Similar evidence for didactic intent comes in the concluding remarks of fabliau 
poets, such as “Par example cis fabliaus dist…” followed by a particular moral in “Les 
Perdris” (IV, 21:150). These are often “conseils de vie pratique” (Jodogne 23) rather than 
expressly Christian morals, advising a male audience not to trust women (or a wife) for 
instance, as in the ending of “La Sorisete des Estopes” (VI, 66) and “Les Tresces” (VI, 
69). Johnston and Owen determine that 95 out of the 152 fabliaux in the nineteenth-
century Montaiglon and Raynaud collection—roughly two-thirds—end with a moral 
(xiv). Limiting her study to only those tales that actually call themselves fabliaux, 
Schenck likewise finds that a majority (forty-five) contain moral conclusions (Fabliaux 
28). If one expands the ground of study to include “not only the terminal moralitas of the 
familiar type (‘Par cest flabel poëz savoir ...’ ‘Par cest example vos deffant’... etc.), but 
also all occurrences of lines or passages in the text, before, after, or during the course of 
the action, when either the author, or one of the characters, or a group of characters 
speaking in unison makes some generalizing observation on the significance of the 
action, or interprets it in relation to an extra-textual frame of reference or system of 
belief,” only “[t]wenty-five fabliaux are without passages of sentence of any kind”  
(Pearcy, “Sentence” 234, 240). 
 Yet, for every prologue that declares didactic purpose, there are those like “Le 
Pliçon” that begin by overtly distinguishing the “risees/ Et mokeries” they offer with 
serious “siermons,” thereby vaunting the absence of instruction (X,116: 1-3). On account 
of statements like these, Glending Olson has argued that fabliaux are mainly intended for 
recreation and the promotion of joy. Works like Cortebarbe’s “Les trois Aveugles de 
Compiegne,” which describes the tale as dispelling “maint duel, maint mal” (II, 9: 7-8), 
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are a prime example of hygienic and not didactic intent, though Olson also proclaims that 
“a great many [non-didactic] fabliaux are just dirty stories”(138).  
 The concluding morals of fabliaux, which do not contain any authorial statements 
regarding the purely recreational aspect of the particular tale just presented, appear to 
remain better evidence for didacticism in the genre, but these too have been subject to 
doubt. For Bédier, “l’intention morale n’est jamais que accessoire. Elle ne vient que par 
sûrcroit” (311); the morals represent false or elevated claims that later critics would 
consider merely a stylistic or rhetorical requirement (Nykrog, Fabliaux 249) included by 
rote as “part of [the] habitual thinking” of fabliau poets (Muscatine, Old French Fabliaux 
102), and indicating either a vestigial origin in fable or an attempt to valorize the tales 
within a system of Horatian criticism that privileges moral instruction.
135
     
Since many concluding morals are not legitimate, they can appear “capricious and 
arbitrary,” incongruous or peripheral in light of the plot they purport to illuminate 
(Pearcy, “Sentence” 244), hence Muscatine’s remark that if “fabliaux often carry a moral, 
they only infrequently embody it” (Old French Fabliaux 102). There is perhaps no better 
example of this than the conclusion of “Du Con qui fu fait a la Besche” (IV, 22). After a 
misogynist account of how women are physically created to enjoy beatings and an 
attribution of female garrulousness to the devil, the poet concludes by calling down 
divine punishment on anyone “who will say anything  but good of women” (“Ja Dieus ne 
li face pardon/Qui d’eles dira fors que bien”) (76-77). If this is not contradictory enough, 
the final lines speak, in yet another reversal of opinion, of how “maint preudomme en 
sont destruit:/Honi en sont et confondu/Et lor avoir en ont perdu” (80-83). Other tales 
present morals in which it is difficult to find any useful instruction. “La Coille noire” (V, 
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 On the connection of fabliaux to fables, see Nyrkrog 250-52 and Johnston and Owen xv-xviii. 
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46) for example, declares that male genitalia of any color are equally good, “Des 
Chevaliers, des .II. Clercs, et les Vilains” upholds that “there is no delight for a churl but 
shitting” (The French Fabliaux II, 33:35-36), and “Le Prestre et le mouton,” presents the 
great truth that one must watch out for everything (“il se fet bon de tot garder”) (VIII, 88: 
18).
136
  Indeed, even as she argues that the genre is didactic, Schenck too admits that she 
includes in her count “morals [that] could be characterized as oblique, or drawn from a 
secondary point in the narrative” (Fabliaux 29) in addition to “one example of a blatantly 
sarcastic moral” (Fabliaux 30).  
Further complicating a determination of didacticism in fabliaux, we not only have 
these conflicting authorial statements, but “frequently heavy-handed” truth claims present 
in many of the tales, which can be interpreted in conflicting ways (Theiner 122). Claims 
that the material presented in obviously fictive plots is “chose veritable” (“Le Foteor,” 
VI, 59:3), “voires” (“Le Fevre de Creil,” V, 42:32), or “verité” (“Les deus Changeors,” 
V, 51:275) can be interpreted in one reading as tongue-in-cheek, similar to how 
contemporary jokes or urban legends are often said to have “really happened.” But it is 
also possible that what we have is “une autre vérité, la seule qui compte, qui est une 
vérité de dévoilement, intimement liée au didactisme” (Abramowicz 12).  From the 
perspective of those who seek proof of instructional content, “the author may be telling 
us not that the event actually occurred, but that it is ‘true’ because it possesses exemplary 
value” (Lacy, Reading 3).137  
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 Other inappropriate morals include those of “Boivin de Provins” variant P (II, 7:341), which inverts 
Christian morality in saying that “a good thief is one who steals from another” and “Le sot chevalier” (V, 
53) which ends with an admonition not to take fools seriously, advice that would not have saved the victims 
in the tale from being wounded by the defective knight of the title.  
137
 A short list of other tales that make such truth claims includes «La Housse partie» (III, 16), « Le 
Bouchier d’Abeville (III, 18), « Celle qui se fist foutre sur la Fosse de son Mari »  (III, 20), « La Male 
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To what can we attribute this dichotomy of critical opinion?  For one thing, the 
heterogeneous nature of the fabliau corpus is already enough to ensure a variety of views; 
the tales are the product of multiple poets over more than a century, and it would 
therefore “be wrong to impose on the fabliaux as a genre a strict unity of conception and 
purpose” (Hellman and O’Gorman 184). Norris J. Lacy has identified a similar polarity 
of views concerning women in the genre, accounting for divergent perceptions of 
whether fabliaux are antifeminist or not; on this basis, Lacy urges critics to 
“systematically resist the temptation to homogenize the stories or the views they offer” 
(Reading 77).
138
  On a related note, different fabliaux, and even versions of the same 
fabliau, were tailored to the requirements of different audiences, courtly or bourgeois for 
example, as Rychner’s study of manuscript variants has shown.139  Perhaps then a 
jongleur would recite a didactic fabliau for one kind of audience and a purely entertaining 
one for another.  
Yet, if these possibilities can explain why one fabliau provides instruction while a 
second does not, they continue to be based on the assumption that there are some clearly 
didactic fabliaux to begin with, which is hardly a foregone conclusion. Nor do they 
permit one to draw any conclusions on the debatable didacticism of individual tales. We 
are thus returned to the sense of questionability, difference, and debate that appears to be 
the only sure characteristic when considering the instructive content of the genre; since 
                                                                                                                                                 
Honte » (V, 43), « Le sot Chevalier » (V, 53), « La Dame qui fist trois Tors entor le Moustier » (V, 54), and 
«Connebert » (VIII, 77). 
138
 For the view of fabliaux as misogynist, see E. Jane Burns, Bodytalk: When Women Speak in Old French 
Literature (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993). Harriet Goldberg presents an opposing 
view in “Sexual Humor in Misogynist Medieval Exempla.”   
139
 Contribution à l’étude des fabliaux. 2 vols. Geneva: Droz, 1960. 
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this is the case, perhaps the question of whether fabliaux are didactic is continually raised 
because the issue is also problematized in the tales themselves.  
Reassessing divergent fabliau prologues from this new perspective, it is possible 
to see them as representing both sides of an ongoing poetic debate on whether poetry 
should be instructive. For example, the plot of Watriquet’s “Les trois Chanoinesses de 
Couloigne,” which features the poet himself as a character, revolves expressly around the 
unresolved question of whether a tale of “sotie” or “sens” is preferable (X, 121:5). But 
more than this, fabliaux are concerned with whether poetry can be instructive.  
As I have discussed in Chapter 1, Augustine sees the distracting fructus provided 
by the literal content of poetry as a communicative impediment precluding its 
pedagogical usus and effectively negating any hidden moral lessons it may contain. 
Debate on the value of secular literature continued throughout the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries, often in relation to the instruction of the universities.
140
 We can regard the 
didactic indecisiveness of fabliaux as reflecting this contemporary debate on the merits of 
poetry, its unresolved conclusion on the subject a means of problematizing the ability of 
fiction to convey moral instruction; to paraphrase Marshall McLuhan, the medium of the 
debate is the message.  
Such an emphasis would not be unprecedented. Robert Sturges has identified 
conflicting notions on whether the hidden meaning of signs is absolutely determinable 
(the dominant assumption of allegorical reading) or indeterminable as the central 
preoccupation in a number of medieval works including the Lais of Marie de France and 
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 A twelfth-century Cistercian manuscript, for example, presents a parable of Virgil in hell urging 
students to renounce poetry and the study of liberal arts (Ferruolo 67), while Jacques de Vitry, following 
Augustine’s ideas on spoliation Aegyptiorum very closely critiques “figmenta poetarum” in the following 
century (Ferruolo 250-51).   
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Chrétien’s Conte del Graal where Perceval is faced with signs that he fails to understand 
correctly. For Sturges, these works are all about the obstacles and difficulties of semiotic 
interpretation; specifically, they “thematize indeterminacy, that is, they make it one of 
their own (determinate) meanings to be communicated to the audience” (34). Thus, while 
the works discussed by Sturges maintain the frequent indeterminacy of meaning in 
allegorical signs, they do not extend this finding to their own verba, but maintain the 
ability of the poetic enterprise to communicate a didactic point. 
Fabliaux, which Sturges does not mention, also explore the nature of signs in a 
post-lapsarian world as one of their main concerns, but, like medieval religious drama, 
many also apply questions of interpretation to their own use of signs. These fabliaux go 
further to assert that any effort to communicate the problematic character of interpretation 
through literature is fraught with the same perils of indeterminacy and can be 
misunderstood. If the message of fabliaux, informed by an originally Augustinian 
perspective on the worthlessness of literature, is that meaning is difficult or impossible to 
transmit through poetry, then it would be just as difficult to locate this particular lesson in 
fabliaux because they too are works of poetry. Given the emphasis of the comic on 
negation, overturning, contradiction, and irony (for Schenck [Fabliaux Chapter 5], one of 
the defining characteristics of fabliaux), it is perhaps not surprising that the didacticism of 
the genre should be expressed this way. Paradoxically, then, the better a literary work 
argues that hidden meaning is inaccessible, the more the argument fades from view and 
conversely, the more accessible it is, the weaker the point. Yet, once we know what to 
look for, we can guess at where to look: in places not likely to contain instruction. For 
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instance, such a lesson is manifest in the very incongruency of fabliaux end morals that 
have tormented critics, which helps to explain their apparent failure.  
Rather than being the symptom of an unintended artistic lapse, when 
interpretation is itself the issue, an oblique or inappropriate moral becomes evidence that 
poetry cannot adequately convey didactic content. At work is something similar to what 
De Looze has identified in the proverbs in Book IV of Juan Manuel’s Conde Lucanor, 
which “quite literally do not make sense” as “part of a larger hermeneutical challenge” 
foregrounding the difficulty of constructing meaning (“Nonsensical” 202). Earlier fabliau 
poets already play with the expectation of finding meaning, creating a discontinuity 
between words—the verbal expression of the moral—and the actual meaning of the tale 
to problematize the nature of verba and the difficulties of interpretation in a fallen world. 
This semiotic basis likewise explains the frequency of tales like “Le Bouchier 
d’Abeville” (III, 18) “Les deus Chevaus” (V, 50) “Le Plantez” (VII, 76), and “Les trois 
Meschines” (IV, 32) that suspend moral judgment of what has taken place in the plot and 
instead direct the audience to decide wrong and right for themselves. In “Les deus 
Chevaus,” a monk and peasant tie the tails of their two decrepit nags together in a pulling 
contest to determine who will win both animals; on the verge of losing, the monk cuts the 
rope, and the poet asks the audience to determine if the peasant ought rightfully to have 
the monk’s horse. Certainly, the absence of a moral increases amusement by creating a 
kind of judicial game that encourages audience participation; yet this is only possible 
because a gap is also created between what is portrayed in the plot and its moral 
interpretation. The poem does not or cannot connect the two. Jurgen Beyer’s statement 
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that the concluding “moral actually documents the unfitness of the fabliau for 
moralization,” aptly encompasses this semiotic point (39).  
Furthermore, it is this gap that contributes to the humor of the morals—they are 
funny because they barely make sense, a trait often used to dismiss their instructional 
value. But the abyss between meaning and expression is not empty, for the humor of the 
bizarre moral encompasses the real didactic message of the tale and hints at where else it 
may be found. If the instruction present in a work of poetry is that poetry cannot be 
sufficiently instructive, then this message cannot be found in the “explicit statements of 
sentence” analyzed by critics without undercutting itself (Pearcy, “Sentence” 245): if the 
point is clear, it becomes untrue. Consequently, as I will demonstrate, fabliau didacticism 
must be situated in the unexpected places of the text like the humor of the genre; this fact 
has heretofore been overlooked because of a tendency toward duality, a persistent legacy 
of Horatian criticism, that assumes didactic content is separate from that which entertains, 
even in a literary work characterized by both. As Catherine Brown observes, 
contemporary readers of medieval texts tend to view “narrative pleasure and didactic 
activity as opponents in a pitched battle,” and feel compelled to choose an obvious victor 
(8).  
For medieval audiences, however, the presence of apparently conflicting motives 
in the same work was less a call to harmonize opposites than a stimulus for learning and a 
means of instruction; such, upon closer scrutiny, is what takes place in the fabliau. 
Lessons of interpretation are also present in the flaws that purportedly mar fabliaux, those 
that have traditionally supported arguments for the absence of meaningful content in the 
genre: their incongruous morals (as we have already seen), in their frivolous plots that 
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defy verisimilitude, in their lack of stylistic adornment, and even in their much maligned 
obscenity.  
 
Res significandi in Fabliau Plots 
 
Inevitably, any findings on the incommunicability of verbal signs in fabliaux must 
be grounded in a broader assumption that the interpretation of post-lapsarian signs, and 
fallen human language in particular, is problematic. Thus, not all of the 127 fabliaux in 
the NRCF focus only on the semiotic shortcomings of their poetic enterprise;
141
 like 
Chretien’s Conte del Graal, 95 tales or three-quarters depict some misinterpretation of 
signs in a more conventional determinate manner that extends beyond poetic expression 
to the world at large.
142
 This high percentage strongly suggests that the didactic point of 
the genre is the difficulty of interpreting signs. In fact, several end morals of an 
apparently practical (and often misogynist) nature like the admonition not to believe 
one’s wife more than one’s own eyes at the end of “Le Vilain de Bailleul” (V, 49) or the 
statement that “fame est fete por decevoir:/Mençonge fet devenir voir,/Et voir fet devenir 
mençonge” in “Les Perdris” (151-53), are unconcealed statements on the need for careful 
interpretation in a world where the manipulation of signs is commonplace. So too is the 
advice of a broader moral like “De folie s’entremet/Qui croit ce que de ses iex voie” (“He 
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 In accomplishing my analysis, I do not think it essential or even possible to prove my conclusions 
applicable to all fabliaux—warnings against homogenizing the genre remain good ones—but to show that 
an interest in the problems of semiotic interpretation is evident in many works in the corpus. Consistent 
with the approach promoted by Norris Lacy, I also intend my findings to represent “characteristics, and 
not…criteria on which we can construct a rigid definition,” and so assume the tales present in the NCRF to 
be a fairly representative sample on which to base my study (Reading 30).  
142
 For a list of specific tales, see Appendix B. I am including in this count open-ended fabliaux that ask for 
audience judgment, like “Les trois Meschines,” “Le Plantez,” and “Le Jugement” (X, 118), as these require 
the audience to interpret the events of the plot. I am not including several other tales relating the correct 
interpretation of signs, like “Le Fevre de Creil” and “Connebert” (VIII, 77), in which a husband recognizes 
his wife’s adulterous behavior.  
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who believes what his eyes see is mad”) in “Le Chevalier à la Robe vermeille” (II, 
12:309-10).  
The difficulties of arriving at the precise meaning of actions suggested by calls for 
audience judgment, also at the end of fabliaux, extend to similar “judicial scenes” that are 
widespread in fabliau plots as well.  Encompassing “a verdict from a judge [or] a decision 
from other characters in the tale,” these have been read as evidence of larger 
developments in the medieval legal system (Schenck, “Orality” 64), but at their core 
involve efforts to decipher the signification presented by ambiguous actions or forms of 
behavior. In “Le Vilain au Buffet,” for example, a nobleman has to interpret the reason 
why a peasant has struck a member of the court and in “La Coille noire” a clerical court 
decides not to annul a marriage after discovering the reason behind the mysterious colour 
of the body part in question. The conundrum that needs to be unravelled in each case 
involves an initial misjudgement of appearance: the vilain is wrongly assumed to have 
perpetrated violence without cause and the discoloured gonads are presumed to be a sign 
of impotence, though another explanation is later found. While Brent Pitts identifies the 
prevalence of truth-seeking or “veritropic discourse” (96) of this sort in fabliaux, it is an 
important point that attaining the truth is an arduous process in which usually “the answer 
offered is neither final nor truthful” (97). The final ruling sometimes fails to penetrate 
appearances and arrive at authoritative truth; judgment is instead based on what affords 
the judge(s) the most amusement. The husband’s implication that his blackened testicles 
result from his wife’s poor hygiene is no more valid an interpretation than hers, but is 
accepted because it makes the judges laugh heartily (108). Literal plots involving 
judgment thus raise semiotic problems but they do not necessarily resolve them. 
  129 
Outside of a judicial context, 74 of the 95 tales that emphasize some kind of 
interpretative puzzle feature res significandi—objects, events, physical appearance 
(including disguise), even sounds—that are at some time hidden or improperly 
understood by one or more characters in the tale. As Muscatine observes, in at least fifty 
fabliaux “we are dealing with a literature preoccupied with things” that are at the centre 
of narrative interest (Old French Fabliaux 59).  In an informal inventory, Marie-Thèrese 
Lorçin finds that physical objects feature in more than 50% of fabliaux, again evoking the 
important role of res in the tales (“Le statut” 9). Perhaps the most obvious semiotic 
example of this is the brief “La Crote,” all sixty lines of which depict an interpretative 
guessing game played between a peasant and his wife to pass the time; she offers him a 
bit of amorphous matter, “plus grosse d’un pois” (VI, 57:29), which he examines and 
touches, wrongly assuming that it is first dough, then wax. Only when the peasant tastes 
the substance on his final guess does he discover it is “merde” (56). It is easy for a 
squeamish critic to dismiss a tale like this as offensive and devoid of meaning, though it 
clearly highlights the risks of empirical interpretation in a humorous fashion.  
In “La Crote,” the intrinsically indeterminate nature of the res that is examined is 
emphasized, as it is in tales where an action is interpreted such as “Celui qui bota le 
Pierre” (VI, 63). Here a passing priest admonishes a woman who is kicking a stone not to 
do so, or she will be “foutré” (24). As her young child looks on, she wilfully continues 
the action, and the priest accomplishes his threat. When the woman’s husband returns 
home, he accidentally kicks the same rock, and the child fearfully warns his father to stop 
or he too will be screwed by the priest, “Sicom il fist ore ma mere” (49). Here, the child 
uses observation in a fashion akin to how Augustine learned the relationship between 
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signs and things as a toddler in the Confessions, but the former misinterprets the meaning 
of an action with likely negative results for his mother.
143
  There is no direct intent to 
deceive through the performance of the action of kicking, but the inherent ambiguity of 
the action and its result leads the child to assume a non-existent semiotic relationship.  
“Celui qui bota” presents a typical example of the visual misapprehension of res 
significandi, by far the most common source of sensory confusion in fabliaux.
144
 Other 
examples include “Estormi” (I, 1) and its variants “Les quatre Prestres” (VIII, 85) and 
“Les trois Boçus” (V, 47), which relate the failure to distinguish objects by sight; each 
plot involves the corpses of three different individuals, either priests or hunchbacks, that 
are assumed by the young man charged with disposing of them to be the same corpse 
returning multiple times. Frustrated at having to repeat his labour, when the youth 
encounters a live priest or a hunchback after disposing of the last body, he assaults the 
fourth individual to forestall yet another iteration, killing him in two of the stories. This 
confusion is, of course, based on the assumption that all priests or hunchbacks look alike, 
which destroys the verisimilitude of the tale and its seriousness; yet, its very strangeness 
suggests metaphorical meaning, one that again relates to the difficulties of empirical 
interpretation. In rejecting the ability of visually apprehended res to communicate their 
meaning transparently, the genre presents a view of signs that contrasts markedly with 
that of religious drama, which may speak to changes in medieval views of vision and 
perception during the thirteenth century. Suzannah Biernoff observes that there was a 
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 Confessions 1.8. In this passage, Augustine is talking about learning names for things, not what actions 
mean, but the principle of semiotic observation pertains. Arguably, the child of “Celui qui bota” has also 
learned what “foutre” means by attaching the verbal threat to the priest’s action. 
144
 “La Crote” emphasizes tactile interpretation while “Les deus Vilains” (IX, 107) and “Gauteron et 
Marion” (VIII, 84) depend on misunderstanding the sound of a fart as a mouth blowing on hot soup and an 
indication of lost virginity respectively. 
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“shift from symbolism to naturalism during this period” wherein “instead of looking 
through the visible world towards a higher, invisible reality,” there was a focus on 
looking at properties of things in the world (40). In the absence of the Platonic 
transcendent ideal that can be accessed, for example, in Augustine’s mechanism of 
comprehension, one must rely instead on assessing the seen object itself, which presents a 
greater possibility of error. 
 Unlike religious drama, which tends to promote learning by observation as an 
error-free process, fabliaux thus present visual apprehension as prone to mistakes. Yet, 
relatively few tales represent visual signs as being naturally ambiguous. Instead, most 
illustrate obstacles to interpreting objects and actions, such as the obscurity of night. The 
action of “Estormi” takes place at night, which lends a modicum of believability to the 
idea of identical corpses. Hindered by darkness, a lover can accidentally put on the pants 
of a husband (“Les Braies au Cordelier” [III, 17]), one bed can be mistaken for another 
(“Le Meunier et les deus Clers” [VII, 80]), or buttocks assumed to be a keg (“Le sot 
Chevalier” [V, 53]). Thus, according to some fabliaux, interpretative difficulties are 
abetted by a natural impediment to visual acuity.  
Following a Robertsonian perspective that seeks a doctrinal lesson in fabliaux, 
one can connect these interpretative difficulties to a lack of faith on the part of the 
interpreter, for “[i]mpaired perception can accompany moral deficiency” within an 
Augustinian system of cognition (Tachau 99): a sinner would not be fully graced with the 
aid of the intus magister while seeking to gain understanding.  However, faith clearly 
does not factor in the secular fabliaux as it does in religious drama, for many of the 
victims of poor interpretation are guilty of nothing more than gullibility, while the 
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perpetrators of semiotic manipulation who get away with it commit more serious crimes 
of adultery and murder.   
The most common cause of interpretative problems is therefore intentional 
behavior by the makers of signs to obscure the meaning behind the appearance of things 
for their own self-interest; the “repeated acts of deception” that Schenck (Fabliaux ix) 
sees as a defining characteristic of fabliaux can be assimilated to semiotic manipulation. 
Confusion arises as to which bed is which in “Le Meunier” because one of the visiting 
clerks purposefully shifts other furniture in the room. A wife is wrongly suspected of 
adultery because the procuress “Auberée” (I, 4) leaves a man’s surcot under her bed as 
part of a plan to make her available for a would-be lover. A cleric steals a chaplain’s meal 
and smears some of the grease on the mouth of a crucifix, presenting the result as 
evidence that Christ has eaten the food (“L'oue au Chapelain” VIII, 86). The deliberate 
falsification of visually apprehended signs can involve something as basic as a wife’s 
hiding her lover under an inverted tub (“Le Cuvier” [V, 44]), her creative use of a double 
who receives a beating in her place (“Les Tresces”), or her elaborate disguise as a male 
knight to humiliate a cowardly husband (“Berengier au lonc Cul” [IV, 34]).  
In each of these cases, the false res significandi remain impenetrable due in no 
small part to the sign maker’s audacious skill. The most masterful manipulators of signs 
in fabliaux alter appearances to the degree that they can make the most outlandish 
semiotic relationships seem plausible. Hence, one of the women in “Les trois Dames qui 
troverent l'anel (II, 11) can disguise herself as her husband’s niece and compel him to 
give her away in marriage to her lover. Yet, as talented as the sign makers are, their skill 
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is often proportional to the blindness of the interpreter, like the husband of “Les deus 
Changeors” who is shown his wife’s naked body by her lover and does not recognize it.  
While a great many fabliaux feature the direct manipulation of res through 
various means of obscuring visual assessment, in the majority of cases (56 of the 70 
extant tales featuring res significandi), misunderstanding is created primarily through a 
lie that is spoken and not through the inherently confusing nature of appearance. In 
“Estormi” and its variants, the young man thinks the same corpse has returned because 
this is what the provider of the bodies says has happened. The wife in “Le Pescheor de 
Pont seur Saine” (IV, 28) thinks the severed penis her husband shows her is his simply 
because he says so; she scrutinizes it carefully and realizes what it is —“ele l’a bien 
regardé…Et connut bien que ce fut vit” (127-29)—but nevertheless seems only to accept 
it as her husband’s based on his story. Thus, when there are potentially uncertain res, 
their final (and incorrect) interpretation is determined by false verba.  
Sometimes a visual sign presented is fairly unambiguous and seemingly simple to 
decipher in the absence of words. When a husband finds another man’s pants in his 
bedroom in “Les Braies au Cordelier,” or actually sees through the keyhole of his house 
that his wife is copulating with the local priest in “Le Prestre qui abevete ”(VIII, 98), an 
inference about what these res signify should be easy to draw; but once the wife says she 
has borrowed the pants from a holy friar as a talisman to induce pregnancy or once the 
priest explains that the keyhole magically alters the perception of what is happening 
inside, these inventive lies supersede the evidence of the senses. In some cases, the 
manipulators of signs go so far as to insist that their victims “see for themselves,” 
“deliberately invoking the ‘real world’ standard of visual confirmation only to employ it 
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against itself” through the addition of a false verbal interpretation as in “Le Prestre qui 
abevete” (Kohler 142).  As Lacy notes, “[w]hile we might expect to hear characters say ‘I 
wouldn’t have believed it if I hadn’t seen it with my own eyes,’ such trust in visual 
perception is overturned in favor of a greater confidence placed in the spoken word,” a 
confidence that is misplaced given the ease with which words can be used to deceive 
(Reading 91).  
Ultimately, then, fabliaux do not present as pessimistic a view of visual signs as 
they do of verbal ones, for misunderstanding of the former tends to happen only when 
they are purposely obscured or abetted by lies. Res, existing independent of human 
intention, are neutral and become deceptive when manipulated by a human actor; verba, 
which are inseparable from a speaker, are not only used in conscious lies but are also 
unreliable as signs in their own right, a point emphasized in an additional eighteen 
fabliaux that exclusively treat the confusing interpretation of words. Because the meaning 
of verba can be unknown or multiple, it is easily altered. Taking full advantage of a 
limited vocabulary, the young man in “Cele qui fu foutue et desfoutue” (IV, 30), for 
instance, tricks a naïve girl into thinking the word “foutre” indicates a form of currency. 
Elsewhere, puns are misapprehended even in the absence of an intent to deceive: in 
“Estula” (IV, 38) the title name is misheard as the question “Es tu là?” and in “La Male 
Honte” (V, 43) the “male,” or bag, of a man named Honte is wrongly understood as an 
imprecation of shame.  
This emphasis on the communicative shortfall of language places fabliaux 
squarely within the established medieval tradition of human words as flawed and corrupt 
in a fallen world. As I have discussed, according to Augustine, before the first sin, there 
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was no need for verbal communication since one soul transmitted meaning directly to 
another and “did not receive words from the outside” (DGCM  2.4.5). With the Fall, man 
“dried up by his sins, has need of    . . . human words,” which can be unfamiliar, 
polysemous, or falsified, and fabliaux present a reminder of this widespread idea (DGCM 
2.5.6).  
Pearcy, on the other hand, sees a more contemporary connection between the 
interest of fabliau plots in “exploit[ing]…the ambiguities of verbal signifiers” and the 
influence of nominalist sign theory, where words have no absolute referents (“Modes” 
194). As is the case with vision, within a nominalist perception of signa, the absence of 
transcendent realities that can be consulted to gain understanding leads to a greater 
possibility of misunderstanding, for one is limited to judging the signs themselves. 
Pearcy’s acknowledgment that the genre “has a firm and defensible philosophical basis” 
in the nominalist-realist debate of the late-thirteenth century ascribes some semiotic 
meaning to the genre (“Modes” 195), but he denies that fabliau poets express any 
“theoretical interest in exploring abstract philosophical questions” (“Investigations” 68).  
Pearcy’s remark that “in some respects fabliaux do make a partisan comment on some of 
the central philosophical questions of the time” (“Modes” 195) is grudging at best and 
makes the expression of such comments less than central to the purpose of fabliaux where 
“such concerns are deliberately eschewed by an intense and exclusive concentration on 
mundane social activities” (“Investigations” 68). This assessment, relegating the 
philosophical or semiotic point of the genre to its underpinnings, is once more governed 
by the conventional separation of deeper meaning from “narrative surface textures 
apparently lacking any abstract philosophical dimension” (Pearcy, “Investigations” 68). 
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However, as we have seen, the consistent depiction of interpretation and its discontents 
that permeates the “mundane social activities” represented in fabliau plots suggests this 
deeper semiotic issue is a significant part of their meaning. 
 
Abysmal Humor and the Instruction of Fabliaux 
In his examination of the comic climax in fabliaux, Thomas Cooke claims that the 
works of the genre “are not told for the sake of any theme they might embody, no matter 
how meaningful and profound, but rather for their humor, which is not a factor added to 
them, but of their essence” (138). In identifying comic intent as the primary trait of 
fabliaux, Cooke voices a truism with a history that goes back at least to Bédier’s initial 
definition of the tales as “humbles contes à rire” (383). Studies that seek to determine 
whether fabliaux are didactic inevitably start with an assumption that they are funny: the 
task is to determine which are also instructive. Or, as Pearcy puts it, “If every essample is 
necessarily a risée, the reverse would not appear to be true (“Sentence” 232).  
We are confronted yet again with a segregation of deeper meaning from the other 
aspects of fabliaux. In this case the separation involves quarantining the humor of the 
tales from “thematic meaning, which is often thought of as an abstract statement of the 
point of a story...found in the moral tag at the end” (Cooke 138).  A shift in approach 
would entail realizing that “the thematic meaning and the comic significance can be 
related, or even identical” (Cooke 138). I have already discussed how the humor of an 
incongruous moral exists as an acknowledgment of the inability of words to express 
meaning, either through the failure of the moral to capture the meaning of the poem or 
the failure of the poem to adequately represent some moral truth. A similar mechanism is 
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at work whenever one appreciates the humor of the genre as a whole: laughing at the 
punchlines of fabliaux involves understanding on some level what they have to say about 
the fallen nature of signs. From a certain perspective, plots that involve the 
misunderstanding of signs produce “stories intended primarily to amuse” (Pearcy, 
“Sentence” 242), and from another angle, the same lack of semiotic comprehension can 
be didactic, but these are not mutually exclusive ideas. The simplest way to reconcile the 
apparent clash of viewpoints is to synthesize them: the amusement generated by improper 
interpretation also contains its didactic message.  
The question of what makes something funny has been the object of extensive 
study among philosophers, psychologists, and anthropologists alike. It is beyond the 
scope of this chapter to examine these issues in depth, but three basic theories of humor 
have been revisited in one form or another since Aristotle’s Poetics, pointing to a sense of 
incongruity, relief, and superiority that underlies what is deemed humorous. All of these 
help explain why fabliaux are funny and also how they are didactic.  
In Le Rire, the philosopher Henri Bergson finds the basis for humor in the 
incongruity of “une certaine raideur de mécanique là où l’on voudrait trouver . . . la 
vivante flexibilité d’une personne,” as in clownish aping (8).145  R. Howard Bloch, 
following Freud’s analysis of jokes, speaks similarly of humor as “a diversion, the 
displacement of an initial topic by a second one, as well as a substitution” (“Fabliaux” 
17).
146
  As already mentioned, this interruption of conventional expectation is responsible 
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 Slapstick is another example: speaking of fabliaux, Yves Roguet coincidentally describes how they 
“réduisent souvent…les victims en mécanisant leurs comportements par la répétitivité de la violence” 
(459). 
146
 Findings on the nature of jokes are applicable to fabliaux, which have been denigrated as “no more than 
extended ‘dirty jokes’” (Muscatine Old French Fabliaux 2), or more objectively considered as “extended or 
narrative jokes” (Cooke 159), sharing the same primary characteristics.  
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for the humor of a fabliau end moral that does not fit, and it is also at work in fabliau 
plots. “Le sot Chevalier” elicits laughter because its concluding punchline involves an 
incongruous act—the accidental spearing of a sleeping guest whose buttocks are 
mistaken for a keg of wine. It also presents an unexpected conclusion to what is 
anticipated by the plot. The knights who receive hospitality at the house of “le sot 
chevalier” fear their host will rape the tallest member of their party and beat the shortest, 
based on his repetition of the mantra “si foutera le plus lonc/et si batra le cort selonc” 
(141-42), which is actually the knight’s personal mnemonic for how to perform 
intercourse. The ending of the tale is unanticipated because although both the shortest and 
tallest are ultimately injured by their host—the former in a fashion reminiscent of anal 
rape—the means by which it occurs is unpremeditated and accidental. These cases 
illustrate that the reversal of expectation that occurs in jokes is not a pleasant and happy 
surprise, but one that remains somehow disturbing.  
Laughter, which can be, but is not always, a physiological reaction to a humorous 
narrative, is commonly held to express a spontaneous release of tension created by the 
danger and inappropriateness of what has been narrated.  “Le sot Chevalier” is 
inappropriate because it suggests the socially taboo subject of homosexuality and 
represents graphic violence. Any laughter that results is thus one of relief at the 
avoidance of what could have been an intentional act of violence and a real case of sexual 
violation; the situation is a near-miss made for amusement, which washes away its 
potential danger. With this alleviation may come an added sense of superiority, a type of 
Schadenfreude felt by those who laugh at the comic misfortune of others: because the 
audience are not being physically abused, they can express relief through laughter. When 
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one does not laugh he or she has either identified too closely with the victim of the tale or 
cannot otherwise dismiss the seriousness of the threat embodied in the narrative. 
Based on these theories, a shattering of expectation is operational in all humor no 
matter what the subject matter of the joke or humorous narrative; that which is funny is 
always based on a semiotic slippage, a breakdown between expected meaning and 
received meaning cultivated to effect laughter. Without this discontinuity there would be 
no surprise punchline. Just as one “gets’ a concept in the context of education, “getting” a 
joke, appreciating its humor, represents a kind of flash illumination, a sudden awareness 
of this rupture that may not be rationalized or consciously analyzed but is present 
nonetheless. To be sure, not all jokes contain narratives that also depict misinterpretation, 
particularly those that simply ridicule stereotypical traits of a specific group such as 
lawyers or blondes.
147
  But because the narrative plots of most fabliaux also represent the 
gap between signs and their interpretation as their central point, the sense of failed 
communication is doubled, with the essential structure of the joke recapitulating and 
reinforcing the literal content.
148
 Therefore, getting the humor of fabliaux coincides with 
grasping their didactic message concerning problems of interpretation on some level: 
humor and meaning are intertwined. The punchline is equivalent to a kind of moralitas.  
Interestingly, the essential social nature of the joke—“unless it is shared and we ‘get it’, it 
fails” (Camille, Image 43)—is reminiscent of what Augustine describes as the goal of 
communitas created by a shared learning of sacred signs; in this case, the punchline also 
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 Consider, for example, the widely circulated joke where the devil offers an attorney increased income as 
well as a long and hedonistic life in exchange for the souls of his wife, children, and grandchildren, to 
which the attorney asks “What's the catch?” Here, the selfish immorality of lawyers is ridiculed and there is 
no emphasis on misinterpretation.  
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 Some fabliaux present indeterminacy only in their comic structure and not their literal content, like “Les 
quatres Sohais saint Martin” (IV, 31), where a husband and wife unexpectedly waste four wishes on 
inappropriate or vindictive desires.  
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creates shared knowledge of signs, but one that, removed from a Christian context, 
reveals them to be faulty.  
When laughter occurs within the action of numerous fabliau plots, as characters 
mock another’s misunderstanding, for example, it is likely to prompt the audience to 
laugh along; like the laugh track of a sitcom, such instances can become cues that “may 
signal expected interpretations,” often pointing “toward deeper implications and 
epistemological concerns” (Gordon 486, 487). The audible response of laughter can mark 
the moment of “breaking through the intellectual barrier” . . . when “something is 
understood,” in this case an awareness of the semiotic disturbance highlighted by the 
humorous (Blyth qtd. in Klein).  
While culturally risqué subjects like castration, adultery, and casual mass murder 
(“Estormi”) in fabliaux may elicit the laughter of relief following discomfiture, the 
interpretative indeterminacy that defines the essence of the humorous itself is dangerous 
enough to prompt this response. As M. Conrad Hyers observes, “in this comic perception 
of absurdity lies the potential for a deeper level of insight into the element of absurdity in 
all things, even the most obvious and assured” (Zen 94-95). The notion implicit in jokes 
that “nothing actual is wholly logical, nothing finite infinite,” that predictability is an 
illusion, presents a glimpse over the edge of an epistemological abyss (Bloch, Scandal 
114). Jokes “expose the inadequacy of realist structurings of experience” (Douglas 108), 
offering up a conception of signs that smacks of what Pearcy has labelled the nominalist 
ethos of fabliaux. Faced with the “new, unforeseeable kinds of interpretation” offered by 
the joke and the prospect of a universe in which “anything is possible” (Douglas 108), 
one can choose to respond with the pessimism of tragedy or the laughter of comedy.   
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A world of disrupted, deceptive signs in which one has to “watch out for 
everything” as in “Le Prestre et le Mouton,” a world in which there are no ideals, no 
absolutes, and thus no ability to grasp truth through Augustine’s Platonic formae 
aeternae, contains a high potential for a tragic outlook. The failure of interpretation and 
the collapse of infallible communication brought about by the Fall are losses that could 
result in utter sadness, but prompt laughter instead. In “De l’essence du rire,” Charles 
Baudelaire makes an explicit association of laughter with the Fall as a symptom of 
humankind’s post-lapsarian nature. There were no tears in paradise and hence no laughter 
either: all laughter springs from a recognition of misery “intimement lié à l’accident 
d’une chute ancienne,” but is also a way of coping with it (235).149  So, as Leech 
observes, “humor fulfills a social function because it allows the audience to laugh at inner 
fears while reaffirming the accepted order of things”—the world has not been redeemed 
(111). We can confront the “awful truth” (Morreal 4) about the nature of fallen signs 
represented in fabliaux because it is contained in a safe, fictionalized form using what 
Lacy terms “esthetic distance” to mitigate the reality of the threat (“Types” passim).  
Fabliau poets employ a number of stylistic techniques “to establish and maintain 
distance between audience and story”—authorial intrusion, absence of geographical and 
historical details, nameless two-dimensional characters; these not only enable one to 
laugh freely at the plight of victims of the tales, but also to safely compartmentalize the 
disturbing universe they present, so one cannot respond with the despair of tragedy 
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 Thomas Cooke holds a very different view of the reversal that takes place in fabliaux and the resulting 
revelation of the way the world functions, which he associates with a “supremely satisfying…vision of the 
good” prefiguring eternal reward (168-69). In this, Cooke appears to overlook the fact that most fabliaux 
end badly for the victim in the narrative, who can be cuckolded, beaten, or castrated. The humor in these 
cases is of a dark, rather than a joyful one. 
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(Lacy, “Types” 112).150  Verisimilitude is altogether lacking in the genre, for instance. 
One cannot reasonably believe that a body would be mistaken for a cut of pork as in 
“Aloul” (III, 14), that a priest would dip himself in dye and disguise himself as a life-size 
crucifix (“Le Priestre teint” [VII, 81]), or that circumstances like these that “strain our 
credulity beyond the breaking point” were likely ever to have occurred in the Middle 
Ages (Lacy, Reading 101).
151
   
Moreover, the victims who are essential in Schenck’s definition of fabliaux 
(Fabliaux ix) are exaggerated in their ineptitude at negotiating ambiguous signs, which 
also forestalls audience identification. Readers or auditors of fabliaux would not likely 
imagine themselves as “Le fol Vilain” (IX, 106) who mistakes his own shadow for a 
lurking thief, then incinerates a wheat field to flush him out. Nor would they believe 
themselves capable of being convinced that they are dead, like “Le Vilain de Bailleul (V, 
49). Any audience-character affinity that exists lies with those who possess the requisite 
skill at penetrating obscure signs like the husband of “Le Prestre teint” who recognizes 
the signs of his wife’s’ indiscretions, spots the disguised priest and castrates him, or the 
wife in “La Borgoise d’Orliens” (III, 19) who sees through her husband’s disguise and 
his plan to entrap her, arranging to have him beaten for his trouble.  
Pearcy’s assertion that the enjoyment of fabliaux depends in part on “the 
emotional pleasures of laughing at one’s fellow victims” therefore needs amending 
(“Sentence” 232). One can be subject to the same post-lapsarian conditions as the 
misinterpreters in the genre and still maintain a sense of alterity and superiority, without 
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 For Cooke, Chaucer’s inclusion of the victim “January’s suffering … at its most severe” in his fabliau 
analogue “The Merchant’s Tale” is problematic from the standpoint of humor, bespeaking an intention that 
is not purely comic, but that tends toward tragedy (191). 
151
 Referencing several outlandish plots, Bloch (Scandal 4-6) debunks the numerous critical claims for the 
fabliau as realistic examples of medieval social history. 
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fellowship. The laughter of fabliaux is possible because of what Baudelaire terms 
“croyance à sa propre superiorité” (241), the perception that one would not be victimized 
by the specific circumstances faced by fabliau characters. This translates to the broader 
belief that one would be a better interpreter of signs in similar situations like Nietzsche’s 
Zarathustra who can “laugh because he is high enough to see all” (Bloch, “Fabliaux” 19). 
It is from this superior position “en situation de hors-jeu et assimilé à un dieu omniscient” 
that one is able to consider the interpretative conundrums that take place in the plots 
(Aubailly 115).  
This is the godlike perspective held by the many “dramatized observers” in 
fabliaux, those who view and judge ambiguous situations and are thus surrogates for the 
fabliau audience itself (Lacy, “Subject to Object” 17). In “La vielle Truande” (IV, 37), 
for example, the hideous old vagabond of the title represents herself as the would-be 
lover of a young man she encounters on the road, then as his mother when she wants him 
to carry her across a watercourse. When he denies both claims, the “hauz hom…de cort” 
(136) and his retinue who come upon the arguing pair take it upon themselves to decide 
which of her contradictory and ambivalent verba are true; they compel the clerk to accept 
either that she is his mother and bear her on his back or copulate with her on the spot if 
she is not. The basis for the judgment is not reasonable, nor does the result represent a 
proper solution to the ambiguity of the situation, but it washes away the problem of 
interpretation with “grant risee” (221). A similar response is promoted by the clerical 
tribunal in “La Coille noire” that fails to come down with a firm ruling on an 
indecipherable sign: it merely laughs the case out of court.
152
  Clearly, while the need for 
judgment of an indeterminate situation may be serious for the parties involved, the task of 
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 “Lors n’i a celui n’en rie…Et la dame se tint por fole” (108-10) 
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unveiling meaning is not a matter of grave import, but a game, just as it is for the fabliau 
audience. This is especially apparent in direct calls for audience judgment on such issues 
as which woman should pay for a wasted cosmetic (“Les trois Meschines”)  or who 
deserves a found ring ( “Le Jugement”). The absence of personal investment in the puzzle 
at hand enables laughter as a way of handling conditions of indeterminacy.  
As Beyer explains, the structure of fabliaux enables one to “laugh about this 
world without ideals, because otherwise one could only weep” (42). Taken a step further, 
in the formulation of Mikhail Bakhtin, “cosmic fear,” which certainly includes 
encountering a world of indeterminate signs, “is defeated by laughter” (335).153 The 
comic dispels despair, for it “presents incongruities as something we can live with, 
indeed, something in which we can take a certain delight” (Morreal 5). The didacticism 
of fabliaux thus broaches the prevalence of duplicitous signs in a fallen world but 
suggests a response: it both forewarns and forearms; this is the lesson embedded in the 
humor of the genre, hidden “derrière le rire” (Bégin 20).  
Again, because the didacticism of signs present in fabliaux is of an unusual sort, 
not conventionally moral and not openly expressed but embedded in its humor and 
absorbed almost osmotically, it is easily overlooked. Thus, Thomas Cooke can see the 
laughter of fable as “an ulterior laughter, laughter with a purpose” vis-à-vis its declared 
moral, but in the absence of explicit moralitas readily declares that the “fabliaux share 
none of these characteristics with the fables” (111). So too, Clarissa Bégin can observe 
that the aim of fabliaux is “d’enseigner par le rire” (27) but miss the broader semiotic 
point in looking too closely at the literal content. Perhaps a useful parallel for 
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 Bakhtin also mentions the particular power of the scatological, something certainly not in short supply 
among fabliaux, in “transforming fear into laughter” (335). 
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understanding the instructive value of the genre involves envisioning fabliaux as the 
literary equivalent of the wise fool whose absurd antics and seemingly irrational remarks 
paradoxically contain deeper meaning. A still better analogue may be that of the Rinzai 
(“Sudden Enlightenment”) school of Zen Buddhism, which offers an important parallel 
for philosophical didacticism in the absence of explicit instruction.  
Rinzai Zen eschews rational teaching as much as it rejects the validity of all 
dualities—between sacred and profane, between serious and comic, and presumably 
between entertainment and edification. Its preferred methods of instruction involve the 
use of koans (puzzling paradoxical statements or questions like Hakuin’s famous “What 
sound does one clapping hand make?”), bizarre and apparently irrational sayings or 
actions on the part of a master, and irreverent vignettes. In a simple sense, all of these 
approaches to teaching deflect attempts to rationalize instruction and suggest that one 
cannot have higher meaning explained and expect to understand it; one must “get it” her 
or himself. The possibility exists too that one simply will fail in this. The learner likewise 
cannot contemplate meaning and expect to uncover it just as one cannot ride a bicycle 
correctly while thinking about how to do it: one just does what comes naturally. In trying 
to analyze, one “seeks and seeks, but cannot find. One then gives up, and the answer 
comes by itself,” often by virtue of the joke (Hyers, Zen 161).  
This surrender to gain understanding is supposed to happen in a particular Zen 
vignette that recalls fabliaux in its irreverence and scatology. A master asks a student 
“‘Where is the Buddha now?’ The anticipated answer would be, ‘The Buddha is in 
Nirvaana.’ The answer given, however, is, “The Buddha is taking a shit!’” (Hyers, 
“Humor” 271). This joke teaches that there is no dichotomy between the reverential and 
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the everyday, but it does not say so outright. To grasp its meaning, the student who hears 
the vignette has to experience a moment of satori, “the sudden and intuitive way of 
seeing into anything” that frequently arrives with a laugh (Watts 161). Thus, in the 
concise phrasing of humorist Allen Klein, “[w]hether it be a Zen koan, one of those 
questions which the rational mind cannot solve, or, a captivating Zen story, when we 
laugh at these, we go from a chuckle (“ha-ha”) to comprehension (“ah-ha!”).154  
Obviously, medieval poets and their audiences in thirteenth- and fourteenth-
century France were not Buddhists, but the pedagogical process that functions in fabliaux 
is similar enough to what takes place in Rinzai Zen to make the comparison a fruitful 
one.
155
 Audiences for fabliaux are not necessarily seeking enlightenment, but do end up 
being illuminated concerning semiotic instability and the best ways to handle it, both 
lessons learned by inference through humor. The authors of the genre choose not to 
declare their didacticism but use this unconventional approach “to teach what cannot be 
taught in words” because it is the best way to communicate the difficulty of 
communicating using fallen signs (Hyers, Zen 35). Having chosen humor as their 
expressive mode, fabliau poets are bound not to explain their lessons which would be the 
equivalent of ruining the joke.  
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 Klein also quotes the Chinese Zen master Hsüeh-T'ou whose maxim “When one has understanding, one 
should laugh; One should not weep” sounds a lot like Jurgen Beyer’s similar observation concerning 
fabliaux. 
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 De Looze (Manuscript Diversity 216) discusses a similar parallel involving the proverbs in Conde 
Lucanor, which he calls “the distant fourteenth-century Spanish relatives to the Zen conundrums that push 
the listener to meditation precisely because of the way they contradict both the listener’s expectations and 
themselves.” 
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Fabliau Learning and the Artes Memoriae 
As the didacticism of fabliaux is inextricably tied to its joke structure, it should 
not be surprising that the same formal qualities contributing to the humor of the genre are 
also those that enhance its instruction. I have already noted how the sketchy and 
unrealistic portrayal of characters in fabliaux precludes emotional attachment and enables 
the laughter of awareness. Stock types such as the adulterous wife, gullible husband, 
lecherous priest, and foolish peasant verge on being allegorical representations: they are 
instruments for a purpose—the joke and its message—not realistic portrayals. 
Along with stock characterization, fabliaux offer an economical style, simple 
linear plots limited to “the narration of a single episode and its immediate results” (The 
French Fabliaux vi), and general brevity of form. As Ocaña observes, brevity is “a 
stylistic desideratum as much as a formal and morphological characteristic of the genre” 
(190). Shorter fabliaux like “Le Pliçon” and “Gauteron et Marion” are mere vignettes, 
crystallized to an occasion of interpretative confusion, often the crisis moment when a 
husband returns home while his wife and her lover are engaged in adulterous behavior. 
Even longer or more convoluted fabliaux of 1000 lines or so like “Le Prestre comporté” 
(IX, 102) and “Aloul” (III, 14) deal with the confusions arising from a single action 
(trying to dispose of a dead priest and discovering a hidden lover respectively) during 
only one night.  
This spare narrative style has led to a certain amount of critical condescension 
toward fabliau poets as lacking “toute prétention littéraire” (Bédier 341) or as “modest 
fellows conscious of their lack of literary graces” (Johnston and Owen xi), based on the 
recurring notion that complex structure is a sign of greater sophistication and literary skill 
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rather than a conscious stylistic decision. From a more neutral, non-judgmental 
perspective, brevity is a structural requirement of the joke, for “the jokester cannot allow 
his audience time to realize what is going to happen,” a consideration that is doubly 
critical in fabliaux where didactic meaning leans heavily on the revelatory punchline 
(Cooke 159). Yet, the spare narrative style that contributes to the efficacy of humor is 
also conducive to the more general requirements of instruction, as in didactic exempla. 
When John Jaunzems describes “the author’s deliberate avoidance of ornament” and 
“plainness of style that serves its purposes as a didactic instrument” in the “Seven Sages” 
tradition of wisdom literature, one can easily assume that he is describing fabliaux 
(58).
156
 Given the inescapable communicative difficulties of fallen verba in literary 
genres that, unlike drama, cannot fall back on visible res, omitting anything that distracts 
from or disguises the central point of the plot is an instructional consideration, as is the 
need to hold the attention of an audience with a relatively short narrative. As the author 
of the sixty-line “La Crote” observes, “li fablel cort et petit/Anuient mains que li trop 
lonc” (4-5). Again, an apparent deficiency in skill becomes evidence of a conscious 
purpose, one that relies heavily on the didactic techniques of the artes memoriae. 
Using evidence from chansons de geste, Paula Leverage has argued that 
“jongleurs traditionally perceived as uneducated, itinerant performers, were acquainted 
with at least the imagery and metaphors of medieval memory theory” (63). It is likely that 
the tenets of mnemonic imagery were commonplace enough so that any poet with a 
rudimentary education would have been familiar with it, yet the number of critical studies 
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 The exempla do differ from fabliaux in being part of larger collections, in prose, and treat Christian 
morality rather than practical problems of interpretation. Schenck notes that fabliaux are also different in 
being even longer than the “eight to twenty lines” that characterize the typical exemplum (Fabliaux 24). 
Both remain “short forms,” however, and share similar structural elements.  
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attributing clerical authorship to fabliaux suggest that their creators had more than a 
passing knowledge of its use.  Pearcy echoes the views of Bédier, Nykrog, and Muscatine 
among others when he asserts that many fabliau poets “belonged to that class of clerici 
vagantes who, in however desultory a way, had spent some time at a university and had 
acquired some familiarity with the main issues of logic, psychology, and the other 
disciplines of the conventional undergraduate curriculum,” (“Obscene” 169).157  It is an 
intriguing fact that fabliaux flourished in Northern France, close to the University of 
Paris, during the rise of the university in the thirteenth century. It is not unlikely that its 
students would have circulated in the area, composing tales in a similar vein as the 
carmina burana. If the creators of fabliaux possessed a university background, memory 
technique would have been a fundamental part of their education, so it is not surprising to 
find it in the genre.  
The brevity and economy promoted by fabliaux, for example, are an essential part 
of the mnemonic art, serving as an aide mémoire in the crucial last stage of learning: 
retention of the lesson. As Hugh of St. Victor observes, “the memory rejoices in 
shortness (‘memoria brevitate gaudet’),” for it is easier to recall that which is 
uncomplicated (Carruthers, Memory 79). The advice of the Rhetorica ad Herennium to 
imagine backgrounds for memory images “in a deserted [rather] than in a populous 
region, because the crowding and passing to and fro of people confuse and weaken the 
impress of the images” speaks to how an absence of complexity aids in memorization 
(III, 19.31). If the structural and stylistic simplicity of fabliaux reflects one aspect of 
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 The classic study is Stephen Wailes’ “Vagantes and the Fabliaux” in Cooke and Honeycutt’s collection 
of articles. Bédier confidently asserts that “Nous tenons pour assure qu’un grand nombre de fabliaux ont 
pour auteurs des clercs errants” (389). Nykrog speaks of the writers’ “carefree days in and around the 
schools” (64) and in The Old French Fabliaux Muscatine dedicates a large portion of his second chapter to 
the subject of clerical authorship.  
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medieval artes memoriae, the emphasis of the genre on settings that are “spare if not 
bare” does so as well (Muscatine, Old French Fabliaux 62). 
To create the clean, manageable memory spaces against which to situate mental 
images, the Ad Herennium advocates envisioning not just uncluttered open areas, but 
small, limited sites like “a house, an intercolumnar space, a recess, an arch, or the like” 
(III, 17.29) which extends to “a bedroom, a monastic cell, a closet” in other memory 
manuals (Carruthers, Memory 197). In sixty-nine of the ninety-five fabliaux (nearly 
three-quarters) that feature interpretation as their central point, the creation of the main 
semiotic problem and its results occur in either an unpopulated outdoor space or a small 
enclosed one (see Appendix B). In this count I am including only interpretative situations 
where the main characters are depicted alone within a deserted or enclosed milieu and 
where we get a definitive sense of place, not just where the action incidentally takes 
place. “La Male Honte” is therefore excluded because verbal misunderstanding takes 
place among a crowd at court, as is “L’Esquiriel” (VI, 58), where manipulation of 
language takes place between the main characters in some unspecified area in a house or 
garden. A tale like “Le Cuvier” is included, on the other hand, because deception is 
perpetrated by hiding the lover under a tub in the main room of the house, and the action 
centres on getting first the husband, then the lover out of the room. Likewise, in “Le 
prestre qui ot Mere a Force,” one misunderstanding takes place at episcopal court, a 
crowded public space, but the culmination of the deceptions in the tale—a priest’s 
offering to take back his own mother, whom he passes off as a stranger, in exchange for 
money—occurs on an empty road where the only apparent actors are the three characters 
involved in the situation.   
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Although Marie-Thérèse Lorçin has observed that very few fabliaux are set 
exclusively outdoors (a half dozen by her count), among our subset of  95 tales, problems 
of interpretation occur al fresco in fifteen, and consistent with the advice of the Ad 
Herennium, they tend to happen in unpopulated places, mainly deserted roads or open 
fields.
158
  For Lorçin, these settings (and a centripetal movement toward “l’abri de la 
maison”) suggest the dangers of travel in the thirteenth century (Façons 20).  Vacant 
thoroughfares are places fraught with danger, from the con game of “Les trois Aveugles 
de Compiegne” where a clerk tricks three blind travelers by pretending to hand them 
alms, to the attempted roadside robbery of  “Le Prestre et les deus Ribaus (V, 45). But 
this is not always the case. In “La Sorisete des Estopes,” there is no threat: a mouse 
mistaken by a naïve husband for his wife’s private parts simply gets lost in the brush at 
the side of a country road. And, after the wife of “Le Vilain Mire” convinces three 
messengers in search of a doctor that her husband is a physician who must be beaten 
before he admits his vocation, they first find him alone in his own farm field and pummel 
him there (II, 13).  
What all these outdoor settings do have in common is the impression of large, 
empty space they create, much like the ideal mnemonic background described in the Ad 
Herennium, against which appear only the characters involved in the situation of semiotic 
confusion. If there are other workers in the field or other travelers on the road, we get no 
real sense that they are there. Description of the outdoor setting is spare but emphasizes 
the notion of solitariness in vacant space. In “Berangier au lonc Cul” the feckless 
husband creates the false signs of battle by beating his own shield in a “bois mout grant et 
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 Lorçin counts only those tales that have “pour seul cadre (my emphasis)  la forêt, la mer, les grands 
chemins” (Façons 17).  
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mout plenier” (90) The robbers of “Le Prestre et les deus Ribaus” meet on a “chemin 
grant et plenier” (29) while the handsome youth subjected to the lies of “La vielle 
Truande” meets her as he “chevauchoit tout une lande” (33). In “Les trois Aveugles,” we 
are told that  
  Troi avule un chemin aloient. 
Entr’aus trois un garchon n’avoient 
Ki les menast ne condesist, 
Ne le chemin lor apresist (12-16) 
[Three blind men were going along the road. 
Among the three there was no boy 
To lead them, guide them 
Or show them the way]  
When a “clerc” and his servant encounter the sightless travelers, they are the only two 
parties on an apparently desolate stretch of road. This places the situation of semiotic 
confusion and its participants at the centre of interest without the distraction of a busy 
background or additional actors.  
Should the action of fabliaux occur indoors, as it more frequently does, we 
continue to get a distinct sense of background space, but one that is more clearly 
delimited and conspicuous despite its spare details for its direct significance to the plot. 
In the economy of fabliaux, one often gets the impression that the action takes place in a 
house comprised of a single small multi-purpose room where characters enter and depart, 
eat, greet visitors, and make love. In the absence of a detailed interior geography, the title 
character of “Le Vilain Mire” appears to beat his wife in the main room of his house, 
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from whence he departs for the fields; his lamenting wife later receives messengers in the 
same room, provides them with food, and invents a lie about her husband there as well.  
 In a tale like “Le Cuvier,” this compressed sense of space is even more important 
to the narrative events. While a woman and her lover are preparing to bathe, her merchant  
husband returns home unexpectedly with business colleagues compelling the wife to 
conceal her lover beneath the overturned tub. Entering the same room, her husband sees 
the tub, tosses a tablecloth over it, and sits down with his associates, waiting to be served 
a meal. There may be other areas in the house, but audience attention is riveted on this 
one room, which is not described in any detail, and more immediately on the space 
surrounding the single prop of the “cuvier.” Numerous fabliaux make use of similarly 
compact spaces in which lovers are concealed “dans un solier, un tonneau de plume, un 
lardier, une cuve ou un coffre” (Brusegan 57). The sense of confined area is crucial to the 
tension of the plot and “c’est l’élément clôture … qui a les consequences narratives les 
plus importantes” (Brusegan 57). 
For Rosanna Brusegan, the interest of fabliau poets on indoor space reveals “une 
attention particulière et originale pour la vie privée” and the movement from exterior to 
interior serves as a metaphor for illicit sexual activity (62). Though this may be true, a 
new focus on private affairs does not explain why intimate interior venues and the 
bedroom in particular are the loci of semiotic manipulation and confusion. A wife can 
hide a lover from her husband in her private bedroom (“La Saineresse” [IV, 36]) and 
even in the bed itself (“Le Pliçon,” “Aloul”), or one bed can be confused for another 
(“Gombert et les deus Clercs”). Given the context of deception tied to the bed(room) and 
small, circumscribed space in general, it is possible that directing audience attention to 
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such an intimate and sexualized setting contributes to the mnemonics of the genre. More 
often than not, the space of the bedroom tends to be sparsely described as the attention of 
the reader or audience is confined entirely to the bed and a small group of characters in or 
around it. This may recall an example from the Ad Herennium of an individual in bed 
with another standing at his bedside as an image conducive to memory (III, 20.33).
159
  
When fabliaux restrict the gaze of their audience to a narrow enclosed space in a like 
manner, the confusion of signs that takes place there is readily visualized and accordingly 
remembered. 
This intensely focused field of vision created by fabliau settings is perhaps best 
illustrated by “Le Prestre qui abevete.”  Here, the visual and verbal deception upon which 
the plot revolves is limited to what can be seen through a keyhole. Though a peasant and 
his wife are eating supper in their home, an itinerant priest shouts that he sees the couple 
engaged in sexual intercourse when he peeks through the keyhole. The peasant denies it 
but is encouraged to go outside and see for himself. The priest enters the house and 
actually copulates with the wife, while the peasant peers through the keyhole and sees 
that what the priest had said was true. Again, this vaguely described small space, its 
extent circumscribed by the device of the keyhole, is the locus of all narrative action.  
The keyhole-width gaze of “Le Prestre qui abevete” exemplifies Paul Theiner’s 
observation regarding “La Borgoise d’Orliens” that “the actual setting … is never at any 
time larger than a space that could be covered by a spotlight” (128). Theiner means to 
evoke the theatrical associations of the genre, a connection first made by Edmond Faral, 
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 The exact position of the figures “grouped against a plain background in an active scene” isn’t critical in 
the fabliaux as it is in most locational mnemonic techniques, as the images do not act as cues for other 
material to be remembered in order, but are to be remembered in their own right (Carruthers Memory 133) 
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who posited the origins of  fabliaux in Roman comedy.
160
  Faral’s claim neglects the 
possibility of independent thematic similarities and has since been discredited by Nykrog 
(Fabliaux l-lii) and others, but the dramatic character of fabliaux remains apparent. Grace 
Frank surmises that a trouvère accustomed to reciting fabliaux could have “decided to 
turn his narrative into dialogue and add thereto impersonation, mimetic action, a more 
pretentious script, and some mise en scène,” changing recitation into fuller performance 
(215) as often happened with twelfth-century romance.
161
  Fabliaux that contain 
“dramatized observers”—audiences of some kind looking on the action of the plot —
whether a tribunal, members of an aristocratic court, a group of diners at a feast, a sexual 
voyeur, or a peeper like the priest in “Le Prestre qui abevete,” hint at the theatrical 
potential of the genre (Lacy, “Subject to Object” 17).  
I have previously noted in my discussion of sacred drama how the visual res of 
the stage—its use of sets, scenes, props, and costumes—resemble the mnemonic art of 
images in places, sharing its ability to install information in memory and subsequently 
recall it. If fabliaux were indeed enacted on occasion, their reliance on res would render 
their content visually memorable in much the same way and amplify their ability to 
convey meaning beyond a reliance on fallen verba. If we admit that most of the time 
fabliaux were only recited or read and did not make direct use of visible signs, the 
authors of the genre nevertheless capitalize on the didactic advantages of res by depicting 
a limited group of characters in settings that can be easily taken in by the mind’s eye. 
These scenes appear designed to invite mental visualization, which is the next best thing 
to physical sight.  
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 See “Le Fabliau latin au moyen âge,” Romania 50 (1924): 321-85. 
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 In Orality and Performance in Early French Romance (passim), Evelyn Vitz discusses how the 
romances of Chrétien de Troyes in particular were readily subject to dramatized performance. 
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Of course, within the ars memoriae, the ideal memory image is not just any visual 
scene against a clear background, but “something exceptionally base, dishonourable, 
extraordinary, great, unbelievable, or laughable that we are likely to remember a long 
time” (Ad Herennium III, 27.35). Certainly, fabliau images fit the bill in their treatment of 
the low (the manure-hauling and dung-tasting peasants of “Le Vilain Asnier” [VIII, 92] 
and “La Crote” respectively), the incredible (lovers hiding in the guise of life-size 
crucifixes in “Le Priestre teint” and “Le Prestre crucefié”), and, of course, the humorous, 
which Cooke deems “the most memorable aspect of the story” (138). The didacticism of 
signs in fabliaux may be bound to its humor, but the laughable nature of the genre also 
aids significantly in retaining what is taught. A common denominator in all of these 
examples of the ideal mnemonic image is the graphic nature of description that also 
happens to be a “determining trait of fabliau style” like its spare settings (Muscatine, Old 
French Fabliaux 59). Sacred drama creates a lasting visual impression through colourful 
costuming, prosthetics like long beards or masks, and props like staves or tablets. In 
fabliaux, vividness is created through scenes that are either graphically violent or 
graphically sexual, evoking the two most common categories of effective mnemonic 
imagery promoted by the artes memoriae. 
As we have seen in discussing the didacticism of the Middle English Passion 
plays, shocking violent imagery is an important tool to create a lasting mental impression. 
The Ad Herennium recommends imagining a certain Domitius being lashed as one of its 
memory images (III, 21.34). Thomas Bradwardine’s thirteenth-century mnemonic for the 
zodiac includes the image of  a ram kicking a bull and “causing a copious infusion of 
blood,” a lion attacking a virgin, and a woman giving birth to twins “from her uterus as 
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though ripped open from the breast” (Carruthers, Memory 283). There is no shortage of 
similarly violent scenes in fabliaux.  Using the NRCF, Yves Roguet determines that there 
is “un protagoniste tué dans 4% des textes, frappé dans 37%” (457). By my count, threats 
or scenes of violence feature in approximately 40% of the corpus, and in 38 of the 95 
tales that treat interpretation (see Appendix B).   
Typical of earlier fabliau criticism, Johnston and Owen see the prevalence of such 
violence in the genre as offering socio-historical insights, in this case into “the rather 
cruel streak in the medieval character” (ix). According to Yves Roguet, the violence of 
fabliaux is part of its humor, for dehumanizing the victim of physical abuse, “en la 
réduisant à un corps, un animal, ou une chose” disallows close identification and permits 
laughter at that which is disturbing but other (458). While violence in fabliaux certainly 
contributes to a morbid sense of humor, its use in the genre also appears calculated for 
mnemonic effect. In “La Dame escoliee,” one of the most widely represented fabliaux 
and one of the most violent, a lord decides to teach his wife a lesson of obedience by 
having his dog and horse decapitated, his cook mutilated, and his wife herself beaten so 
badly with a spiked club that she was “carried to bed unconscious and nearly dead, where 
she lay for three whole months” (VIII, 83.369-71). When his visiting mother-in-law 
evinces wilfulness, she is held down and undergoes a mock castration, during which the 
lord’s retainer slices “a half foot into her thigh” with a razor (481-82). The experience of 
violence is meant to be a lesson remembered by the women of the tale and visualizing it 
makes the point that men should “chastise their wicked wives” (566-67) memorable to 
the fabliau audience.  
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The example of “La Dame escoliee” shows that while violence can be mnemonic 
in the genre, unlike traditional memory images that refer to specific ideas external to 
themselves, violent fabliau imagery only renders memorable the narrative context in 
which it appears. Since acts of violence in those fabliaux that deal with signification are 
situated in close narrative proximity to scenes involving problems of interpretation, to 
remember them is to remember the fallen nature of signs, which is the didactic point; 
violence is generally the direct result of manipulated signs, such as an undeserved beating 
due to mistaken identity or justified abuse as punishment when semiotic deception is 
uncovered.
162
  In “Estormi,” a married woman deceives three priests into coming to her 
house with the promise of sex for money; the husband kills them one after the next by 
striking them so hard on the skull that their “blood and brains flow out” in gruesome 
fashion (185). He then tricks his nephew Estormi into disposing of all three bodies 
individually, pretending that they are all the same corpse returning again and again 
through supernatural means. When the young man encounters an innocent fourth priest 
on the road, he kills that cleric too by bludgeoning his brains out. The first act of graphic 
violence, a triple homicide, occurs after the priests are lured by a false story, and 
Estormi’s last murder is the result of mistaken identity abetted by his uncle’s fabrication 
and the obscurity of early morning.  
Like violence, the use of sexual imagery as a mnemonic device also has a long 
history.
163
  Clerical authors since Augustine have visualized the female body as a means 
                                                 
162
 “Le Provost a l’Aumuche” (4, 24) which is not included in my count of tales relating to misrepresented 
signs, is a case where a character attempts to disguise an object (hiding stolen lard under his hat) but is 
revealed by a sign (grease running down his forehead). In this case, the tale ends with a vicious beating that 
is punishment for merely attempting to manipulate res. 
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 Even today, according to http://www.everything2.org, an online, user-compiled repository for pop 
cultural knowledge, students in the sciences and medicine continue to promote obscene imagery as the 
means of recalling abstruse knowledge. Thus, a biology student remembers the taxonomical hierarchy 
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of stimulating memory. Though he expresses some anxiety over its eroticism, Augustine 
comments on the image of the Church as a beautiful woman for its didactic virtues 
originating with the pleasure it inspires in the (male) reader (De doctrina 2.6.7). Albertus 
Magnus’s discussion of the Book of Isaiah over eight centuries later pauses on the phrase 
“revela crura” (“with revealed thigh”) and invents a mnemonic connection with the 
“custom of prostitutes to reveal their legs in order to incite desire” (qtd. in Carruthers, 
Memory 142). As Carruthers also notes, Peter of Ravenna admits in the fifteenth-century 
Foenix “that he marked his memory places with images of seductive women, for ‘these 
greatly stimulate my memory’”) and he was not atypical in doing so (Craft 306 n.109).    
Perhaps the most widespread and systematic medieval use of sexual mnemonics 
occurs in twelfth-century grammatical manuals and thirteenth-century marginal 
illustrations. Latin grammars capitalize on the sexual innuendo present in technical terms 
like “copula,” “supine,” and “conjunction” to develop fuller visual images that help 
recollect them. One grammar handbook again evokes the fallen woman: “Femina lasciva 
retro cadit abseque ruina,/Lapsa gerundiva recipit prebetque supine”(Ziolkowski 1), 
while Alain de Lille’s Complaint of Nature speaks of  how “Venus should put that organ 
characterized by the signs of the masculine sex in the seat of the adjective” (Prose V, 96-
98) and uses homosexuality, transsexuality, and adultery as metaphors for the corruption 
of grammatical laws (Metre I). Ziolkowski also discusses the use of sexual puns for 
                                                                                                                                                 
(kingdom, phylum, class, order, family, genus, species) through the mnemonic “kinky people can often find 
good sex,” an engineer recalls the colours of resistor wires (black, brown, red, orange, etc.) with “bad boys 
rape our young girls, but Violet gives willingly; get some,” and, in a construction that recalls twelfth-
century grammatical manuals, a medical intern recollects the branches of the external carotid artery 
(ascending pharyngeal, superior thyroid, lingual, facial, and so on) with “as she lay flat, Oscar's penis 
squirted madly.” 
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grammatical terms by the vagantes, suggesting that fabliau poets from the similar circles 
were likely familiar with them (62-66). 
But the use of sexual mnemonics that best parallels fabliau imagery in its graphic 
nature appears in the explosion of obscene marginalia that also peaked during the 
thirteenth century. Gothic manuscripts containing secular and sacred texts alike are filled 
with “obscene” illustrations of copulating couples, nuns observing male genitalia, and, in 
the realm of scatology, men defecating in front of women  (Randall, Images figs. 405, 
525, and 530). Like fabliaux, marginalia were long deemed unworthy of scholarly 
consideration for their apparent frivolity and for their frequent obscenity. When Lilian 
Randall assumed the serious study of these images in the late 1950s, she promoted the 
idea that they were diverting “visual manifestations of themes popularized through 
fabliaux and exempla,” though she sees both of these genres as equivalent in their shared 
concern with moral indoctrination (Images 8).
164
  More recently, Michael Camille has 
promoted a complex understanding of marginalia as reflecting new medieval thinking on 
the role of images vis-à-vis words, but reinforces the point that they represent “the 
visualization of proverbial experience” (“Labouring” 436). Since many fabliaux are also 
about problems of language, Camille’s view of marginalia offers an excellent parallel for 
how the former use obscenity to teach about the problems of poetic meaning, as I will 
later discuss. However, the basic notion that vivid marginalia, including obscaena, can 
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 Randall’s “Exempla as a Source of Gothic Marginal Illumination," Art Bulletin 39:2 
(June 1957): 97-107, provides a detailed analysis of specific exempla themes in marginalia. 
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grab a reader’s attention through a visual image that recapitulates a lesson presents a 
mnemonic parallel for the obscene imagery of fabliaux.
165
  
Among the 95 fabliaux in the NRCF that deal with interpretation, 60 or roughly 
two-thirds contain scenes that are either suggestively erotic, explicitly sexual, or 
scatological. Those of a sexual nature range from nudity (“Les deus Changeors” 92-99) 
or a couple sporting in bed (“Le Chevalier a la Robe vermeille” 63-79) to explicit 
descriptions of genitalia and the mechanics of sex (“Li pautoniers, qui to gros vit,/La fot 
mout viguerosemant” [“Le Maignien qui foti la Dame” VI, 73.73-75]). Scatological 
imagery, rarer in the corpus, ranges in extremity from explosive defecation (“Jouglet” [II, 
10]) to kissing of the anus (“Berengier”). Like the placement of violent scenes, 
descriptions of sex in this subset of tales always occur either directly before a 
manipulation of signs needed to disguise illicit relations or as a direct result of semiotic 
manipulation (lies, hiding, disguise) that subsequently allows sex to take place. 
Scatological imagery tends to represent either mistaken signs, like a fart in the darkness 
confused for someone blowing on hot soup (“Les deus Vilains” [IX, 107]), or a 
punishment for lies and trickery as in “Jouglet” or “Berengier.”  As in the case of violent 
imagery, obscenity accompanies the theme of problematic interpretation, drawing a 
mnemonic association between image and context.
166
   
If the placement of obscene imagery is not enough to demonstrate its contribution 
to the didacticism of many fabliaux, the strongly visual aspect of sex and scatology in the 
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 In “Visualization and Memory: The Illustration of Troubadour Lyric in a Thirteenth-Century 
Manuscript,” Sylvie Huot discusses how the illustrations of Pierpont Morgan M. 819, a collection of 
troubadour poems, recapitulates conventions of the artes memoriae. 
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 Both kinds of imagery are conflated in about twenty fabliaux. “La Saineresse,” for example, where a 
wife describes her sexual liaison as violent medical treatment: “Granz cops me feroit et sovent,/Morte fusse 
mo nescient” (IV, 36:78-79.) 
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genre should. When a fabliau poet makes use of “scènes grivoises ou . . . mots grossiers,” 
Nyrkog observes that “il a tendance à le faire en y insistant très fortement, à l’aide de 
détails souvent orduriers, ou de implémentes propres à renforcer l’impression qu’il fera 
sur le lecteur” (Fabliaux 213). This special tendency to provide “une description détaillé” 
(Nykrog, Fabliaux 212) such as a penis “plus lonc d’un coutre” (Nykrog, Fabliaux 211), 
makes an image more obscene and thus more visually memorable. Adherence to the 
techniques of the artes memoriae also offers an explanation other than pornographic or 
prurient interest for the large number of fabliau settings where “one character is watching 
another, or two others, who are most often engaged in, or preparing to engage in, sexual 
activity” (Lacy, “Subject to Object” 17).  Viewed from the new perspective of 
mnemonics, such scenes of rampant voyeurism are invitations for the audience to look on 
sexual imagery (often against the spare background of the bedroom) and simultaneously 
internalize the surrounding context. Seeing sex with the mind’s eye may be titillating but 
“titillation…is a necessary component of the art of memory” (Carruthers, Memory 137). 
Although sex or violence feature in more than three-quarters of the 95 fabliaux 
with a focus on signs (23 tales contain both), a similar ratio occurs in the remaining tales 
in the NRCF, suggesting that mnemonics are not limited to lessons of interpretation. In 
some cases, like “Le Vallet aus douze Fames,” sex and violence may support a lesson 
unrelated to signs. In this tale, a young man brags he should have multiple wives and is 
sexually exhausted after trying just one. At the end of the tale, a male wolf that has been 
killing livestock is caught in a trap and his captors debate whether he should be skinned, 
drowned, starved, swung by a chain, or burned to ashes (103-111). The young man 
suggests the wolf should be given a wife as a punishment, which is what happens at the 
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conclusion. Sex and violence are used in tandem to enforce the point that “no one should 
boast/Of anything he cannot accomplish” (157-58).  
 Yet, because the morals of “Le Vallet” and other tales often seem inauthentic, it 
is also possible to claim that fabliau poets use mnemonic imagery only to help audiences 
remember their jokes, not any inherent meaning in their texts. Neither of these 
possibilities minimizes the didactic contribution of violence or obscenity in fabliaux that 
promote the fallen nature of signs, however, for whenever either occurs in conjunction 
with interpretative situations it cannot fail to make these more memorable. Furthermore, 
since the didacticism of fabliaux in these cases remains fixed to their humor, it is 
impossible to separate a desire to promote the joke from a desire to highlight a situation 
of semiotic confusion. 
 
Fabliau Style and the Rejection of Courtliness 
Speaking of the memorable as it pertains to amusing narratives, Thomas Cooke 
discerns two types of remembrance desired by authors. The first “allows us to recall, with 
varying degrees of skill and accuracy, a story we have read or heard, taking as our goal 
the recreation of that story in sequence, as process” (19). For Cooke, “[n]o medieval 
storyteller who thought of himself as an artist would have been content to have his tale 
remembered in only that way. An itinerant tavern minstrel maybe, but not a professional” 
(19). The second sort of remembrance sought is memory of the deeper meaning or 
message present in the narrative. Based on their thematic interest in signs and their 
handling of structural elements that contribute to didacticism, many fabliau poets appear 
to have an abiding interest in promoting more than the remembrance of a literal narrative. 
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It is thus not surprising that the brevity and obscenity in the genre reflect more than just 
memorial technique: these attributes also reinforce the notion of verba as fallen.  
First, consistent with this perception of verbal signs, the economy of expression in 
fabliaux and their absence of stylistic adornment represent a rejection of rhetoric, and 
therefore of the literary genres like courtly romance that make use of artful language, on 
the grounds that these amplify the deception inherent in words. Although artes poeticae 
like the Poetria Nova of Geoffrey of Vinsauf describe the mastery of rhetorical tropes as 
an essential part of poetic composition, heavy use of rhetoric was also criticized as 
exploiting the duplicitous nature of fallen language. In the Didascalion, Hugh of St. 
Victor disapproves of those poets who enjoy “taking some small matter and dragging it 
out through long verbal detours, obscuring a simple meaning in confused discourses” 
(qtd. in Sturges 17). Making continued use of sexual imagery, Alain de Lille’s 
personified Nature explains the confused understanding of a homosexual relationship 
between Zeus and Ganymede as the result of rhetorico-poetic art that has “distorted the 
ultimate categories of love for purposes of literature” (Prose IV, 235-36). Thus, in 
enlisting Venus as her helper, Nature forbids the “metonymic uses of the 
rhetoricians…lest if, in the pursuit of too strained a metaphor, she should change the 
predicate from its protesting subject into something wholly foreign, cleverness would be 
too far converted into a blemish, refinement into grossness, fancy into a fault, ornament 
into a gaudy show” (Prose V, 174-85). Alain’s complex venereal metaphor raises a fear 
of the negative transformative power of rhetoric, and ultimately makes an equation 
between rhetorical or poetic excess and sexual vice; it is wrong that “a plain and simple 
style does not please man, who instead enjoys tropus, or literary contrivance,” just as it is 
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a sin when man “scorns Nature’s natural and unpretentious art (heterosexual intercourse 
directed toward the goal of reproduction) for Venus’s magic art (homosexual 
intercourse)” (Ziolkowski 16).167   
Dangerously manipulative rhetoric of this sort is most commonly associated with 
the language of courtly literature. The serpent in the Paradise of the twelfth-century Ordo 
representacionis Ade woos Eve in the courtly idiom as “fresher than the rose…whiter 
than crystal,/Than snow” (488-90).  Eric Jager shows how both the Ancrene Wisse and 
the secular Livre du Chevalier warn their female audiences against “the dangers often 
concealed by courteous speech,” sexual seduction couched in the eloquent style of 
courtly love lyrics (226). Not only does such literature furnish a language of seduction, 
but romances in particular evince the “full panoply of rhetorical colors” (Pitts 99) and 
thus trade in the tricks of fallen language.  
Nykrog’s proposition that fabliaux and works in the high style like the roman 
share the same creative context recognizes that the former function as “an essentially 
reactive genre” working against courtly models through parody (Vaszily 525).168  But 
what are they poking fun at specifically?  There is no systematic one-to-one parody of a 
single work of courtly literature among fabliaux, though narratives of some tales parody 
isolated aspects of romance and chansons de geste, as “Le Chevalier a la Corbeille” (IX, 
113) evokes the basket scene in Floire et Blancheflor, or reduce the elevated ethos of 
courtly love itself to gross sexuality. But if we turn away once more from the literal 
content of fabliaux to assess their style, it appears that because the “diction of the 
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 Patricia Parker discusses how metaphors of sexual corruption were also used to criticize the “Ciceronian 
copia of style” (210) in ancient Rome as “effeminate” and “impotent,” a view later adopted by early 
modern authors like Montaigne and Jonson (202). 
168
 See Nykrog’s third chapter, especially pp. 72-85. 
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fabliaux is just about the reverse of courtly” (Muscatine, “Courtly” 3), a specific 
opposition to the use of language and rhetoric in courtly genres is at work. 
Generally concerned with the problems of verba, fabliaux set themselves in 
opposition to the rhetorical excesses of courtly works. Fabliau poets purposefully shun 
stylistic ornament in favour of narratives that relate events “teus comme il sont,” that is, 
plain and unadorned, “Sanz colour et sanz leonime” [“without rhetorical colour and 
leonine rhyme”], “sanz bons moz” [“without bons mots”] (“Les trois Dames qui troverent 
un Vit” VIII, 96:4-8), and “sans batel et tout sans lime” [“without poetic art and entirely 
without polish.”] (“De la viellete” Montaiglon V, 129:10).  
Furthermore, as Muscatine observes, “[m]ore sustained and elaborate description, 
suggesting the catalogues and the rhetorical descriptio of learned or courtly literature, is 
rare enough to be noticeable” in fabliaux (Old French Fabliaux 62). Instead, the tales 
favour abbrevatio, which though a rhetorical technique in its own right, eschews the 
verbiage of ornament. Geoffrey of Vinsauf’s choice of “L’Enfant qui fu remis au Soleil” 
as a model for abbrevatio (713-17) illustrates just how well fabliaux lend themselves to a 
simple style.
169
 Within the genre itself, a number of fabliaux include authorial 
interjections abbreviating descriptive passages. The poet of “Les deus Chevaus” seeks to 
get to the business of his narrative “por ma matere abregier” (22), while the author of “Le 
povre Clerc” opens his work with “Ge ne vol pas faire lonc conte” (VII, 79:1). Other tales 
raise questions about the need for lengthier narration with “que vous diroie? Cest la fins!’ 
(“Les trois Boçus” 116), “que feroie plus lonc conte?” (“Le Vilain au Buffet” Variant A, 
52), “que vos iroie plus contant?” (“Le Vilain Mire” 354]), and the like.  
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 The text reads “Her husband abroad improving his fortunes, an adulterous wife bears a child,  On his 
return after long delay, she pretends it begotten of snow,  Deceit is mutual. Slyly he waits. He whisks off, 
sells, and—reporting to the mother a like ridiculous tale—pretends the child melted by snow.” 
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Occasions like these pass up an opportunity for the extended description one 
might find in romance; whereas Chretien de Troyes spends some thirty-nine lines 
describing Enide’s beauty at her first appearance (402-41), the author of “Les trois 
Boçus” introduces the hunchbacked husband of the tale as a rich man in town, breaking 
off the description there after having earlier dismissed the need for a fuller catalogue of 
his ugliness (37). When the knight of  “Le Chevalier qui fist parler les Cons” comes upon 
a castle, the poet remarks “Ne sai que feïsse lonc conte” (337), and omits describing the 
edifice in marked contrast to the prolonged architectural descriptio of “châteaux 
enchantés aux salles sans nombre des romans de Chrétien de Troyes” (Bédier 347).  
It is true that a few fabliaux, like “Le Prestre qui abevete” and “La Borgoise 
d’Orliens” call themselves “courtois”(VIII, 98:3) or “une aventure assez courtoise” (III, 
19:2).  Since these tales do not relate to situations at court, and furthermore lack the 
rhetorical complexity of other courtly genres, the reference seems to be ironic, designed 
to be funny or to highlight the slippage between claim and content in a humorous way. A 
fabliau that does have content reminiscent of courtly forms, “Le Chevalier qui recovra 
l’Amor de sa Dame” (VII, 78), actually provides an opportunity to witness the 
abbrevatio-descriptio relationship as an indicator of generic opposition. Existing in a 
single manuscript, “Le Chevalier” has been counted among fabliaux because it concludes 
with a husband cuckolded and happily oblivious, but its plot involving knights, a lady, a 
joust, and a courtly love relationship is primarily one of romance or lai. As if fighting 
against the courtly register that threatens to overtake the fabliau elements of his tale, the 
poet insists three times on abbrevatio in a 253-line text, stating “Je ne voil pas lonc conte 
faire” (12) after noting that he wishes to narrate his story “Sanz plus longuemant 
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deslaier” (1). When he indulges in a long descriptio, a picture of tournament combat 
reminiscent of chansons de geste, the poet again attempts to rein in his material with 
“Que vos feroie plus lonc plait?” (84).  
This impetus toward truncation could stem mainly from a desire to promote ease 
of learning and memorization and not from any criticism of verbal excess, but this is not 
the only critique of courtly rhetoric in the genre: fabliaux also represent the role of 
figurative language in exploiting the indeterminate nature of verba. As Vazsily points 
out, courtly metaphors can promote the “forced introduction of ambiguity into essentially 
unambiguous ‘signs’: women are described as goddesses, sexual desire as divine 
worship, frustrated sexual desire as fatal” (531). One of the most common manifestations 
of figurative language characteristic of courtly works is the use of euphemism to replace 
frank sexual terminology. Nykrog sees euphemism as “propre au langage courtois” 
(Fabliaux 213) and echoing him in several studies of medieval vulgarity, Muscatine 
asserts that the “rules of clean speech . . . came along with the new courtly rules of 
feeling and behavior” (“Vulgarity” 288).170  
Since his agenda is to demonstrate the courtliness of fabliaux, Nykrog must assert 
that “il est plus fréquent de voir un poète garder le bon ton que d’y manquer”(Fabliaux 
209) in the genre, and he is correct that tales with other close stylistic and narrative 
affinities to romance and lais like “Le Chevalier qui recovra l’Amor de sa Dame,” “Le 
Chevalier a la Robe vermeille,” and “La Dame qui se venja du Chevalier” (VII, 82) tend 
to omit describing the sex act entirely, replace it with vague terminology, or a 
combination of both as in “Ele le prist entre ses braz…/D’autre joie, d’autre soulaz/Ne 
vos quier fere mencion” (“Le Chevalier a la Robe” 70-72). According to “La Dame qui se 
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venja,” care must be exercised even when using euphemism in a courtly context: the lady 
of the title bears a grudge against her lover for describing his desire to make love as 
“cracking nuts,” a metaphor that she finds unforgivably vulgar (23).  
However, a count of those tales with plots that relate to genitalia, the sex act, or 
scatology and which compel the poet to choose between euphemistic and explicit 
expression reveals that the numbers slightly favor obscene language, including graphic 
description and use of words like “con” and “foutre.”  Though slightly less than half of 
the fabliaux that deal with risqué subjects, and especially those that with courtly 
affinities, still seem to promote euphemism, we cannot overlook the majority of fabliaux 
that are frankly obscene and particularly those that directly address the use of metaphoric 
language as part of their plots; these invariably present euphemism in a negative light as a 
source of manipulation and deception. As in the critiques of courtly rhetoric discussed by 
Jager, indirect speech is used to accomplish or cover up illicit sexual behavior. In some of 
these tales, woefully naïve girls are seduced after being misled with euphemisms. Perhaps 
the most innocent of the bunch is the girl of “La Pucele qui voloit voler” (VI, 65) who is 
seduced over the course of an entire year by a young man who describes his lovemaking 
as a means of giving her the tail and beak that will fulfill her strange desire to fly.  
A reversed situation occurs in “La Saineresse” where a wife deceives a literal-
minded husband by describing her difficult medical treatment (in actuality, her sexual 
encounter with a lover) as blows to her loins and multiple applications of ointment that 
issued from “une pel mout noire et hideuse” (95). Both male seducers in “Aloul” (III, 14) 
and “Le Maignien qui foti la Dame” ( VI, 73)  refer to their genitalia in similarly 
medicinal terms as a curative root, which ultimately coerces their victims into sexual 
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situations. The author of “Aloul” comments that, like the husband of ‘La Saineresse,” the 
lady “didn’t understand the metaphor” (“n’i entent nule figure” [91]) before she is 
seduced, though her request to see if the root is between her would-be lover’s legs 
suggests she may simply be playing coy.  
False modesty is the motive in “De cele qui ne pooit oïr parler de foutre” where a 
young girl favours euphemistic speech to the point of fainting whenever she hears the 
word “foutre.”  However, when a young man of the household approaches her sexually, 
she is perfectly willing to engage in a game of touching and naming body parts using the 
metaphors of a horse drinking at a guarded fountain, a kind of verbal foreplay that 
culminates in intercourse. The point here appears to be that how one describes sexual 
topics matters little, and if anything, linguistic deflection is more an erotic and seductive 
facade, a notion borne out in “La dame qui aveine demandoit pour Morel sa Provende 
avoir” (IX, 108). In this fabliau, a husband encourages his wife to indicate her desire for 
lovemaking by stating that Morel, a euphemism he creates for her vagina, needs his oats. 
At first, the wife, like the lady of “La Dame qui se venja” expresses disgust at the 
vulgarity of even this indirect nomenclature, but ultimately the use of figurative language 
boosts her libido to the point that she exhausts her husband.  
None of these examples from fabliaux represent a grave warning against using 
euphemisms, but they make a point through laughter that recapitulates serious clerical 
advice against fair speech. Beyond these direct critiques, the way fabliau obscenity tends 
to be situated as a sudden stylistic change after a stretch of proper language also suggests 
linguistic critique through stylistic parody. As an example, the short introductory 
description of “Le Pescheor” treats the domestic circumstances of a fisherman and his 
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new wife, their economic circumstances, and the mutual love they share, but ends with 
the unexpected information  that “he fucked her as best as he could” (“Et la fouti au 
mieus qu’il pot” [17]). “Cele qui se fist foutre sur la Fosse de son Mari” and “Le 
Chevalier qui fist parler les Cons” each start with the courtly situation of a knight errant 
and his squire encountering a lady or ladies on their travels, but instead of chivalric 
exchange, the former narrates how the knight receives the ability to talk to “cons” and 
“culs” while the latter concludes with graphic sex between the squire and a widow on her 
husband’s grave.  
This sudden subversion of proper speech participates in what Leslie Dunton-
Downer has rightly termed  a “punchline effect” (32), a surprise that makes one take 
notice of the moment in which it occurs and absorb its message on some level. Usually, 
this jarring juxtaposition is understood as a simple desire on the part of fabliau poets to 
shock an audience, but something more sophisticated is at work. Reactions to this  change 
of tone can range along a graduated scale from complete disgust  to ready laughter, 
reactions that raise the listener’s or reader’s attention to something in a memorable 
way—either, as we have discussed, a scene of deception in which the obscenity 
participates, or to the nature of verbal expression itself. Discomfort may accompany a 
sense of shame or embarrassment at applying frank terminology to sexual res and 
laughter can mark a release from this feeling to some understanding that obscene speech 
can be safely enjoyed. Both of these responses indicate a connection between fabliaux 
and other philosophical considerations of verbal signs.  
Speaking of Rutebeuf, who also authored fabliaux, Dunton-Downer notes that “in 
cases of obscenity, as distinct from pornography, [there] is a recurring criticism of or 
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reflection on the inadequacies of a given available language” (27), primarily the 
limitations or deflections of non-obscene language that impede complete expression. In 
patristic thought, this deficiency is a result of the Fall and the use of euphemism is one of 
its symptoms. Augustine observes in the City of God that the distinction between proper 
and improper speech did not exist before the Fall, when talk had “free scope, without any 
fear of obscenity, to treat any idea that might come to mind when thinking about bodily 
organs… Nor would there be any reason for calling the actual words obscene (14.23). 
Consequently, euphemism is a reminder of the Fall in several ways: it is the equivalent of 
a verbal fig leaf disguising the naked referent of a sign, and so symbolizes the opacity of 
post-lapsarian human language;
171
 further, the need to use euphemistic language  
rehearses the shame resulting from the first sin. Finally, though euphemisms appear to 
shield their audience from visualizing sexual matters, they depend on the fact that one has 
already “fallen” into a knowledge of such things in order be fully understood. If an 
innocent child read “La Damoisele qui ne pooit oïr parler de foutre, ” rife as it is with 
concealing metaphors, “il ne pourra pas arriver à savoir ce qui se passe” (Bégin 21). 
“Pour comprendre la véritable signification du langage à double sens,” Bégin notes, “il 
faut posséder un certain savoir”: the carnal knowledge that came with the Fall (28).  
Taken to the next logical step, the antithesis of euphemism—using frank 
obscenity—comes close to recovering an aspect of pre-lapsarian communication like the 
use of res on stage or visual imagery in written works. For example, Dunton-Downer 
finds evidence that the frank obscenity of Rutebeuf’s poems, which are contemporaneous 
with fabliaux, is a reaction to the idea that “language has fallen from some pristine God-
ordained state…into a cacophonous urban mess where language can mean whatever a 
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particular group of speakers wants to mean” (35). Considered alongside the other 
evidence we have seen of an interest in the fallen condition of language, the unabashed 
obscenity of fabliaux also marks an attempt to regain pre-lapsarian communication. 
Perhaps then the number of critics who maintained well into the twentieth century that 
“the era of the fabliaux [was] … a lost paradise” (Bloch, Scandal 8-9) characterized by a 
naturalistic innocence of expression (Nykrog’s “franche et naïve pornographie” 
[Fabliaux 216]), were misconstruing a semiotic point made by fabliau poets for an 
unselfconscious characteristic of their writing.  
Critics seeking evidence of naturalistic speech acting against courtly euphemism 
inevitably cite the famous passage from the Roman where the Lover berates Reason for 
using the word “coilles” to describe the castration of Saturn; he finds this inappropriate 
coming from the mouth of a “courteise pucele” (6931) and suggests she should have 
“glossed the word with some courtly term” (“Au meins quant le mot ne glosasts/Par 
quelque courteise parole”) (6933-34), a suggestion Reason dismisses.172  Reason’s reply 
that the Lover is really objecting to the thing signified and not its name echoes nominalist 
views on the purely arbitrary nature of verbal signs in the absence of pre-existent ideals. 
Pearcy finds the specific influence of nominalism in Reason’s claim that frank language 
signifies “particularized, concrete reality” unlike the euphemisms “reliques” and “riens” 
which signify in “so vague a way that the specific referent is lost sight of completely” 
(“Modes” 193, 172). Like Jean de Meun, who was educated at the University of Paris, the 
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clerici vagantes who composed fabliaux were likely exposed to Aristotelian 
developments relating on verbal signs; Pearcy goes on to identify the same philosophical 
emphasis on tangible referents in the fabliau penchant for explicit and detailed sexual 
description, its preference for describing a vit “lonc et gros” instead of the highly abstract 
and vague “riens” (“Modes” 170).   
 
The Meaning(lessness) of Fabliau Scatology 
Although it is apparent that the stylistic characteristics of unadorned brevity and 
frank obscenity are another means by which fabliaux voice their particular view of signs, 
it is important to consider not just what obscene imagery does but what it means as well. 
For instance, Bloch has discussed how the amalgam of sexual and violent imagery that is 
castration serves in fabliaux as “less the sign of bodily mutilation than of a mutilation in 
language, of language” consistent with a semiotic interest in fallen verba (Scandal 74).173  
This is based on a traditional clerical equivalence of testes with the dissemination of sen, 
meaning both “seed” and “‘signification’ ou ‘interprétation’” (Nitze 15), so that “from 
Adam on, men were sowers of seed in field, womb, and text alike” (Jager 73). On this 
basis, castration or its threat in fabliaux like “Le Prestre crucefie” and “Connebert” can 
be construed as punishment for both misuses of sen: as much for adultery as for the 
dissimulation or creation of false signs it involves. 
Of course, using symbolic obscenity in a work of literature to indicate that literary 
signs are unreliable in presenting deeper meaning borders on self-contradiction: only if 
this claim is false could it be true, or if it is true, the claim is weakened. Yet, 
                                                 
173
 Bloch’s pioneering work in The Scandal of the Fabliaux also identifies a preoccupation with tattered 
garments, theft, persistently circulating corpses, and chunks of meat among other things as emblems for the 
problematic signs of poetry.  
  175 
contradiction is the essence of comedy and since comedy is the instructional method used 
by fabliaux, ignoring the inconsistency only helps to further the semiotic point; 
furthermore, because the didactic approach of the genre and its content both differ from 
the concrete moral lesson ascribed to literature, fabliau poets can debunk the notion of 
poetic truth in its conventional sense and sidestep any apparent contradiction. Thus, 
recurrent fabliau imagery, particularly that of an obscene nature, can serve as metaphors 
for the flawed nature of the verba used by fabliaux themselves.  
Where castration pertains to words it represents an inability to generate absolute 
meaning in language or in narrative. “Les trois Dames qui troverent un Vit” illustrates 
this indeterminacy of meaning through the symbolic severed penis three women find on 
the road: the abbess who is expected to rule on possession of the member is able to lie 
and claim it for herself as the lost key to the abbey because its nature is in some way 
mutable.  Likewise, when the fisherman of “Le Pescheor” castrates a dead priest he finds 
floating in the Seine, he can give any meaning he likes to the tumescent member he 
brings home; as in “Les trois Dames,” the sen he gives it—that it is his own—is a false 
one. Indeed, reiterating the association of euphemism with meaningless signification, the 
fisherman’s wife only calls her husband’s penis “rien” after she thinks it is severed 
(Version A 142).  
Bloch also notes that fabliaux feature a type of female castration that is related to 
uncertain meaning in such tales as “La Sorisete des Estopes” and “Le fol Vilain” where 
deceptive narratives—a newly married wife’s story that her pudendum has been left 
elsewhere—accompany the idea of disembodied genitalia (Scandal 74-75). This variant 
is interesting in seeming to attribute the metaphorical possibility of productive 
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signification to female genitalia in a genre that has often been labelled misogynist: much 
the way a properly attached penis figuratively engenders meaning, a vagina would 
presumably give birth to the same.
174
  The detachment of female genitalia is not a 
widespread theme in fabliaux beyond these few tales, but the notion of the productive con 
does appear elsewhere, particularly in symbolic opposition to another orifice, the cul. The 
antithesis of a vagina that productively gives birth to meaning is another type of “faux 
con,” the anus. In this juxtaposition, the con stands for fictional tales (contes) that claim 
meaningful content, while the anus, an orifice associated with the vagina in Old French 
poetry, is a faux con(te), or literature without any deeper truth.
175
  
Bloch speaks of the fabliau “Guillaume au Faucon” (VIII, 93) in terms of how 
this pun depicts language “cut off from univocal meaning” (Scandal 75), for the husband 
of the tale unwittingly grants his soon-to-be adulterous wife (in vulgar terms, his “faux 
con”) to a retainer believing that he is surrendering his “faucon.”   The lady of the tale 
who abandons her resolve not to commit adultery illustrates in misogynist terms that all 
cons are ultimately duplicitous, just as the pun reveals all language to be; yet, the play on 
words extends further to suggest that all literature is ultimately revealed to be anal, a faux 
con(te).  
“Guillaume” itself, for example, begins as a courtly tale involving a lord, his lady 
(whose beauty is introduced with sixty-nine lines of descriptio [50-119]), and her suitor. 
Should the narrative continue in this vein one might expect rich allegorical content and a 
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 On the confusion of orifices, see Burns 34. Citing Luce Irigaray, Burns also observes the connection 
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misogynist perspective because a woman “lacks the signifying phallus, [she] also lacks access to 
meaningful speech” (34). 
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clear moral; what we get instead is a story in which adulterous “actions are freed from 
their moral significance” (Eichmann 75). Facing a choice between committing adultery 
and allowing a man to die, the lady appears to have no viable option, and so the author 
“decided that the only way to bring his story to a conclusion is to shift it to a fabliau” 
(Eichmann 75). The lady’s noble husband is suddenly depicted as abusive and violent 
like his fabliau counterparts, and we get more than a hint of anti-courtly obscenity in 
wordplay surrounding “faucon.”  Instead of courtly literature that possesses some readily 
accessible truth, we are left with a “faux con(te)” presenting no clear lesson, which 
reinforces the semiotic point made by the dubious and discontinuous end morals of the 
genre. 
Perhaps the best representation of how fabliau poets situate their work in the con-
cul dichotomy occurs in “Le Chevalier qui fist parler les Cons.”  If the power to be 
amusing for money (the knight’s first magical gift) and the ability to make con(te)s speak 
(his second gift) are for Bloch “those of the poet or jongleur” (Scandal 108), the knight’s 
curiously overlooked third talent to make culs speak stands for his ability to create tales 
without clear moral value, or fabliaux. Appropriately enough, this power only comes into 
effect should the genitalia refuse to speak, thus equating a con(te) that says nothing with a 
fabliau. Indeed, after the countess of the tale stuffs her con to keep it silent, the knight 
demonstrates his talent to make her anus speak “après disner” (460), recalling Rychner’s 
famous definition of fabliau as an “after-dinner story” (qtd. in Schenck, Fabliaux 13); the 
knight is essentially creating his fabliau. Inevitably, the tale tells us, literature degrades 
from con to cul; “Le Chevalier” exchanges the possibilities of deeper moral meaning 
suggested by its courtly plot of a knight errant for the anal antics of fabliaux,  
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 “Le sot Chevalier” is another fabliau that uses scatological imagery to deny its 
own moral value. The tale begins with the author’s intriguing opposition of “conter” and 
“fabloier” which sets the stage for a confrontation between a meaningful and non-
meaningful tale (2).
176
  Unclear on another distinction—the difference between his wife’s 
con and her cul—the knight of the title is educated to understand that the con, like courtly 
literature with moral content, tends to be “plus haus” and “plus lons” (70-71) than the cul 
or fabliaux, which is “plus cours” (73).  The perversion of meaning associated with the 
faux con may be based on an implicit but unspoken association with anal sex as a 
dangerous corruption of reproductive intercourse, like Alain de Lille’s identification of 
perverted grammar with homosexuality. Just as medieval poets who seek to follow the 
ideal  Horatian literary standard must aim to compose works with moral content, so the 
“sot chevalier” also learns that the cul should be avoided at all costs lest one commit a 
“granz mesfais” there (76). Nevertheless, the knight does not follow this last piece of 
advice completely and ends up using a hot brand to enact a  rectal violation on one of his 
guests; with this, any potential of the tale to maintain a courtly focus or present a true 
moral breaks down into fabliau obscenity, farcical violence, and a completely 
incongruous end moral (76). The poet’s concluding remark that the naïve knight “eut 
apris a foutre” followed by the comment, “A cest mot est li fabliaus oltre” (321-22), 
marks an admission that the outré tale has degraded from a meaningful conte and like the 
poker-wielding knight has penetrated into the fabliau realm of cul.  
“Berengier au lonc Cul,” makes the same distinction between “contes et fableaus” 
(1) that appears in “Le sot Chevalier” and the feckless husband of the tale also confuses 
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con and cul; this mirrors his perverted social status (he is a usurer who buys a marriage 
into the nobility and a knighthood along with it) and the blending of courtly and fabliau 
themes in the tale. To deal with his wife’s reproaches concerning his less than knightly 
idleness, the moneylender dons armour and heads out to a desolate spot where he dents 
his own shield and shatters his lance, simulating combat with a real opponent. When his 
wife becomes suspicious and confronts her husband disguised as the fearsome knight 
“Berengier au lonc Cul,” she compels her husband to kiss her anus or die. He chooses the 
first option, but has difficulty differentiating between his wife’s con and cul when he sees 
them: “Do cul et del con: ce li sanble/Que trestot se tienent ensanble” (“of asshole to cunt 
it seemed to him that they were both entirely together”) (243-44). This is ultimately an 
inability to recognize the difference between true courtly behavior and that which is not, 
or the failure to distinguish between a romance narrative and actions that are really the 
stuff of farce. When the wife later reveals that she knows her husband’s shame, she 
dispels this confusion: in kissing Berangier’s cul, her husband has revealed his true status 
as an ass and a usurer, not a knight; and, like him, the concluding circumstances of the 
tale show that it is not lofty and true but a fabliau with no such pretense. Unlike the 
husband’s situation in “Berengier,” this revelation is not necessarily a negative one, for 
the absence of univocal truth in the genre works to promotes its humor and its view of 
fallen signs.  
Further evidence that fabliaux purposely cultivate their absence of meaning 
through scatological imagery appears in tales that feature the products of the anus—farts  
and excrement. In medieval thought, the fart occupies a place as “l’anti-langage” 
(Aubailly 13), an often diabolical inversion parodying oral speech with its meaningless 
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anal equivalent.  Though farting does not figure in very many fabliaux, when it does 
occur it is emblematic of communication stripped of its proper significance, nether-
speech that is not so much the inversion of verbal language as it is indicative of its fallen 
state. Hence its appearance accompanies circumstances of indeterminate or absent 
meaning. I have already mentioned “Les deus Vilains” as general evidence for scatology 
signalling circumstances of semiotic confusion; to be more specific, when one peasant 
mistakes the fart of his sleeping companion for his blowing on hot soup, we have a  case 
where a meaningless afflatus is mistaken for a meaningful sign.
177
   
Several other fabliaux relate the non-meaning of a fart more directly to the empty 
signs of literature.  In “Gauteron et Marion,” the significance of a new bride’s fart on her 
wedding night is perceived by her husband as evidence that she is not a virgin; she co-
opts his interpretation with a competing narrative that it is a sign her virginity is just now 
escaping. Both claims confuse cul and con, meaninglessness with truth: Marion’s 
explanation is definitely a fabrication and the truth behind Gauteron’s initial suspicion is 
unknown; thus, the afflatus remains an indeterminate sign that generates a tale of dubious 
truth for both the husband and the fabliau audience. There is no culminating lesson here. 
“Les trois Meschines” continues the semiotic con-cul opposition. Having 
purchased a cosmetic powder, the three girls of the title must add urine to make it 
efficacious, and so one of them, Agace, squats over the preparation; however, she 
accidentally lets escape “un tres grant pet” (61) that disperses all of the powder. Another 
of the girls attributes the mishap to the fact that Agace’s “cul est si pres du con” (85); 
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thus, we have a situation where the two orifices are again confused and an unproductive 
fart substitutes for what could have been the fruitful product of the con(te). Along with 
the loss of the powder we get a loss of any univocal meaning in the tale itself, which ends 
with a request for audience judgment on the uncertain question of who is liable for the 
incident, she who farted or she who held the powder too close to the cul. 
Perhaps the most explicit connection made between flatulence and the nature of 
literary signs appears in the misogynist mock-etiological fabliau “Le Con qui fu fait a la 
Besche” (IV, 22). Here, the Devil’s fart on Eve’s tongue is provided as an explanation for 
the garrulousness of women; however, the explanation “Por ce a fame tant de jangle. Por 
ce borde ele et jengle tant” draws a clear equivalence between the meaningless chatter of 
the female sex and “jonglerie,” the empty (but funny) recitations of poets, both of which 
are an oral displacement of a demonic fart (66-67). Immediately reinforcing the windy 
nature of his work, the author of “Besche” follows Satan’s fart with a moral 
anathematizing those who would speak anything but good of women and their genitalia 
(76-79), then summarily undermines his point with a counter-moral that does precisely 
what he had forbade in observing that many good men have been “destruit…Honi…et 
confondu” (80-81) by the con. Interestingly, just as this tale begins with the creation of a 
con and ultimately becomes the story of a fart, so too it begins with what appears to be a 
serious etiological tone rehearsing the creation of man and woman (1-10) that rapidly 
degrades into nonsense and contradiction.  
More prevalent than flatulence in fabliaux is the concept of literature as 
excrement, which Bloch has discussed primarily as an emblem for the nature of poetic 
performance. In his reading, poetry is akin to “dead—fecal, inert—matter” that 
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“circulates and recirculates” incessantly in the telling and retelling (Scandal 55). Yet, the 
metaphor functions beyond concerns with originality and plagiarism to encompass the 
essence of poetic signs. If we recognize “faecal production as creative power” (Camille, 
Image 115), it is also essential to recognize that what is created is a useless waste 
product, and so the fecal metaphor presents literature as worthless. The common clerical 
trope of consuming books when reading them participates in this analogy and is specific 
in identifying certain characteristics of written signs that make them excremental. The 
moral lessons of a text are digested and absorbed by the reader are while everything 
without usus is figuratively excreted. Therefore, in written works without Christian or 
moral sententia, all that remains is shit. Carolyne Larrington has shown how images of 
defecation and the disgusting contents of the privy are symbolically “evoked to 
stigmatize requests for and narration of heroic material” as opposed to Christian texts 
(27). Though she speaks within the context of Old Norse texts, Larrington’s findings are 
useful to this study: since fabliaux actively promote their lack of conventional meaning, it 
is only fitting they should also flaunt the stigma of their fecal nature.  
This use of scatology is exemplified by the peasant woman of “La Crote” who 
reaches into her cul until she has “trové” (“found” or “composed”) a turd (28). In 
essence, her guessing game involves interpreting the undefined material she has 
generated. Her husband’s first guess, that it is dough, assumes she has created something 
productive, for unformed dough is the stuff of wheat, not the chaff, and can become 
bread.
178
  This, however, is an improper reading, a “fausse parole” (44). The second 
guess, that it is wax, also has literary connotations, though that which is written on wax 
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tablets is temporary and perhaps less likely to contain meaning that is worthy of 
preservation on parchment. When the vilain finally tastes the ball of feces—his version of 
consuming his wife’s text—he is able to determine that all he has is a bit of merde: 
interpretation yields nothing but the awareness that he has eaten shit, and so reading 
literature, and “De la Crote” in particular leaves its reader with no great moral truth or 
didactic lesson except an understanding of the fecal nature of literature.  
“Charlot le Juif,” a fabliau by Rutebeuf, whose concern with the nature of 
language we have already discussed, is another tale that uses scatology as a means of 
overturning the idea of literature with hidden moral significance. After losing his horse 
on a hare hunt, the knight Guillaume le Panetier tells the jongleur Charlot he will reward 
him with something that costs “plus de cent souz” (87) (the value of his dead horse) then 
gives him the worthless hare skin. Here the “pel du lievre,” a kind of parchment, is a 
medium embodying the deceptiveness and multifarious meanings of verba (91). Charlot 
reinforces the connection of this duplicity to literature by defecating in the skin and 
returning it, telling his patron that there is something in it. The fact that the animal skin is 
a hare’s further calls to mind ancient connotations of fertility like cons and testicles, 
suggesting the possibility of  productive content that is then rudely shattered. Guillaume’s 
subsequent act of reaching below that surface of the hare-parchment and coming up with 
only a handful of excrement reflects the futility of looking for something of value hidden 
in the works of jongleurs.  
Excrement is situated in distinct opposition to images of fertility to represent the 
meaningless nature of verbal or literary signs in several other fabliaux besides “Charlot.”  
The scatology of “La Coille noire” is often overlooked, but is an important part of its 
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humor and semiotic point. The wife’s charge that her husband’s testicles (and his vit) are 
black in this tale is essentially an accusation that he is impotent. He counters her assertion 
by implying that they are black because they have come in contact with her unwashed 
cul. The episcopal court hearing the case rules in favour of the husband because his 
explanation is funny, but there is no notion that the ruling has been made on the basis of 
truth. The moral of the tale, that a prick of any colour is good, likewise ignores the need 
for a real lesson. Once the “coille noire” is placed in real or imagined contact with 
excrement, any concern for meaning—whether the husband or the fabliau can generate 
sen or not—vanishes.  
Such punchlines featuring defecation signal an abandonment of the possibility 
that literature can embody serious moral content such as that supposedly present in longer 
courtly genres to an understanding that poetry inevitably collapses into the 
meaninglessness of fabliaux. In “Jouglet,” which Jurgen Beyer has termed “a 
disagreeable scatological fabliau,” resistance to the idea that literature is meaningless is 
depicted as a form of anal retention, while its acceptance is represented as a veritable 
explosion of defecation (39). Like his counterpart in “Berengier,” the new husband in this 
tale, Robin, is low-bred and foolish but able to marry into disenfranchised nobility 
because of his family’s money. Beyond what it may reveal about social currents in the 
thirteenth century, this mixed marriage suggests the potential for cohabitation between 
the foolery of fabliau and high literature.  
Unfortunately, Robin’s mother makes the mistake of entrusting her son’s sexual 
education to the jongleur Jouglet. Since poets generate excrement, not sen, Jouglet’s 
education consists of forcing Robin to eat an excess of unripe pears then telling him that 
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it is forbidden to defecate on his wedding day. This forced act of restraint mirrors the 
temporary reluctance of the tale to abandon itself entirely to fabliau. Though it is unlikely 
that Robin will be able to quell his diarrhea, the possibility remains along with a chance 
that the tale will contain some moral meaning. Robin is left neither able to relieve his 
bowels nor to perform sexually due to his discomfort, and the fabliau, like him, remains 
in a temporary state of stasis, neither generating meaning nor its absence. However, the 
author of the tale broaches a desire not to wait any longer—with the customary  “Que vos 
iroie je contant” (96)—to truncate his tale and bring it to its conclusion; this is equated 
with Robin’s ultimate evacuation of his bowels, for his wife uncovers Jouglet’s trick and 
directs him to defecate freely on three sides of the sleeping jongleur’s bed, on his pants, 
in the fire, in a bucket, and finally, in Jouglet’s fiddle case. Here, abbrevatio does not 
bring meaning but an abundance of excrement. 
Moreover, in a narrative “loose end” that Lacy has commented on as “unusual” 
(Reading 107), we never hear whether Robin is able to perform in bed once he relieves 
himself—the author states “ne voil alognier le conte” (292) and expresses a total lack of 
concern for how the consummation turns out (293). Yet, the scene is passed over not out 
of modesty (the frank scatology of the tale precludes a concern for euphemism), but 
because the point of this second abbrevatio is again not an ability to generate sen but a 
revelation of the excremental. The tale ends when Jouglet accidentally covers himself in 
Robin’s waste and ultimately with the resistant jongleur’s crippling beating at the hands 
of peasants who demand a performance and are instead smeared with the feces in his viol 
case. We thus receive a last assertion that the tools of the poet’s trade are always fecal in 
nature. With this comes the understanding that the tale too is entirely a fabliau, for the 
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supposedly courtly wife is revealed to have a lover already and is the one who is 
responsible for releasing the scatological; along with this twist, we get a twisted closing 
moral—“He who wants to shit on others, is shit on first” (419-20)—that is extremely 
literal and limited in application that Beyer terms “not a teaching comparable to that of 
the didactic exempla” (39). This moral does not so much oppose “one of the most 
fundamental convictions of the Middle Ages, namely, the belief that a useful lesson could 
be derived from every event” as Beyer claims; it, and the presence of fundament in 
fabliaux, work more specifically against the idea that there is any usus in literature.  
“La Dame qui Aveine demandoit por Morel sa Provende avoir” is a more direct 
example of a fabliau in which “excrement is presented as the alternative to sex or to 
semen” (Lacy, Reading 88), representing the supplantation of sen by feces (Muscatine, 
Old French Fabliaux 129). The narrative begins with an idealized portrait of a husband 
and wife with obvious parallels to Erec and Enide, and whose great love is compared to 
that of Tristan and Yseut (30-31). Sexual relations between the two is described in 
similarly courtly terms as “le solas et le deduit” (45). This penchant for euphemism 
continues when the husband of the work requests that his wife refer to her desire for 
intercourse from then on as the horse Morel’s need to be fed his oats. Initially, the wife 
finds even this euphemistic expression vulgar and refuses to go along with the idea. 
However, her libido eventually takes precedence and she exacts oats for Morel to the 
point that her husband becomes exhausted sexually. Eventually, he stifles her libido by 
defecating on her, with the comment that since the oats are spent, she will receive only 
bran. Thus, semen is literally equated with productive seed or grain, and defecation with 
its non-fruitful external husk; the tale, which begins in a courtly register implying the 
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possibility of sen, ends by washing away any kernel of possible truth in a flood of 
feces.
179
  This turning point where the narrative definitively becomes fabliau is 
incidentally accompanied by the first uses of direct obscenity in the tale (“cul,” and 
“merde” [299-301]) and is followed by a tacked-on moral for married people that does 
not seem to entirely fit the tale. 
Based on an examination of obscene imagery in fabliaux, and particularly images 
of a scatological nature, we can safely dismiss the idea that there is an “absence totale 
de…valeur symbolique” in the genre (Jodogne 22). Beyer’s claim that “[t]he 
fabliau…does not offer an alternative” (39) when it does away with standard moral 
edification is likewise untrue. If fabliaux aim to derail attempts at hidden interpretation 
and make ruins of allegory as Sarah Buchanan asserts, they do not leave nothing behind, 
but develop a different use of symbolism on the rubble they have created. There may be 
no “allegorical movement toward a ‘higher’ plane of truth” (Buchanan 14) in terms of 
Christian or ethical meaning, but the genre is not merely entertaining: fabliaux create a 
new awareness that such elevation is not available from literature. To see this and their 
larger didactic point regarding the dangerous nature of signs requires a shift of critical 
perspective to seek instruction in unconventional places: in the literal content, humor, 
structure, and style of the genre, in other words, to recognize that semiotic interest 
permeates almost every aspect of fabliau except its explicit declarations of moralitas.  
The absence to date of critics systematically considering this didacticism reflects either 
the failure of its message or its utter success.  
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 “Porcelet” (VI, 67) is a close analogue that replaces oats and bran with wheat and straw, which comes 
closer to the more traditional clerical opposition of wheat and chaff. Defecation is also replaced by a fart. 
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CHAPTER 4: SIGNS AND LEARNING IN THE LIBRO DE LOS ENGAÑOS 
 
The Purpose of the Engaños 
If the complex instructive approach of Old French fabliaux and the overt 
preaching of sacred drama represent divergent approaches on the didactic spectrum, the 
exemplum collections of medieval Spain would appear to occupy a middle ground 
between these two poles. Some of the most important works of medieval Spanish 
literature are collections of wisdom tales lacking the doctrinal emphasis of religious 
drama;
180
 much like the fabliaux, works like Calila e Digna, Conde Lucanor, and the 
Libro de los engaños or Sendebar focus instead on practical, secular lessons, but are 
bound by a more uniform and explicit claim of didactic purpose.  
For example, the first and most influential of the collections compiled in Spain, 
Pedro Alfonso’s Latin Disciplina clericalis (c. 1135), paved the way for the acceptability 
of “practical ethics” (Parker 63), providing a series of fables and parables that illustrated 
“ways and means of living successfully and of escaping the dangers of the world”; of 
these, “scarcely more than three…deal with ethics which one can truly consider Christian 
in tone” (Jones and Keller 18). The Castilian translation of the Arabic Kalila wa-Dimna 
from 1251 follows this tradition of promoting a “manera de vivir cuerdo y enterado” 
(Keller and Linker XVI), and the purported aim of the Libro de los engaños or Sendebar 
translated a mere two years later is similarly secular in nature —to teach “los engañados e 
los asayamientos de las mugeres” (ll. 15-16). So is the practical advice of Don Manuel’s  
fourteenth-century Conde Lucanor, provided in response to specific ethical quandaries 
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 The translators’ introduction (17-32) to The Book of Count Lucanor and Patronio provides a fine 
overview of the exemplum tradition in medieval Spain. 
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raised by the Count of the title and bound by the aim “that all men should accomplish in 
this world such deeds as would be advantageous to their honor, their possessions, and 
their stations” (Book of Count Lucanor 49). Although these collections may not 
emphasize Christian doctrine, their didactic features still make a more explicit case for 
instructional purpose than the heterogeneous fabliaux; after all, the Spanish exemplum 
collections are self-contained compendia of tales assembled for the stated purpose of 
instruction and feature frame stories that also support this goal. 
  Despite the presence of an instructional focus in these collections, they have been 
seen as “pseudo-serious” and “pseudo-didactic,” containing tales that are 
“primarily…meant to amuse” (Esten Keller, The Scholar’s Guide 18). The Libro de los 
engaños, in particular, has been targeted as a work where the “recreational…completely 
obviates the didactic,” perhaps in reaction to Robertsonian criticism that seeks some 
hidden moralitas in all medieval literary texts (Esten Keller, “The Literature of 
Recreation” 24). 181 Contemporary critics at the other extreme, such as Menéndez y 
Pelayo who promoted the Engaños as a “grave y doctrinal” (I, 51) in purpose, do seem to 
be ignoring an important aspect of the text, but it seems equally shortsighted to dismiss 
all meaning from the collection.   
Both sides set up a very contemporary dichotomy where didacticism and 
recreation are placed squarely at odds with the strong presence of the one taken to 
exclude all possibility of the other. This is not necessarily the case. As Catherine Brown 
has observed about the didacticism of another problematic medieval Spanish text, the 
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 Jaunzems cites just such an elaborate allegorical reading of the Seven Sages from the eighteenth-
century. In it, the king “signifies the world, and his only son stands for all mankind” while the stepmother 
emblematizes Sin and the “Seven Wise Masters represent the seven liberal sciences, by whose aid man 
frustrates the intention of sin” (58-59).  
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Libro de Buen Amor, “[p]rofoundly modern is the unease apparent in the scholarly 
tendency to divide neatly on whether or not…[a medieval text] is didactic, as if the 
problem were a simple question of either/or” (118). The need to separate aims of 
instruction and entertainment and classify the Engaños as “primarily” one or the other 
was not likely as pressing a concern for the translator(s) who rendered it into Spanish 
(Parker 9); it is not inherent in the medieval understanding of Horatian literary criticism, 
which prescribes the blending of edification and instruction. It is more reminiscent of 
now-discounted critical responses toward other humorous works of the thirteenth century, 
the fabliaux, which were long considered merely “contes à rire” because of their 
entertainment value (Bédier 30). Like the fabliau, the exemplum tale operates in an 
indirect fashion, “less explicit in its operations and less predictable in its effects” than 
other didactic modes (Weiss 5, n. 8). This suggests that any conception of its didacticism 
must be adjusted to recognize that the instruction it contains may be located elsewhere 
than in its direct declarations of meaning.  
Translated from a now lost Arabic original at the behest of Prince Fadrique, 
brother of Alfonso “El Sabio,” in 1253, the Engaños is an exemplum collection 
recapitulating tales from the Eastern branch of the Seven Sages folkloric tradition. In 
brief, its frame story relates the situation of a prince who has taken a seven-day vow of 
silence. After the prince rebuffs his wicked stepmother’s offer to murder his father and 
rule with her, she accuses him of rape. While his father, King Alcos of Judea, decides the 
fate of the completely silent prince, the youth’s stepmother and a group of seven court 
sages tell competing tales of deceitful women, hasty judgment, or untrustworthy counsel 
designed to convince the monarch to kill or spare his son. Finally, the week of silence 
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ends, the prince reveals his innocence, and tells several exempla of his own, before the 
Engaños ends with the stepmother’s execution.  
Though this summary of the Engaños hardly seems to invite comparison with the 
French fabliaux, this link is made in Alan Deyermond’s characterization of the former as 
“the first substantial collection of fabliaux in Spanish” (Literary History 98), in María 
Jesús Lacarra’s comparison of the works as “textos antifeministas” centering on 
adulterous relations (163), and even in Menéndez y Pelayo’s claim that the Engaños lacks 
the “cinismo grosero de los fabliaux” (I, 51). And, although the Enganos is considerably 
less vast and varied a collection than the 150 or so fabliaux, the proposed transmission of 
the Eastern Seven Sages tradition is nearly the same as Gaston Paris’ tortuous schema of 
fabliau origins: from “an original (lost) Sanskrit text translated into pehlvi, the language 
of Ancient Persia,” to a Syriac version, then an Arabic manifestation that was rendered 
into Hebrew, then into Latin and finally “into various vernacular languages” (Bloch, 
Scandal 20); the only difference is the substitution of an additional Greek source for the 
Latin (Fradejas Lebrero 14).  
Such a generic parallel cannot be drawn merely on the basis of purely recreational 
intent however, for the fabliaux are not without some form of didactic content, as I have 
demonstrated. A more appropriate connection between the genres is hinted at in Lacarra’s 
claim of a common antifeminist focus and in what Deyermond calls a shared 
“concentration on women’s sexual guile” (Literary History 98). This is not an indication 
of their inherent misogyny, as “the majority of fabliaux are not antifeminist—or 
profeminist, or even essentially about women” (Lacy, “Fabliau Women” 326).182  The 
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 Lorçin argues as well that the fabliaux are not “plus antiféministes que bien d’autres genres littéraires” 
(174) 
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tales of the Engaños, as well, are “uneven with regard to their success or appropriateness 
as examples of the theme” of deceitful women (Cooper 177); only the frame story and 
nine out of twenty-three tales present a negative impression of women. In others, 
including the frame, women are presented in a positive light as givers of good advice or 
as innocent victims. The opening tale, for instance, features a virtuous married woman 
who offers moral correction to a lascivious king and ends up being shunned by her 
suspicious and fearful husband, while “Del palomo e de la paloma” (tale 15) shows an 
innocent female dove brutally slain by her mate. Given this mix of positive and negative 
female characters, the purported misogyny of the text “se revela pues como un 
instrumento, un medio para aleccionar al individuo, enseñándole las maldades del 
mundo” (Orazi 42). “Sexual guile” in the tales is rather a device, part of a thematic 
interest shared with fabliaux in illuminating semiotic deception practiced often, but not 
exclusively, by women.  
That deception is central to the message of the Engaños is hardly surpising.  The 
generic roots of the frame tale lie partly in the Arabic and Hebrew māqamā—rogue’s 
tales based on deception, trickery and disguise (Wacks 42). This general focus on deceit 
is emphasized further in the prologue of the collection. Unlike earlier extant versions in 
the Eastern branch of the Seven Sages tradition—the Syriac Sindban, Greek Syntipas, and 
Hebrew Mishlei Sendebar—the Engaños contains a short preface focusing the purpose of 
the text firmly on exploring the aspect of deception and trickery; such a central aim is 
absent from the titles of its predecessors and from their openings.
183
  The Syriac text, for 
example, begins simply with “In the Name of our Lord, the History of the wise Sindban 
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 Of course, it is impossible to know the start of the lost Arabic version, of which the Engaños is 
purportedly a direct translation. 
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and of his comrades” (100), while two Hebrew manuscript variants commence with “We 
[or I] will begin the tales of Sendebar” (l. 1). By contrast, the Spanish prologue explicitly 
notes that Prince Fadrique was pleased to have the book translated from Arabic into 
Castilian “para aperçebir a los engañados e los asayamientos de las mugeres,”making no 
mention of the sage (ll. 11-12).  
I elect to see this declaration as announcing a broader interest in interpretation, 
though this reading is not crucial in light of testimony given in the content that follows. 
Prior to later scribal emendation attributing both “deceits and wiles” (“los engaños e los 
asayamientos”) to women, this original statement of purpose can be read as projecting 
two separate yet related aims: “to instruct the deceived (engañados) and [to teach] the 
wiles of women”(12).184  The stipulated aims are to teach those who are tricked—not 
necessarily by women—as well as reveal the machinations of the female sex; this 
removes the incongruity of those tales that do not relate directly to the behavior of 
women, including, as I will discuss, those addressing the poor counsel of male privados 
or the need for careful judgment in general.
185
   Furthermore, this split purpose reduces 
objections concerning the didactic uselessness of lessons based solely on misogyny, such 
as the assertion that “sophisticated, educated, and wily rulers and politicians anywhere 
[would not] rest the fate of their governments upon the ‘wisdom’…that women are 
deceitful” (Keller, “The Literature of Recreation” 197).  
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 In this construction, the verb functions separately with each object: “aperçebir a” addresses the deceived 
as receivers of instruction and “aperçebir…los asayamientos” indicates that which is also taught.  
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 Artola also splits this scribal declaration for other reasons of comprehensibility but alters it to “para 
aperçebir a los engañados. E los asayamientos de las mugeres, este libro, fue transladado…” [my italics], 
but he sees the engañados solely as the victims of women’s ploys (“Review” 40). While this continues to 
emphasize the purported antifeminism of the text, it also continues the emphasis on deceptions present in 
the narratives that follow. 
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By emphasizing both duper and duped, the two-fold purpose attributed to 
Fadrique’s translation also foregrounds the bipartite semiotic process innovated by 
Augustine, in which there must be makers of signs and receivers who try to interpret 
them. The prologue thus raises a widespread medieval concern with semiotic 
interpretation that also features in the didactic content of genres as wide ranging as 
religious drama and fabliaux and which now governs the didacticism of the Engaños.  
Teaching about the dangers of interpretation is not limted to the Engaños in 
medieval Spanish literature, for it appears later as the didactic focus of Juan Manuel’s 
Conde Lucanor, which De Looze has shown to be heavily invested in exploring the 
search for true signification in the world (Manuscript Diversity 113). This is not 
surprising considering that the Sendebar tradition, along with Kalilah wa-Dimna, served 
as a model for Juan Manuel (Wacks 148). Anxiety about the risks of interpreting signs, a 
“pan-European preoccupation” (De Looze, Manuscript Diversity 119), is brought to the 
forefront in Manuel’s fourteenth-century text following philosophical (Ockhamist) and 
social upheavals, though its presence in medieval thought of the previous centuries is 
apparent as we have seen.  
The particular sort of trickery implied by “engañ(ad)os” involves altered 
appearances (res significandi)—sometimes purposeful, sometimes natural—often abetted 
by the ambivalent nature of verbal signs.
186
 When it is accomplished willfully in fabliaux, 
this “quasi-magical” power of manipulation (termed “engin,” the Old French parallel for 
engaño) is an object of fascination because it generates enjoyable plots (Pearcy, 
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 The concept of engaño would be firmly identified with the duplicity of signs in Book I of the later 
Conde Lucanor (De Looze, Manuscript Diversity 120). 
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“Sentence” 232).187 However, while discussing its prevalence in romance, Robert 
Hanning remarks on “the educative function of engin” and “its effect…to heighten 
awareness” in a literary audience (123). Indeed, “aperçebir a” does not imply 
conventional instruction as much as it carries the sense of “to make aware” or “to create 
perception in” the deceived by showing examples rather than by preaching. The 
“engañados” to whom this is addressed can include members of the audience who are 
reminded of the need to carefully interpret signs in a fallen world, often through the 
vehicle of entertaining and humorous tales as in fabliaux. Keller is therefore right that 
serious moral edification is not prevalent in the collection, though practical lessons on 
semiotic interpretation saturate the text. This is surely a broader lesson of greater 
practical worth to an aristocratic audience than the limited point that women are tricky.  
 
The Prince’s Inscrutable Silence 
When narratives emphasizing the confrontation of ambiguous situations like those 
of the Engaños have appeared in other compendia, they have been seen as extolling the 
virtue of Prudence. In the quest for a holistic assessment of Spanish exemplum 
collections, James Grabowska finds prudentia at the thematic center of many medieval 
exemplum collections, noting that the prudent possess a certain perspicacity enabling 
them to anticipate future consequences based on past experience and personal 
knowledge; they then use this skill as well as the advice of friends to act wisely and 
perform good works (37-38). Citing Joseph Pieper, Margaret Parker isolates the two main 
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 As Hanning (83) notes, engin stems from the Latin ingenium. Engaño is a derivation of the Vulgar Latin 
ingannare or the Latin engannum/enganare, which also originates from ingenium according to Du Cange 
(“Ingenium”). This link is apparent in the phonetic resemblance of the words and shared definitions related 
to trickery and machinery (Jenkins 235)  
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components of Prudence as illustrated in Calila e Digna: nearly preternatural judgment 
based on “the objective perception of reality” and a “willingness to take advice from a 
desire of real understanding” which itself leads to a wise decision (67-8).  
To be sure, the counsel given to King Alcos by his privados urges prudence as, in 
fact, do the warnings of the monarch’s wicked wife; Çendubete too displays a near-
magical foresight in his apparent knowledge of the Prince’s destiny and how the crisis 
will finally play out. Yet, the Engaños does not dwell on all facets of prudentia and 
particularly not on the positive ones. Friendship barely registers in the text. Alcos never 
actively seeks understanding and he hardly weighs advice he passively receives, taking 
all counsel, good and bad, readily and equally. Nor does he consider the future, turning 
choice into definitive and right action, for he sways repeatedly between ordering and 
staying the execution of his son and sole heir.  
It seems then that the elements of Prudence identifiable in the Engaños are those 
pertaining specifically to interpretation, and the text focuses more on those challenging 
worldly conditions that require perspicacity than on illuminating some virtuous ideal. 
According to Keller and Linker, the Indian niti-shastra tradition from which works like 
the Calila e Digna and the Engaños originate, has a positive component (the wisdom of 
rulers, the communication of ideas among friends, “el uso digno de la inteligencia”) and a 
negative component: “la seguridad” (XVII). It is this last need to bolster oneself in a 
world of fallen signs that is central in the collection. Indeed, George Artola, a specialist in 
the Seven Sages tradition goes as far as to say that the Spanish version focuses on the 
aspect of deceit rather than on “demonstrating the wisdom of Çendubete and the other 
sages as emphasized in all the other texts of both Oriental and Occidental traditions” 
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(“Review” 40). In other words, the emphasis is on problems rather than solutions, not on 
Prudence as a whole but on the conditions that demand it. Along these lines, scholars like 
Harriet Goldberg have pointed to the vice of deception as the unifying principle within 
many exemplum collections. Her functional analysis of tales from the fifteenth-century 
Libro de los exenplos por a.b.c. identifies a shared interest in trickery. Given the vast 
range of sources for Sánchez de Vercial’s work, Goldberg suggests that their common 
focus must derive from “the cumulative popular tradition” and so are extensible to other 
collections (“Deception” 36). Yet, deception still fails to accommodate signs that are 
naturally ambiguous without the intervention of an active manipulator, and so the broader 
category of semiotic deceptiveness continues to be the most inclusive rubric under which 
to place tales of this sort.  
Nowhere is the connection between interpretative puzzle and didactic purpose 
more evident than in the frame story of the Engaños, specifically seven-day silence of the 
prince. In the introduction to his edition of the text, Fradejas Lebrero reads this as a 
ritualistic test for initiates, possibly of Pythagorean origin (16) and thus the last stage in 
the prince’s education. In a similar vein, since the prince has completed his studies, one 
can perceive his muteness as a form of “enlightened silence” within the Eastern 
philosophical tradition that informs the Engaños (Dauenhauser 110). However, these 
readings overlook the fact that Çendubete requests the prince’s silence for purely 
practical, not philosophical, reasons—the stars indicate his life will be in danger if he 
speaks. Should this be a test for the prince, he fails it right away, for he speaks in the 
worst possible way, telling his stepmother the exact conditions of his silence and putting 
himself at risk solely because of this.  
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If anything, the test is designed by Çendubete for Alcos and his counselors who 
are confronted with the completely indeterminate and “irrecusably polyvalent” sign of the 
silent youth (Dauenhauser 137). The master goes so far as to hide (“yo esconderme” [l. 
208]) to keep himself from being compelled to explain his charge’s behavior, which no 
one manages to read correctly: the sages wrongly speculate that the prince has been given 
a performance-enhancing drug and is now experiencing a side-effect ( ll. 222-24). Even 
the immediate interpretative task of determining whether the prince tried to rape his 
stepmother is contingent on properly deciphering his silence, as the very unwillingness to 
speak is taken by Alcos as the primary sign of guilt. Conversely, once the prince is able 
to respond, he is automatically acquitted because the king freely takes his son’s word as 
the truth. The prince’s eagerness to share his knowledge immediately before a public 
audience further discounts an equation between taciturnity and his enlightenment, 
echoing Çendubete’s statement that “the greatest wisdom in the world is to speak” 
(“mayor saber que en el mundo ay es dezir” [l. 1150]). 
The circumstance of silence thus represents a “negation of explanation” in this 
case (Dauenhauser 88), a state of indeterminate meaning without clues akin to the puzzle 
of an utterly silent Christ before Herod in the York, Wakefield, and N-Town Passion 
sequences.
188
  But, whereas Herod seeks to wrest understanding of Christ through 
interrogation and torture in the plays, here the “zones of obscurity” (Dauenhauser 23) 
created by silence cause the sages to abandon specific interpretation altogether and 
generate exempla encouraging careful analysis of signs in general. They abandon trying 
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 The original passage  in Luke states “interrogabat autem illum multis sermonibus at ipse nihil illi 
respondebat.”  Another famous medieval equation between silence and semiotic ambiguity is, as Peter L. 
Allen reminds us, the Roman de Silence, with its protagonist of ambiguous gender who is named Silence.  
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to get at the truth and instead concentrate on teaching the king how to look for it. The 
didactic focus is on the dangers of signs and the need to scrutinize them closely  
 
Dangerous Signs in the Tales 
When the actual tale telling of the sages and the king’s wife takes place, the 
emphasis is again firmly on polyvalence of signs and the risks of interpretation. This is 
immediately apparent in the first tale told to Alcos by his sages, which, as the opener, 
presumably dictates the tenor of their tale-telling enterprise as a whole. The only one to 
involve a monarch as the receiver of signs in need of interpretation, “La huella del leon” 
is chosen as the opening exemplum because “[e]l paralelismo con la conducta del rey 
Alcos es appreciable” (Lacarra 87). In it, a king is dissuaded from raping a married 
woman when he understands that the words of a book given to him by his intended victim 
are meant as advice against the impropriety of such behavior. However, in his haste to 
depart, the king leaves behind his slippers, which the woman’s husband later falsely 
interprets as a sign that she has been seduced.  To redeem their daughter, the woman’s 
family then chooses the didactic technique of an allegorical exemplum (“e agora demosle 
enxenplo” [ll. 306-07]) to reveal her husband’s fears to the king.  “If he is wise,” they 
observe, “he will understand it,” and he does (ll. 307-08).189  
In the course of this narrative, “La huella del leon” itself embodies the shifting 
nature of signification, as Biaggini points out (40-62).  It begins with a king whom we 
assume to represent Alcos.  However, as the tale develops, it becomes clear that this 
identification is false; Alcos is represented by the husband who misjudges the meaning of 
the slippers in his house as a res significans of his wife’s guilt, a parallel to Alcos’s likely 
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misunderstanding of his son’s behavior. Then, when the husband’s marital doubts are 
related to the king using the allegory of a lion that he believes has trampled through his 
field, the grounds for signification shift completely: among other representations, the 
king is signified by the lion, the wife becomes the field, and the king’s slippers become 
the tracks the lion left behind. Understanding the metaphors, the king in the tale continues 
the semiotic game and assures the husband his field is safe.  The first interpretation by the 
husband is replaced by a new one accepted as truth “parce qu'elle prend en compte la 
totalité des signes” (Biaggini 61). 
We, and perhaps Alcos himself, may have started off with a misreading of the 
privado’s equivalencies. The audience—both we and Alcos—then (hopefully) understand 
the actual intended association of Alcos with the husband of the tale as well as the 
interpretative lesson it presents.  Finally, the allegorical passage, through which the king 
evinces his mastery of reading signs, presents a model that the extra-diagetic audience 
(we and Alcos again) should strive to emulate. The ultimate point, however, embodied in 
the shifting, polyvalent nature of signs in the tale is that interpretation is tricky and that 
“[l]a vérité jaillit de la concordance des signes” (Biaggini 62).  
This notion is consistent among the remaining narratives of the Engaños. One of 
the most apparently bizarre and puzzling tales in the collection is the “Enxenplo del 
ladron e del leon, en commo cavalgo en el” (ll. 855-891), which Escobar believes “can 
not strike the reader as anything but amusing” (52). Despite this claim, the elements of 
the plot represent various aspects of semiotic interpretation that appear throughout the 
collection. In this exemplum, a thief sets out to steal an animal from a caravan during a 
night of torrential rain. Limited by great darkness (“gran escuredat”), “començo de 
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apalpar qual era la mas gruesa para levarla e puso la mano sobre un leon e non fallo 
ninguna mas gordo pezcueço que el; e cavalgo en el [“He began to feel which was the 
fattest to carry it off; he put his hand on a lion and since there was none with a fatter 
neck, he rode off on him”] (ll. 865-69). 
But just as the thief mistakes the lion for a mule, the lion apparently thinks he is 
being ridden not by a man but by the storm itself, “la tenpestad que dizen los omnes” (l. 
870). When day breaks, the thief realizes his mistake and leaps with great haste into the 
canopy of a tree, though the lion still remains ignorant concerning the nature of his rider. 
A monkey tries to show the lion the truth by pointing out the thief in his hiding place, but 
before he can do so, the thief seizes him by “los cojones” (l. 884) and kills him. The tale 
ends with the lion fleeing for his life, praying God to save him from what he still terms 
“la tenpestad.”   
Critical reactions to this tale have primarily addressed its earlier variants in the 
Eastern Seven Sages tradition (Artola, “Nature” 23-24) or have broached the incoherence 
of its narrative elements. Fradejas Lebrero, for one, points to “una cierta incongruencia” 
as to why a lion should fail to recognize a human being, and to a “contaminación” of the 
tale in the inclusion of the monkey’s ignominious death (108). Yet, these moments of 
incongruency are more than a reflection of stylistic lapse, for they highlight the issue of 
problematic interpretation in the tale and hint at its presence throughout the tales. 
First, the catalyst for the plot is the failure of both lion and thief to identify one 
another because the darkness of a stormy night impedes the ability to scrutinize visual 
signs; other signifying qualities or res significandi like a thick neck are insufficient to 
derive a correct referent. This high potential for opacity in a post-lapsarian world is, as 
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we have seen, a key aspect in the consideration of signs among fabliaux, and one of the 
primary symptoms of the Fall in patristic tradition. Of the twenty-three tales in the 
Engaños, fifteen, or approximately two-thirds, feature as their central focus signs that are 
inherently difficult to decipher.
190
  As in the tale of the thief, proper interpretation of a res 
significans can sometimes be the result of some concomitant obscurity. In “Del bañador e 
de su muger” (tale 9), for instance, a bathkeeper assumes the impotence of a corpulent 
prince whose genitals, the sign of his sexual prowess, are apparently hidden by his 
obesity; only after prostituting his wife to the prince does the bañador learn that he has 
interpreted incorrectly.  
Even in the absence of other sensory obstruction, what appears to be a reliable 
visual sign often is not. Within the supernatural context of a tale like the sixth of the 
collection, where a succubus disguises herself as a young woman, physical appearance 
remains deceptive even when directly observed. Yet, the natural world presents its own 
obstacles to interpretation, as in “Del palomo e de la paloma” (tale 15). A male dove 
warns his mate not to eat any of the fresh wheat stored in their nest, but returns to find 
some gone; after beating and pecking his mate to death for disobeying, he discovers that 
the volume of grain expands and sinks depending on the amount of moisture in the air; 
thus, natural signs, which Augustine had presented as examples of res that reveal their 
own qualities upon empirical observation in the De magistro (10.32) are not transparent 
signifiers in the Engaños.  
Often the circumstances in which a visual sign appears, rather than creating an 
accurate interpretative context, abet false understanding of a res significandum that would 
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 A sixteenth tale, the eighth in the collection, which details the magical transformation of  male into 
female, could be added to this count though arguably the change of appearance itself never comes up as a 
semiotic conundrum.  
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otherwise be open to multiple interpretation. This is the situation in the opening tale as 
well. Seen elsewhere, the “arcolcoles del rrey” (l. 304) might signify only the prior 
presence of the king, but found in the context of a married woman’s room they suggest 
adultery. So too, the thief quite reasonably assumes that among the beasts of a caravan 
any thick neck he encounters would be that of a pack animal, not a lion. 
A similar misunderstanding occurs in “Del perro e de la culebra e del niño” after a 
father leaves his infant son for a short time in the protection of his hunting dog. He 
returns home and is greeted by the dog whose muzzle is soaked with blood, a visual sign 
that could signify a number of things in the absence of a particular context. But, in the 
present circumstance which appears to include only the two parties of dog and child, the 
father immediately slays the dog for mauling his son. Only later does he find the child 
resting safely beside the corpse of a snake the dog had slain.   
  The lion’s mistaking the thief on his back for “that which men call ‘the storm’” 
marks yet another sort of interpretive error, an inability to attach the proper signifier to an 
unknown referent, in other words, a misnaming (“que dizen los omnes”).191 This 
linguistic component is absent from analogues in the contemporaneous Hebrew Mishlei 
Sendebar (ll. 616-49) and the late fourteenth-century Persian Book of Sindibad (Sindibád-
námah) (69-70), but appears in the Syriac text (mid-eighth to eleventh centuries), where 
the lion mistakes his rider for “the one of whom I have heard that people call …the night-
watchman” (120, my translation). If this misunderstanding is more plausible than that of 
the Engaños, the bizarre nature of the beast’s error in the Spanish text serves to 
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 Keller (The Book of the Wiles of Women 35) omits this connotation in his amended translation of 
“tenpestad” as “the fiend.”  Whether or not the text represents scribal misunderstanding, as Keller suggests, 
the confusion of naming remains central. 
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exaggerate his inept interpretative skills in a humorous fashion likely to draw the notice 
of an audience, thus foregrounding the breach between verbal sign and referent.  
Varieties of linguistic error feature in two other tales as well. The inexactitude of 
language appears as a danger in the “Enxenplo de…los tres dones” (tale 17) when a man 
granted three wishes by his demoness lover first asks to be gifted with women only to 
find that the non-specific nature of his request has burdened him with too many. Using 
his second wish to be rid of them, he finds he has no women at all, and so having wasted 
two of his wishes because of imprecise wording must spend the third restoring all to the 
way it was before.  
 On the other hand, rather than promoting the shortcomings of language the eighth 
tale in the collection presents a situation in which the multifarious nature of verbal signs 
proves a saving grace. A prince is tricked into drinking from a fountain that changes him 
into a woman. Because of his comeliness, he wins the sympathy of a demon who agrees 
to assume the prince’s condition temporarily while he settles his affairs. When the prince 
returns to satisfy the vow he finds the demon in the form of a pregnant woman and 
therefore argues that the terms of their oath are invalid based on the demon’s violation of 
the original wording. The demon had told the prince he would become a “dueña como tu 
eres” (l. 587) which the latter understands to mean “donzella e virgen” (“damsel and 
virgin”) excluding the condition of a “muger preñada” (pregnant woman) (ll. 594-95), 
either because the honorific “dueña” precludes pregnancy by fornication or because the 
condition of “como tu eres” (“just as you are”) no longer applies. In either case, the 
demon’s error is precipitated by the possibility of taking the same words in several ways, 
either generally or in a very exact sense. He assumes the bargain to mean that he must 
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maintain femaleness in general as opposed to a specific behavioral condition and thereby 
loses his case. Thus, polysemy provides the prince with the escape clause he needs. 
While certainly beneficial for evading demonic obligations, the subjectivity of 
language also facilitates its exploitation for purposes of deception. The intentional 
alteration of words (lies), often in conjunction with manipulated res significandi, features 
more often in the Engaños than the inherently opaque nature of signs themselves as a 
threat to interpretation. The “Enxenplo del ladron e del leon” enforces this idea through 
its monkey episode. Medieval etymologists, drawing on a perceived connection between 
simia and similtudo hominis, consistently perceived apes as “endowed with a share of that 
precious gift, ratio, which Augustine had established as the only property that 
distinguishes man from the beasts” (Janson 76). However, Augustine also established that 
understanding (intellectus) was a property of higher reasoning beyond ratio, something 
apes would not possess (In Ioannis Evangelium XV:19).  
It is not surprising, then, that monkeys were commonly affiliated with poor 
interpretation. One marginal image depicts an ape in the guise of a copyist/scribe 
misinterpreting, consciously or not, the division of “cul-pa” as an obscene pun, while 
exempla collections describe “the ape who discards the nut on account of its bitter rind,” 
a common metaphor for the exegete ignorant of deeper signification (Randall, “Exempla” 
104). Thus the ape, so frequently depicted in  manuscript illuminations, “came to signify 
the dubious status of representation itself, le singe being an anagram for le signe—the 
sign,” calling attention to the easily altered nature of words even as it “draws attention to 
the danger of mimesis or illusion” in the fallen world (Camille, Image 13).  
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Though the nature of this particular plot demands that the monkey interpret 
correctly, his fate binds him nonetheless to the notion of semiotic danger and the 
destruction of meaning. His self-appointed project in seeking out the object of the lion’s 
fear involves verifying the connection between verbal sign and physical referent through 
visual evidence. Identifying the thief in his hiding place, the monkey attaches a different 
and more appropriate signifier—“omne”—to the object that had been on the lion’s back 
(l. 882). Unfortunately, the thief undermines this effort at establishing true signification 
by killing the monkey, perpetuating the post-lapsarian detachment of sign and referent—
the lion flees in continued ignorance, calling for liberation from “the storm.” The 
monkey’s fall from the tree appropriately enough mirrors the original Fall into a world 
where the promotion of false signification is intimately allied with sin: here, murder 
precipitated by an initial theft.  
The monkey’s ignominious mode of death—by having his testicles crushed—
similarly evokes a broader association of castration with the adequacy of verbal signs. 
Language in medieval texts is commonly imagined in male sexual terms as the begetting 
of meaning. This connection is plain in a fabliau like “De pleine bourse de sens,” where 
sens is a pun referring to testes as well as to the meaning of the tale itself, as in Chrétien 
de Troye’s famous distinction between matière and sen (Bloch, Scandal 73). The 
severing of meaning from name or referent from sign, “a mutilation in language,” is a 
form of castration, as we have seen regarding the fabliaux (Bloch, Scandal 74). The well-
known debate in the Roman de la rose over whether euphemism or overt naming more 
accurately conveys the meaning of an object likewise centers on the “coilles” of the 
castrated Saturn (III, 30). “El bañador” makes a similar equivalence as the theme of 
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impotence (a metaphorical castration) propels a plot centered on misinterpretation though 
ultimately the bathkeeper himself is rendered impotent by his misreading when the prince 
beds his wife. Not coincidentally then, the thief’s detachment of meaning in the narrative 
is accompanied by his genital mutilation of the monkey who had sought to promote a true 
relationship between name and object.   
In eleven other stories, appearances are altered and/or a lie is told to abet similarly 
unsavory desires like robbery, attempted murder, rape, and adultery. In many of these 
cases, the interplay of ambiguous appearance and verbal dissimulation is emphasized 
when a lie is told to force a false interpretation of what has just been seen. Thus, the 
succubus who disguises herself as a weeping young woman in the midst of a wasteland 
explains that she is a princess who fell asleep riding her elephant and got lost from the 
rest of her traveling party. In the tale of the sex-changing fountain, the wicked counselor 
who abandons the prince explains the latter’s absence to the king by observing that he 
was likely devoured by wild beasts. And, in what is probably the most inventive 
manipulation of words and appearance in the Engaños (tale 10), a procuress woos a 
married woman for her client by first feeding her dog hot pepper which makes it weep. 
When her would-be victim wonders at the meaning of this unusual and otherwise 
inexplicable visual sign, the procuress offers up a suitable false interpretation: the dog 
was once a beautiful woman who refused the advances of a sorcerer and was 
subsequently transformed by him into the dog who now bewails her condition. The 
married woman agrees to submit to the procuress’s client for fear of suffering a similar 
fate.  
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When these various obstacles to interpretation presented in the “Enxenplo del 
ladron e del leon” are tallied across the collection, they are found in 19 of 23 tales (see 
Appendix), suggesting that the ability to gage the truth of what one sees or hears is the 
main focus of the text. Those that do not conform to the majority (“[l]as pocas 
excepciones”) either represent other minor arguments or can be owed to “las 
características de la transmission” (Lacarra 87). Whether these situations are entertaining 
and prompt laughter or not—and some are tragic as we have seen—they surely constitute 
the “narrative hinge” of the Engaños, drawing audience attention specifically to 
interpretative situations (Goldberg, “Deception” 33). If readers or listeners do laugh at 
these circumstances, they likely do so, as in fabliaux, both from the uncomfortable 
recognition that the world is replete with semiotic deceptiveness and from relief that they 
are able to see through it unlike the victims of the plots. One feels superior to those who 
remain ignorant while reserving something like awe or admiration for those who possess 
engin, “the virtue par excellence of fallen man” and use it to negotiate signs well 
(Hanning 106).
192
 As Goldberg observes, “ingenuity itself is attractive and satisfying to 
an audience which is privy to the deception, and of course, is not its target” (“Deception” 
34). An audience can recognize that they inhabit an absurdly dangerous and 
unpredictable world where signs are not what they seem and safely “draw back from the 
abyss” since what they encounter remains fictive (Dettweiler qtd. in Goldberg, “Sexual” 
73).  
If this directed interest and the responses it can awaken furnish a didacticism of 
signs in the collection, the Engaños also offers morals that reinforce what it otherwise 
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 In his consideration of fabliaux, Roy Pearcy calls this power to penetrate and make use of opaque signs 
“mana,” noting that it tends to create “intellectual fascination and the emotional pleasures of laughing at 
fellow victims and laughing with the expert practitioners of mystifying skills”  (“Sentence” 232) 
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teaches by illustration, a luxury not afforded by the fabliaux. The reasons given for telling 
the nineteen stories centered on interpretation vary, but the morals most often repeated by 
the king’s counselors and son are that women’s actions and words are not to be trusted (2, 
5, 10, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 23) and that one must weigh things carefully before acting (1, 4, 
9, 12).
193
  The king’s wife counters with several tales illustrating the untrustworthy 
advice of privy counselors (6, 8). Though nine tales put forth a possibly “antifeminist” 
message, the majority do not, so again a critique of women cannot be the unifying theme 
of the collection. Instead, these morals can be assimilated to an emphasis on the need to 
carefully decipher the meaning behind words, deeds, and scenes one encounters, to make 
indeterminate situations determinate; these purposes reinforce the content of the plots 
they summarize, which is often not the case in the fabliaux.  
Where other morals are stated in this group of tales centered on interpretation, 
they offer more general caveats like a warning against the “artes del mundo” (l. 1464, tale 
22) or an observation that the king would surely suffer should he make an error of 
judgment and execute his son (tale 15); these still do not contradict their plots detailing 
the manipulation of signs. Such a consistent narrow emphasis is not as evident in other 
major exemplum collections from medieval Spain. For instance, the twelfth-century 
Disciplina clericalis, which contains many of the same narratives as the Engaños, is a 
book of “tales, moralizations, maxims, and proverbs” (Jones and Keller 16) addressing a 
wider range of issues including the nature of friendships, the suitability of certain 
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 Tale 15, “Del palomo e de la paloma,” includes a second point reminding the king “quel engaño de las 
mugeres es la mayor cosa del mundo” (ll. 920-21), which has no relevance to the story preceding it unlike 
its first moral. Keller omits it from his English translation, presumably because it is a scribal interpolation. I 
therefore exclude it from those tales reiterating the manipulative power of women. Another tale (number 7), 
of the honey drop that caused a war, concludes with the notion that one ought to learn the truth before 
acting and so might be added to this group. Since its plot does not seem to offer this possibility, I do not 
count it at all among the nineteen narratives that deal with interpretation. 
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associations (I, II) and proper table manners (XXVI) alongside ruminations on mortality 
(XXXIII). The later Conde Lucanor likewise treats a variety of conundrums related to 
statecraft including relations with neighbors (39), acquiring land (12), and coping with 
territorial crises (37).  
 
The Insufficiency of Verbal Instruction 
The purpose of an exemplum collection like the Engaños, and, as I have shown, 
of medieval doctrina more generally, is not only teaching a particular lesson but 
“drawing attention in more explicit fashion to the process of teaching and acquiring 
understanding” itself (Weiss 7). This second facet is made apparent in the emphasis on 
the pairings of Çendubete/the prince and privados/Alcos, in other words on the 
“dynamics of the relationship between master and pupil” that become an opportunity to 
explore the nature and limits of instruction (Weiss 7). Ultimately, the central point of the 
Engaños concerning instruction is that the difficulty presented by signs manifests itself in 
a failure even to teach the need for interpretation; despite Çendubete’s flattering of 
Alcos’s “entendimiento” and “enseñamiento” (1113) to deflect blame from himself, there 
is little evidence that the monarch has internalized the perspicacity recommended in the 
tales told to him. Based on his pattern of fluctuation between ordering death and reprieve, 
Alcos would likely have changed his mind in favor of execution once more upon hearing 
another narrative from his wife if the prince had not begun speaking again. Thus, the tale-
telling exercise succeeds only in instituting delay, not in inculcating an understanding of 
interpretation. As the king himself admits, only by the grace of God did he not execute 
his son (ll. 1104-05).  
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By attributing the resolution of the crisis to divine intervention, Alcos introduces 
what appears to be the broader pessimistic point about interpretation in the text: because 
signs are so ambiguous, complete understanding is rarely, if ever, possible through purely 
intellectual means. The “[r]idiculous and even hilarious” nature of the king’s vacillation, 
its repetitive outlandishness, which seems to undermine the didacticism of the Engaños, 
actually directs considerable attention to the limits of learning from the verbal signs of 
exempla (Keller, “The Literature of Recreation” 198). No matter how strongly 
convincing or poorly related a particular tale is, for the king “toute narration lui semble 
valide” (Biaggini 15); every story told sways Alcos either to condemn or spare his son.  
Moreover, when the prince finally speaks, he clears himself of his stepmother’s 
accusation not by any demonstrative argument but simply by declaring himself. Because 
words, for Alcos, seem to have this “vertu d'auto-légitimation” they ultimately have little 
signifying force and interpretation does not take place (Biaggini 15). Indeed, the tales are 
interchangeable and are often reordered or attributed variously to the king’s wife or his 
advisors in other versions of the collection (Weisl-Shaw 736). 
The monarch’s ineptitude reflects a textual emphasis on the impossibility of 
complete comprehension. This point is reinforced in a crucial section of the frame story 
when the central predicament has been solved and the court is engaged in reflecting on its 
lessons. Alcos seeks to prolong the interpretative exercise by asking who would have 
been blameworthy had he executed his son. His sages posit various individuals—the 
wife, the king, Çendubete, the prince—but again can come to no definitive answer, so the 
prince enthusiastically offers to show off his knowledge (“mostrar mi fazienda e mi 
rrazon” [l. 1155]) concerning the puzzle. This is significant because, having attained 
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complete enlightenment, there was “no one in the world wiser than he” [“en el 
mundo…non ay mas sabio que el”] (l. 1202); thus, it is a reasonable expectation that his 
exempla, also the last told in the collection, represent the crystallization of his wisdom, 
meant to sum up the meaning of the work in some way.
194
 
The first tale he tells is another slightly more complex version of the same puzzle; 
this time a number of guests at a feast are killed by drinking milk brought by a maid who 
did not notice venom drip into it from a snake held in the talons of a raptor flying 
overhead. After soliciting various guesses from the sages on who is to blame, the prince 
observes that no one is since it was simply time for each of the victims to die. The ability 
to make rational judgments from evidence is summarily negated, replaced by fatalistic 
submission to the mystery of difficult res significandi that is hyperbolically lauded as the 
pinnacle of wisdom. The lesson of this game, and of semiotic deceptiveness in the 
collection as a whole, thus involves recognizing that conventional interpretation can 
collapse in the face of difficult signs. Interpretations remain multiple and not one can be 
said to represent authoritative truth. 
This point is also made earlier and most obviously in the final tale told by the 
sages. Combining manipulated appearance with a direct consideration of interpretative 
limitations, this narrative acts as a bridge to the discussion of the concluding frame. In it, 
a scholar who has dedicated himself to studying the wiles of women is tricked by the wife 
of the man with whom he is lodging. Realizing that he has wasted his time seeking what 
he assumed was complete understanding, something no man alive can fully comprehend, 
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what the sages know (126). In the Hebrew Mishlei Sendebar he tells no tales at all. It is not known, of 
course, what is in the Arabic text. 
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he burns all of his books (ll. 1059-63).  Despite being voiced by one of the king’s 
advisers, this tale is emblematic of what Keller considers a humorous satire of sages in 
the work, though its emphasis on scholarly ineptitude makes a philosophical point that 
ranges beyond simple mockery (“The Literature of Recreation” 197). The remarkable 
failure to interpret correctly among those who are supposed to be learned constitutes the 
rejection of a purely rational approach to deceptive signs. This extends to conventional 
didactic methods as well: the scholar who desires to master the deceits of women finds 
only imperfect understanding in books, and Alcos never learns perspicacity by listening 
to the exempla told to him, for the verbal signs used for instruction are subject to the 
same limitations as other fallen signs. Their truthfulness, for instance, can vary depending 
on the reliability of the teller, which is difficult to assess; the king’s duplicitous wife can 
tell stories containing useful lessons about the need to scrutinize advice while lying about 
the privados and the prince, rendering the didactic value of her words suspect. 
Conversely, there is no assurance that well-crafted arguments told truthfully are 
more efficacious. The very first story of a ruler who is an expert interpreter, recognizing 
both the intention and meaning of exemplum told to him, is clearly meant to furnish a 
model for what Alcos himself needs to do. He changes his mind after hearing the tale, but 
had he truly achieved the perspicacity suggested by the narrative, multiple iterations of 
the same advice would not be needed later. The telling would have ended where it began. 
As it is, if a transparent point in a well-crafted tale is not internalized, there is little hope 
that verbal signs themselves can teach.  
Perhaps the error of the initial tale lay in its inclusion of good advice from a 
woman, which primes Alcos for his wife’s competing narrative. The queen is able to 
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undo the sages’ teachings with her first foray and can convince by telling one tale to 
every two related by the privados, a total of only four additional tales (3, 6, 8, 11, 14) to 
their thirteen. Often her tales are of “relatively poor narrative quality…far shorter and 
less developed” than those of the sages like the incongruous tale of the Boar and the Ape 
(11) that is a mere nine lines long (Weisl-Shaw 735). Moreover, she often convinces 
Alcos of his son’s guilt entirely on the basis of pathos rather than verba. In tale 11, the 
king is swayed only because he is afraid his wife will take the poison she is carrying in 
her hand, not because of any logical arguments she makes (“ovo miedo el rrey que se 
mataria con el tosigo que tenia en la mano” [ll. 739-40]).195 In fact, she dispenses with 
tale-telling altogether on the seventh day and simply makes preparations to burn herself 
alive, which brings the prince closest to being executed (ll. 950-54). This spectacular act 
is equally if not more successful than any persuasive narrative. These instances further 
diminish the value of exempla, as the quality of instruction is not the final arbiter of how 
well one obtains interpretative skill; rather, the talent of perspicacity seems fully 
dependent on individual capacity, which appears to be a pre-existing quality. Simply put, 
some get it and some do not, in a manner quite similar to Augustine’s Platonic conception 
of understanding in the De magistro where “an individual cannot be taught truth, only led 
to discover it within himself by means of his intellect” (Gerli, “Recta voluntas” 503). 
This point is made in the remaining tales of the concluding frame. 
After revealing his wisdom, the prince acknowledges that there are two in the 
world wiser than he: a four- and five-year old child whose stories he then narrates (ll. 
1208-09). There is no inclusion of children in the variants of Mishlei Sendebar (Epstein 
285) and the Syriac text simply introduces them and an old man as examples of others 
                                                 
195
 The queen similarly begins tale 6 by weeping and ends it with a threat to kill herself.  
  215 
who are wise (127). Indicating that children of these particular ages are the wisest 
essentially proclaims the inspired nature of understanding and the superiority of 
knowledge that comes without formal education; the prince only begins his studies “a 
edat de nueve años” (l.88), at which time he still fails to learn anything. Çendubete is able 
to succeed years later not because he is necessarily a wiser instructor but because he 
allows the prince to teach himself: the initiative lies entirely with the student. The 
philosopher’s method involves allowing the boy to absorb on his own the information 
written and drawn on the walls of his sumptuous classroom; and, because the prince is 
already “de buen engeño and de buen entendymiento” (ll. 183-84, my emphasis), he is 
guaranteed to learn. Like engin and its Latin root ingenium, engeño implies an “innate or 
natural quality,” a pre-possessed genius that empowers the prince’s learning much as 
natural ingenuity enables some to negotiate signs in the tales while others remain 
ignorant (“Ingenium”).196  But if the nearly supernatural engaño is an ambivalent skill in 
the exempla, the equally intangible engeño reflects its positive equivalent in the process 
of comprehension.  
Ultimately, placing the burden of understanding (to whatever extent it is possible) 
on the learner resolves the paradox of using a text comprised of verbal signs in need of 
interpretation to teach the difficulties of interpreting signs, and of using tale-telling to 
illustrate the didactic insufficiency of the tale-telling enterprise. This conception of 
instruction also results in a didactic mode like that of the Engaños “characterized by its 
ambiguity and absence of direct admonition” (Gerli, “Recta voluntas” 504). The creators 
or translators of the work can present illustrative stories and statements of purpose 
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 This emphasis on the prince’s mental capability is absent from the Syriac (101) and Hebrew versions 
(ll.136-39). 
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emphasizing the component of semiotic interpretation, but there will always be the 
possibility of missed and multiple readings: those who perceive only the literal content 
(figured elsewhere in medieval poetics as the nutshell) and those who penetrate the 
surface plots to grasp some kernel of meaning beneath.
197
 The vision we are left with by 
the frame and its diegesis is “one in which certain rare people just ‘know’ what things 
mean” whereas others simply do not “get it” (De Looze, Manuscript Diversity 121).   
If Alfonso “El Sabio” and his learned court were sophisticated readers who 
“realized that any book could have a variety of meanings,” we may wonder to what 
degree this immediate audience saw beyond the recreational to the interpretative focus in 
the collection (Keller, Alfonso 55). The timing of the translation right after Alfonso’s 
coronation makes it tempting to surmise that the lessons of the Engaños were intended by 
Infante Fadrique for a very specific audience: as a speculum principis for the new king of 
Castile, Léon, and Galicia. Perhaps the otherwise “irresponsible and unstudious” 
Fadrique, recognizing some fraternal tension and his older brother’s penchant for Arabic 
popular tales after the recent translation of Kalilah wa-Dimna, wished to encourage 
perspicacity in rulership especially where he was concerned (Keller, Alfonso 52). 
Eventually the “story of a power struggle at court” represented in the frame of the 
Engaños would play out in the succession disputes and revolts that marred Alfonso’s 
later reign, with disastrous results for the Infante (Deyermond, “El libro” 160). Fadrique 
was compelled to seek exile in Tunis with his other brother, Enrique, and, though he 
reconciled with the king in 1272,  met his demise five years later, executed on the basis 
of the king’s interpretation of res significandi (O’Callaghan 241). According to 
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 The analogy  is at least as old as pseudo-Fulgentius’s Super Thebiaden, which observes that “[j]ust as 
there are two parts to a nut, the shell and the kernel, so there are two parts to poetic compositions, the literal 
and the allegorical meaning” (239). 
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Ballesteros, the increasingly irrational Alfonso arrested and hanged his brother out of fear 
that a close relative would lead a revolt against the throne, a prediction that he had 
ironically “learned by means of astrology” like his astrologically inclined counterpart in 
the Engaños (qtd in Keller, Engaños 55 n. 35). In this case, however, no tale-telling 
endeavor would delay the king’s interpretation of the prince’s behavior. 
The ongoing debate over the purpose of the Libro de los engaños has itself 
generated multiple critical readings overlooking the didacticism of signs in the text; these 
hardly bear fatal consequences.  Nevertheless, reading the book in light of semiotic 
interpretation offers a valuable means of approaching the themes of deception and 
prudence identified in the major Spanish exemplum collections such as the Conde 
Lucanor and on their overall instruction. Critics like E. Michael Gerli have also looked 
closely at Juan Ruiz’s Libro de buen amor for its “fascination with the ambiguities of its 
own meaning,” its exploration of “the temporal nature and limits of language,” yet this 
same exploration also takes place in the Engaños (“The Greeks, the Romans, and the 
Ambiguity of Signs” 418). Like the Archpriest’s text, the Engaños is “both jokebook and 
textbook” and also should be situated within the broader medieval interest in semiotics 
and particularly in the fallen nature of signs (Catherine Brown 118). Edmund Reiss’s 
words concerning the Libro de buen amor—“wisdom comes about through recognizing 
complexity, not through insisting that it be removed; through realizing that apparent 
signification is not necessarily final or total signification; and through acknowledging 
that myrth and doctrine remain intertwined” (134) could very well be describing the 
Enganos. Recognizing this sort of message earlier in medieval Spanish literature 
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confirms the extent of this focus in didactic genres ranging beyond the doctrinal 
instruction of religious drama to the practical lessons of the popular tradition. 
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CONCLUSION: CONTEMPORARY RESONANCE 
 
The popularity of medieval religious drama as a didactic form, the prolific 
representation of fabliaux in manuscripts, and the broad appeal of tales from the Spanish 
exemplum collections provide a vast ground in which to examine the importance of 
teaching semiotic interpretation during the Middle Ages. These genres evince 
Augustinian preoccupations with how to communicate meaning through signs even as the 
primary meaning they offer is the skill of interpreting signs itself, whether for the purpose 
of salvation in religious drama or the practical function of negotiating a fallen world in 
fabliaux and exempla. This includes an equally Augustinian interest in exploring the 
relative efficacy of verbal versus visual signs in the communicative process as well as a 
concern with the pedagogical merit of the literary medium.  
Beyond their usefulness for our understanding of medieval didacticism, these 
genres anticipate important questions that continue to be a part of pedagogy and 
communication theory to the present day, particularly in an age where visual media are 
increasingly employed in the creation of meaning. The debate over the didactic value of 
fictive forms, for example, and the role of visuals, including graphic ones, in learning, 
persists today. A recent example of violent imagery in the service of doctrina is Mel 
Gibson’s The Passion of the Christ, a piece of contemporary filmmaking that most 
closely resembles a medieval Passion play. In fact, when examining the parallel of the 
movie to its forebears, Jennifer Trafton comments explicitly on the old issue of generic 
appropriateness for instruction: “To what extent the medium of drama-whether on a 
portable stage in medieval England or on the big screen of a modern movie theater-can 
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and should be used to tell the Christian story is a question still worth debating.” Beyond 
the issue of genre, much of the controversy over this film related to its extreme violence. 
Critic Roger Ebert called it “the most violent film I have ever seen” (41) while New York 
Times reviewer A.O. Scott remarked that it “essentially consists of a man being beaten, 
tortured and killed in graphic and lingering detail” (E1). At the heart of the negative 
polemic is the gratuity of Gibson’s violence, called by some “a kind of pornographic 
catalogue of Christ’s sufferings” that threatens to overwhelm the message of the movie 
(qtd.. in Goodacre 34).  
However, even in the face of such criticisms, there is also recognition that Gibson 
“has exploited the popular appetite for terror and gore for what he and his allies see as a 
higher end” (Scott E5). This appears to be the promulgation of Christian instruction 
through a contemporary affective piety that can only be achieved through visual 
spectacle. As Scott observes, “By rubbing our faces in the grisly reality of Jesus' death 
and fixing our eyes on every welt and gash on his body, this film means to make literal an 
event that the Gospels often treat with circumspection and that tends to be thought about 
somewhat abstractly. Look, the movie seems to insist, when we say he died for our sins, 
this is what we mean” (E1). In so doing, he has “departed radically from the tone and 
spirit of earlier American movies about Jesus, which have tended to be palatable (if often 
extremely long) Sunday school homilies” (Scott E1). In other words, Gibson has not only 
selected the visual medium to best achieve doctrinal instruction; he has also innovated the 
use of ultra-violent imagery in a manner of medieval religious drama to drive his message 
home and make it unforgettable. Thus, the technique of the shockingly gory image as an 
exemplary mnemonic device finds new life at the movies.  
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Though The Passion of the Christ may have created potential opportunities for 
direct Christian instruction via the big screen in the future, the likelihood of this 
happening on a wide scale is slim. However, there is no doubt that the makers of visual 
media, both moving and static, continue to draw on the lessons of the artes memoriae 
beyond the violent scene, particularly in the arena of advertising. The notion that sexual 
images sell products and that such images are prevalent in ad culture needs little support, 
though their connection to the mnemonic imagery offered in manuals like the Rhetorica 
ad Herennium, thirteenth-century marginalia, and the fabliaux deserves mentioning.  
Even the idea that strange or unusual images provide the best value for 
recollection has a place in contemporary visual advertising. As Paul Messaris observes 
“[i]n a medium whose very essence is the ability to reproduce the look of everyday 
reality, one of the surest ways of attracting the viewer’s attention is to violate that reality” 
(5). A spate of television viewing quickly reveals that “some violation of physical reality 
is a very common convention in advertising”: a man’s touch turns everything to Skittles 
candies, a talking gecko interacts with human co-workers as he sells car insurance, and a 
young man transforms into Betty White on the football field (Messaris 10). Though the 
specific purpose in such cases is neither to bolster a rhetorician’s memory nor to implant 
instruction in a student’s mind but to sell products and services, an ancient recall 
technique continues to be used, though now with the added justification of science. 
Cognitive psychologist  Roger Shepard explains that if we encounter “an object that is 
novel and yet similar” to something we know in reality, like a face or body that is 
somehow morphed by software, in essence something surreal, our brains are programmed 
to take notice (qtd. in Messaris 8).  
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The need to get attention and remain memorable is in these cases a function of the 
sheer pervasiveness of images in contemporary American culture. As a nation, “we are 
exposed to hundreds, even thousands of images and ideas not only from television but 
now also from newspaper headlines, magazine covers, movies, websites, photos, video 
games and billboards” on a daily basis, all clamoring for attention (Stokes 13). This 
differs considerably from the experience of people during the Middle Ages, who, 
“depending on the social class to which they belonged, may have seen only the relatively 
few images in their local church throughout their lives” (Miles, Image 9).  In light of the 
ubiquity of images, the exploration of visual signs vis-à-vis verbal language and the 
communicative power of verba visibilia that so interested the makers of medieval 
didactic genres is all the more relevant today. 
Contemporary images are “so compelling that we cannot not watch them. They 
are so seductive that they have revolutionized human social communication. Oral and 
written communication are in decline because a new form of communication, 
communication by image, has emerged” (Davis). Cultural critic Sut Jhally goes so far as 
to propose that media images, specifically those circulated on television, serve as the 
primary venue for our making of meaning, how we “arrive at answers to the questions of 
who we are, where we fit in and how the world works.”   
Why has this happened?  First, we have the widespread availability and popularity 
of visual media like television, films, and websites for both entertainment and 
information. Technology makes the further promulgation of images easier than ever 
before. Anyone with a computer and basic software can create and edit photographs and 
video, then add his or her content to the existing body of image culture. With 
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globalization and the concomitant need for interaction, images become sort of a universal 
idiom with fewer communicative impediments than words, as can be seen in the 
language-independent visual assembly instructions of multi-national corporation IKEA. 
Ultimately, though, the motivation lies once more in the brain. 
Visual communications scholar Anne Marie Barry has presented research 
showing that images and even verbal imagery (such as Augustine’s woman with teeth 
“like a flock of shorn ewes” from Song of Songs) are more readily accepted and 
processed by the human brain, whereas ordinary written text, “experientially remote and 
less directly emotionally involving” than images is not (56). Such findings show that 
human evolution built brains “to process visual images with great speed and alacrity. 
They did not evolve written verbal symbols in the same way” (Barry 56).  
But perhaps the most direct cognitive support for Augustine’s privileging of 
imagery in learning comes in the dual-coding theory promoted by Allan Paivio.  Widely 
supported by numerous empirical studies involving students (Sadoski and Paivio Chapter 
8), this idea holds, in simplified terms, that verbal imagery is encoded twice by the brain, 
once in the visual and once in the verbal memory. This quality leads to greater retention 
and recall with profound implications for educational psychology.  Such neurological and 
cognitive research on human perception “adds new medical information to the study of 
visual communication and helps us assess the efficacy of existing theories of 
communication,” in this case, the Augustinian notion that verba visibilia come closer to 
natural language (Barry 45). Augustine’s supposition has been credited by neuroscience, 
and the contest between verbal and visual signs seems on the verge of being settled. 
Indeed, even as he remarks on the rapid decline of reading in The Rise of the Image, the 
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Fall of the Word, Mitchell Stephens expresses enthusiasm about the communicative 
possibilities of video as a replacement (8-11).  
If “[i]mages are fast replacing words as our primary language” as contemporary 
trends suggest, we must continue to examine the interpretation of visual signs and be 
concerned with developing and teaching this skill as was done in religious drama, 
fabliaux, and exempla (Avedon qtd. in Stephens, The Rise 11). And so, “we are presented 
with a new set of challenges: to understand how images and their viewers make 
meaning…and to consider what it means to negotiate so many images in our daily lives” 
(Sturken and Cartwright 1). For the authors of medieval didactic genres that 
foregrounded interpretation, negotiating signs meant recognizing the inherent semiotic 
dangers in a fallen world, and similar risks must be addressed today with the 
multiplication of visual signs. 
Primary among these is the misconception that images are perfect and vastly 
superior to words in their communicative power when visuals are also easily 
manipulated. The same technology that enables home users to create visuals also 
facilitates their manipulation. Photo-editing software, like Adobe Photoshop, “in effect, 
democratizes the ability to commit fraud” (Rosen 52). Numerous examples exist of 
doctored photographs purported to be real and circulated online, most famously those of a 
tourist atop the World Trade Center on 9-11 as a terrorist-piloted aircraft bears down on 
him and a great white shark attacking a military helicopter: 
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(“Tourist Guy,” “Helicopter Shark”) 
Such examples of pranks or demonstrations of photo-editing talent are relatively 
harmless when compared to the manipulation of photos for political purposes as occurred 
in 2004 when Democratic Presidential candidate John Kerry was added to a photo of Jane 
Fonda at a Vietnam-War-era protest (Hafner G11) or when commited by journalists like 
Adnan Hajj, who increased the amount of smoke in an image of Beirut following Israeli 
bombing in 2006 (Malkin 11).  
 (Casimiro 76)  
 
(“Fake Smoke Over Beirut.”) 
The implications of belief in such cases are potentially more serious. As Ken 
Light, who took the original photo of Kerry, asked, ''What if that photo had floated 
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around two days before the general election and there wasn't time to say it's not true?” 
(qtd. in Hafner G11). Doctored photos are not new, of course—dictators like Mao 
Zedong and Josef Stalin famously airbrushed former friends turned political enemies out 
of photographs—but the digitization of images, the ease of making sophisticated 
forgeries and circulating them widely present a particular challenge, especially when 




Beyond photo alteration, professionally produced computer generated images 
(CGI) continue to blur the boundaries between virtual and simulated reality, as recently 
witnessed in the movie Avatar. Meanwhile, so-called “reality television” is manipulated 
in the editing room to make situations more dramatic as the need requires to “preserve an 
illusion: that the shows are authentic and true to life” (Poniewozik). The end result is that 
“[w]e may find ourselves in a world where…our understanding and acceptance of what 
we see is questionable” (Rosen 48). Here the biology of the human mind is a negative 
factor, for although images may be handled better than words in the brain, “visual 
messages are mostly processed by the unconscious regions of the brain that do not 
understand that art and mass media are not reality” (Barry 65). In other words, we tend to 
accept what we see on television or in photographs as “direct copies of reality” the way 
we would something we encounter in the physical world (Messaris vi). And so, the 
“adage ‘seeing is believing’ is often applied, not just to natural objects that are being 
directly perceived, but often to visual representations of objects, people, and events, as 
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 On Stalin’s manipulation of photographs, see David King’s The Commissar Vanishes: the Falsification 
of Photographs and Art in Stalin's Russia, New York: Metropolitan Books, 1997. 
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well” (Hill 124). The warnings of fabliaux and the Libro de los Engaños to exercise 
caution in apprehending visual signs are clearly pertinent in today’s image culture. 
The tendency to see and believe may be particularly prevalent among those of the 
generation who have been exposed to the intensification of visual culture during their 
formative years. Charles Hill, for one, identifies a dearth of interpretative ability among 
college students when it comes to analyzing images. Speaking not only of falsified 
visuals but of those designed to persuade, Hill observes that “[w]hile we are all being 
increasingly exposed to highly manipulated images meant to influence our beliefs, 
opinions, and behaviors, very few of us are adequately prepared to analyze and critique 
these images in order to make informed decisions about them. In fact, many people seem 
unaware of the rhetorical power of images and of their mediated nature” (119). Camille 
Paglia further remarks that “young people today are flooded with disconnected images 
but lack a sympathetic instrument to analyze them as well as a historical frame of 
reference in which to situate them” (qtd. in Rosen 55).  
Given this deficiency, interpretative skills need to be taught to negotiate the visual 
signs dominating the cultural landscape, a desideratum met by calls for hands-on 
instruction in visual literacy where currently there is “a neglect of the visual” in college 
curricula (Hill 124). “Since so many of the texts that our students encounter are visual 
ones, and since visual literacy is becoming increasingly important for everyday social 
functioning and even for success in the workplace,” Hill writes, “it would seem obvious 
that our educational institutions should be spending at least as much time and energy on 
developing students' visual literacies as these institutions spend on developing students' 
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textual literacy” (124).199 Douglas Kellner echoes this idea as part of his general 
emphasis on fostering at an early age multiple literacies appropriate to contemporary life 
(visual, computer, media, environmental, and multicultural literacy among them) beyond 
the logocentrism of education solely “organized around books and gaining literacy in 
reading and writing” (“Reading” 33). This develops “a group of competencies that allows 
humans to discriminate and interpret the visible action, objects, and/or symbols, natural 
or constructed, that they encounter in the environment” (Education Resources 
Information Center [ERIC] qtd.. in Stokes 12). Essentially, we have an urgent call to 
expand semiotic instruction.  
The ultimate goal is a practical one notably similar to the didactic purpose I have 
identified in Spanish exempla (and Old French fabliaux): to furnish a kind of “sabiduria 
práctica” useful for living in a world of signs (Lacarra 192). As Paul Willemen asserts, 
“education must concentrate, not on the transfer of information nor on the reproduction of 
value systems, but on the urgent task of equipping people with the necessary ‘thinking 
tools’… so that individuals may become better at assessing the ‘likely’ verisimilitude of 
any account or representation of the world,” in essence to interpret signs (20). Instructors 
who teach interpretation “are teaching a way of experiencing the world, a way of 
ordering and making sense of it” (Berlin qtd. in Duffelmeyer and Ellertson). Such an aim 
recalls the project of medieval authors engaging a nominalist world full of duplicitous 
signs; though some of the philosophical underpinnings have changed, the semiotic 
anxiety remains.  
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 A contrary view is expressed by Stephens, who suggests that we already are capable of understanding 
what is real and what isn’t in media: “We already watch movies in which bicycles fly and television 
commercials in which it snows in the desert. For most of us, seeing has already stopped being exactly 
equivalent to believing” (“Let Pictures Speculate” 115).  
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Along with this conception of educational content comes an alteration of 
pedagogical approach. Just as medieval religious drama used verba visibilia (props, 
gesture, scene) to promote the didactic value of visual signs in teaching semiotic 
interpretation, contemporary instructors are urged to “evolve teaching methods that 
[appeal] to students’ visual literacy as a means of cultivating greater verbal literacy” and 
presumably visual literacy as well (Wack 64). This goes beyond running the occasional 
in-class film to the deep integration of visual media with the aim of making “complex 
subject matter accessible and engaging” for students accustomed to images as the 
dominant mode of expression in their lives (Kellner, “Multiple Literacies” 114). Studies 
show the effectiveness of visual media in achieving these aims; Stokes (14-16) describes 
a half dozen that illustrate concretely how “using visual treatments in lessons enhances 
learning” to varying degrees (14). These range from better conceptual understanding 
when reading a summary with visuals as opposed to one without to improved learning of 
facts through graphics. Evidence like this is hardly surprising given the long-held belief 
in the pedagogical usefulness of images and recent neurological findings about how the 
brain processes them. 
For all its proposed benefits, the increased reliance on visual signs for 
communication, in which education also participates, is not without its detractors. One 
concern about this expanded role is that the sheer proliferation of images will diminish 
their emotional impact, that is, their ability to get attention and be evocative and 
memorable. Writing twenty-five years ago, Margaret Miles warned that “our capacity for 
vision is—or will shortly be – congenitally fatigued by the sheer volume of images with 
which most modern people cope” (Image 9). Rosen cites the repetitive replaying of the 
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World Trade Center bombing to the point where a horrific scene is rendered 
commonplace, but her point applies equally to the depiction of graphic violence and 
sexuality: images “have, by their sheer number and ease of replication, become less 
magical and less shocking—a situation unknown until fairly recently in human history” 
(46). In a nutshell, viewers are becoming jaded, a development that targets the very 
characteristics responsible for the expansion of visual signs in the first place; whether 
saturation of images will reach a critical mass upon which they lose their efficacy 
remains to be seen.  
Another prominent criticism is one that revisits Augustinian concerns of genre (in 
this case, medium) and, specifically, the concept of usus versus fructus concerning the 
content of television. The nature of the objection, expressed most vocally by the late Neil 
Postman in Amusing Ourselves to Death, is that visuals on television are not conducive to 
communicating meaningful content. The problem lies in the expectations of those 
viewing the medium, which are to be entertained above all. Catering to this desire, 
information on television--whether in a political debate, a newscast, or a documentary--is 
presented as a series of brief snippets without sufficient (read: boring) context, 
sensationalized, and dramatized toward the end of entertainment. Thus, it is impossible to 
arrive at any depth, since in the pursuit of creating amusement for its audience even the 
content of televised news is “decontextualized and discontinuous, so that the possibility 
of anyone’s knowing about the world [through it] as against merely knowing of it, is 
effectively blocked” (Postman 113).  
At its crux, this is a matter of superficiality: the issue is that “‘good’ television has 
little to do with what is ‘good’ about exposition or other forms of verbal communication 
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but everything to do with what the pictorial images look like” (Postman 88). Postman is 
not speaking specifically about fictive forms or literature, but his points echo Augustine’s 
objections to fabulae as a venue for instruction. Because audiences view television as 
amusement they focus only on surface appearance at the expense of any depth. It is 
difficult, in other words, to delve below the veneer of entertainment and extract any 
meaningful information from TV.  
Postman also explicitly extends these concerns to education via television, as in 
children’s shows broadcast on public stations. To him, the medium is simply 
inappropriate for instruction; regardless of whether a program like Sesame Street teaches 
children the alphabet, it first teaches them the larger lesson to assume school will be like 
television—“that teaching and entertainment are inseparable”—which Postman sees as a 
concept unprecedented in the history of educational theory (146). This desire for constant 
entertainment presents a competing notion of what ordinarily takes place in schools and 
is responsible for a number of social ills including an inability to engage in activities 
centered “around the slow-moving printed word” (Postman 145). And, indeed, today’s 
students “very quickly can become bored by slow-moving, traditional lectures and static 
textbooks; and effecting learning has become even more difficult” (Howard et al 432).  
It is difficult to make a case, despite the apparent decline of logocentric learning, 
that words will cease to be used either in education or in contemporary society, that 
reading or the teaching of verbal literacy will come to an end. Until we develop some sort 
of mental communication such as the pre-lapsarian inner language envisioned by 
Augustine, words always will remain necessary in communication even if their role is 
diminished. We will never be “forced to communicate via gesture and expression rather 
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than language” (Rosen 47). The push among proponents of visual media in instruction 
conceive of it not as a replacement for words but as a supplement to a curriculum 
grounded in verba, a supplement that aims to “achieve an optimal balance between verbal 
and visual cues in education, interdependence between the two modes of thought” 
(Stokes 11). Particularly in the study of literary texts, verbal signs will remain primary, 
but multimedia can be used to enhance “the comprehension of historical, social, and 
material contexts, which in turn facilitates informed analysis of the texts” themselves 
(Williams 81). A upper-level course in Anglo-Saxon literature, for example, can involve 
teaching with digitized sources enriched with multimedia content such as the Electronic 
Beowulf, which includes individual manuscript facsimile pages alongside an edition that 
provides a glossary, word definitions, Old English grammar, and translation on mouse-
over as well as links to additional resources. In this case, students still learn to read and 
interpret a written text but have the material supplemented with enhanced, primarily 
visual content “to learn more thoroughly” (“addiscere” in the words of Gregory the 
Great) (XI, 10:23).  
 
Screenshot of Electronic Beowulf 3.0 (“Studying Beowulf”) 
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Part of the balance between textual and visual instruction also involves 
developing an educational approach that counteracts the dangers of television. Drama 
was also considered dangerous for Christians on account of its surface fructus until 
Hrotsvit “despoiled” the form for Christian indoctrination, a project that would later 
evolve into its widespread usus for semiotic instruction. Just as medieval religious drama 
brought a visual medium into the service of teaching interpretation, television can be used 
in a classroom environment as a tool to create critical awareness of what television and 
media in general do. Rather than preaching a reactionary return to purely verbal 
instruction, educators like Kellner propose to “teach students to read, analyze, and decode 
media texts, in a fashion parallel to the cultivation of print literacy” (“Multiple 
Literacies” 113). There is little chance of visual culture disappearing and so the most 
appropriate response is to enlist it toward optimizing doctrina, the paramount didactic 
consideration now as it was for Augustine and his medieval followers.  
Learning how to use, teach about, interpret, and negotiate signs remains a 
requisite skill set, an indispensable foundation for the formation of an effective teacher 
and an educated student alike, whether addressing Scripture, literature, or empirical 
reality. When we teach students, they must interpret our signs, and our pedagogical 
rhetoric—the media we choose to present our ideas—is no less determined by the desire 
to maximize student understanding. Nor are we liberated from the concerns with 
signification first voiced by Augustine. How to achieve success in semiotic instruction is 
a pedagogical concern that foregrounds the continued relevance of questions first posed 
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